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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the structure of legal bases according to competences, instruments, 
and procedures; as well as legal basis litigation in the European Union before and after 
the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon. Its main contribution lies in the analysis of 
general criteria for legal basis litigation as they have been developed under 
supranational EU law. It discovers several flaws inherited in the quest for the correct 
legal basis on the grounds of overlapping competences, divergent inter-institutional 
interests, and inconsistencies in the courts’ judgements. In addition, the previous pillar 
structure of the EU has also led to cross-pillar litigation which is particularly the case in 
the area of external relations. 
With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, the previous pillar structure has been 
abolished and the former third pillar has been integrated into the realm of supranational 
EU law. While the intergovernmental sphere is thus minimised to the area of common 
foreign and security policy, legal basis conflicts will continue to occur between this area 
and the TFEU as well as within the TFEU itself. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty has even 
created new problems concerning the choice of the correct legal basis, most notably as 
regards the newly codified competence categories as well as the new hierarchy of legal 
instruments. This may require the development of new criteria for legal basis litigation 
in order to guarantee legal certainty in these areas for future cases. 
  
6 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACP ........................................... African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group 
Art ............................................. Article 
CFI ............................................ Court of First Instance 
CFSP ......................................... Common Foreign and Security Policy 
DHS ........................................... Department of Homeland Security 
EAEC ........................................ European Atomic Energy Community 
EEC ........................................... European Economic Community 
EC .............................................. European Community 
ECJ ............................................ European Court of Justice 
ECOWAS .................................. Economic Community of West African States 
e.g. ............................................. exempli gratia (for example) 
ERTA ........................................ European Agreement concerning the work of crews of 
vehicles engaged in international road transport 
et al. ........................................... et alii (and others) 
etc .............................................. et cetera (and other things) 
EU ............................................. European Union 
EUI ............................................ European University Institute 
ECR ........................................... European Court Reports 
GATS ........................................ General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT ........................................ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
i.e. .............................................. id est (that is) 
ILO ............................................ International Labour Organisation 
JHA ........................................... Justice and Home Affairs 
NATO ........................................ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
No .............................................. number 
p. ................................................ page 
para ............................................ paragraph 
PJCC .......................................... Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
PNR ........................................... Passenger Name Record 
SEA ........................................... Single European Act 
TEU ........................................... Treaty on European Union 
TFEU ......................................... Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TRIPs ........................................ Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
7 
 
UK ............................................. United Kingdom 
UN ............................................. United Nations 
US .............................................. United States 
v ................................................. versus 
WEU .......................................... Western European Union 
WTO .......................................... World Trade Organisation  
8 
 
DECLARATION OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP 
I confirm that this thesis is my own work and the use of all material from other sources 
has been properly and fully acknowledged. 
Parts of the third Chapter of this thesis have been published in a collective EUI Working 
Paper: Engel, Annegret (2012), “Retained Distinctiveness in the Integrated Third Pillar: 
Safeguarding Member States’ Competences in the European Criminal Law Sphere”, in 
“Deconstructing EU Federalism through Competences”, EUI Working Paper LAW 
2012/06, p. 39-49. 
  
9 
 
STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without the prior written consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged.  
10 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First and foremost, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor, 
Professor Robert Schütze, for his encouragement to pursue a Ph.D. and his patient 
guidance and constructive suggestions throughout the process. I am also grateful for his 
support in various extra-curricular projects, such as the traineeship at the European 
Commission and the reading as a visiting student at the EUI in Florence. The additional 
supervision received at the EUI by Professor Marise Cremona and her feedback on an 
earlier version of Chapter III was highly appreciated. In addition, I would like to thank 
Dr Andres Delgado-Casteleiro and Professor Takis Tridimas for their valuable 
comments and recommendations at the Viva. 
I would like to extend my thanks to the entire academic and administrative staff at 
Durham Law School as well as the EUI. In particular, I would like to thank Dr Antonis 
Antoniadis and Dr Mike Adcock for the opportunity to let me teach the tutorials for 
their modules. Further, I would like to offer my special thanks to the staff at Ustinov 
College who have provided additional support for academic research and beyond. I am 
particularly obliged to Dr Penny Wilson, Dr Theresa McKinven and Mr Steve Kirk for 
their personal assistance. 
Finally, I wish to thank my mother and my grand-parents for their loving care and 
continuous encouragement. Their selfless support has permitted me to pursue my 
studies in the smoothest possible way. I would also like to thank Dr Christos Mavis for 
his useful ideas and constant optimism. Last but not least, I am happy to have met many 
friends during my studies who have enriched my academic experience: I am grateful to 
Nadine, Alice P., Pauline, Anne-Pauline, Alice D.-L., Julian, and Madalina, to mention 
but a few.
11 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The motivation of this thesis has been the incomplete and often rather fragmented 
literature on the structure of legal bases and the resulting legal basis litigation in the 
European Union. While certain cases have been discussed extensively in academic 
literature (e.g. Tobacco Advertising, ECOWAS), there is little analysis of the generally 
underlying criteria and principles governing the choice of the legal basis by the 
European institutions. Such an analysis has, however, become necessary in order to 
better understand and possibly predict judicial outcomes, or to identify existing flaws in 
the current legislative framework. Despite the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
differences in the structure of legal bases and therefore the problem of legal basis 
litigation will continue to exist with minor changes. Therefore this thesis will provide a 
comprehensive discussion of legal bases and legal basis litigation under supranational 
EU law as well as the intergovernmental areas, intra-pillar as well as inter-pillar 
conflicts, before and after the Lisbon Treaty. At first, the introductory section will 
provide a general overview of the structure of legal bases, secondly the causes for legal 
basis litigation in the EU, which is thirdly followed by a brief examination of the 
development of the pillar structure, and fourthly an outline of this thesis. 
 
I. The structure of legal bases 
The structure of legal bases is an important indicator for the potential for legal basis 
litigation: The existence of differences between legal bases often causes conflicts 
between the EU institutions or between the EU and its Member States. In the same legal 
order, differences can be found in the scope and nature of the competence,
1
 in the legal 
instruments and the procedures.
 2
 In general, all actors aim for a maximum of influence 
and autonomy and therefore favour one legal basis over another which may then 
conflict with the choice of legal basis of their counterpart. The different institutional 
                                                          
1
 “[A] competence is the material field within which an authority is entitled to exercise power.” 
Definition in Schütze, R. (2009). The European Community's Federal Order of Competences - A 
Retrospective Analysis. 50 Years of the European Treaties: Looking Back and Thinking Forward. M. 
Dougan and S. Currie. Oxford, Hart Publishing: 63-92, at page 65. 
2
 This is called the “supply-side” factor, Jupille, J. (2006). “The Legal Basis Game and European 
Governance.” Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 12: 1-70, at page 17. 
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actors thus endeavour to continuously increase their input during the legislative process 
and to extend their overall scope of competences:
3
 Different legislative procedures can 
have an impact on the degree of involvement of the different legal actors available (for 
example the European institutions, competent authorities of the Member States, etc.). 
Finally different legal instruments having different legal effects can be used dependent 
on the legal base. 
 
II. The conundrum of legal basis litigation 
The so-called ‘principle of conferred powers’ according to Article 5 TEU requires the 
Union to derive any action from the powers provided for in the Treaties: 
the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the 
Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 
In general, the reference to a specific legal basis is considered “as a minimum item of 
information” for a measure to contain.4 Further, according to the Court, the choice of 
the correct legal basis is of “constitutional significance”: The reliance on an incorrect 
legal basis would render any measure or agreement which was adopted on such basis 
nugatory.
5
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the conferral principle is of a constitutional nature, it has 
been undermined in the past three decades or so by the courts’ teleological 
interpretation and by the more and more extensive application of general legal bases, 
such as Articles 114 and 352 TFEU. The EU has extended its competences within the 
first pillar in such a way that the principle of enumerated powers has become less and 
less important. Thus, for the majority of cases, there will almost always be a Union 
                                                          
3
 This is called the “demand-side” factor, ibid, at pages 17 and 18. 
4
 Case C-370/07, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union, [2009]: 
ECR I-08917, at para 52. This judgement was criticised on the grounds that the threshold was placed too 
high for the requirement to indicate a legal basis and that the Court failed to explain under which 
circumstances an exceptional non-statement of the legal basis in a measure would be allowed; 
Heliskoski, J. (2011). "Court of Justice: Case C-370/07, Commission v. Council, Judgment of the European 
Court of Justice (Second Chamber) of 1 October 2009, nyr." Common Market Law Review 48(3): 555-
567, at pages 566 and 567. 
5
 Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, [2001]: ECR I-09713, at para 5. 
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competence available.
6
 In only a few exceptions, the courts have refused to accept that 
those provisions could serve as a legal basis for a proposed measure. 
In general, therefore, the question today is less likely about whether there is a legal basis 
available, but rather the determination of which one applies. Legal basis litigation has 
therefore become a frequently discussed issue before the European courts. This 
phenomenon is not an invention of the European Union but is quite familiar to some of 
its Member States, for example Germany.
7
 The quest for the correct legal basis is often 
complicated inter alia by the complexity of the treaties and can mainly be attributed to 
the fact that there are differences in the structure of legal bases. 
 
III. The pillar structure of the EU 
For more than one and a half decades, EU law was shaped by the artificial concept of a 
three-pillar structure, introduced in 1993 by the Treaty of Maastricht.
8
 The three pillars 
represented different sets of competences and were decisive in determining who was 
acting when and how.
9
 The distinction between different competences thus had an 
impact on the choice of which measure had to be used, the institutions involved in the 
decision-making process and the degree of judicial control.
10
 During the time of its 
existence, the pillar structure was amended twice, once by the Treaty of Amsterdam
11
 
and once by the Treaty of Nice
12
. Throughout its existence, the system was flawed with 
certain deficiencies concerning uncertainty and inconsistencies in legal basis litigation; 
competence overlaps between the pillars, i.e. between the Union and the Member 
                                                          
6
 As has been observed, e.g., in Wuemeling, J. (2004). "Kalamität Kompetenz: Zur Abgrenzung der 
Zuständigkeiten in dem Verfassungsentwurf des EU-Konvents." Europarecht 39(2): 216-229, at page 
219. 
7
 See e.g. BVerfG, 1 BvR 636/02 vom 9.6.2004, concerning shop opening hours on Sundays and public 
holidays. 
8
 For an extensive study on the Maastricht Treaty, see O'Keeffe, D. (1994). Legal issues of the Maastricht 
Treaty. London, Chancery Law Publishing Ltd. 
9
 It goes without saying that such differences could not only occur between the three pillars but also 
within the pillars themselves, i.e. inter- as well as intra-pillar differences. 
10
 This sometimes created confusion and many authors pleaded for a simplification of the treaties and 
the underlying pillar structure. As an example, see de Witte, B. (2002). “Simplification and 
Reorganization of the European Treaties.” Common Market Law Review 39(6): 1255-1287. 
11
 For an interesting discussion on the changes introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, see O’Keeffe, D. 
and Twomey, P. (Eds.), (1999). Legal Issues of the Amsterdam treaty. Oxford, Hart Publishing. 
12
 Further discussion on the changes introduced by the Treaty of Nice can be found in Andenas, M. and 
Usher, J.A. (Eds.), (2003). The Treaty of Nice and beyond: Enlargement and constitutional reform. 
Oxford, Hart Publishing. 
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States; as well as a certain lack of clarity surrounding the distinction between the 
concepts of the European Community and the European Union.
13
 
With the so-called ‘de-pillarisation’ of the Union, the pillar structure has finally met its 
fate by formally being abolished under the Treaty of Lisbon. Thus, at first glance, it 
seems as if these problems surrounding the former pillar structure have now been 
solved. However, having a closer look at it, such a conclusion would be rather 
overhasty. The merger of the pillars does not in itself solve this kind of issues. While 
the Reform Treaty has brought about an integration of the former third pillar into the 
realm of supranational EU law which constitutes the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), some of the former intergovernmental characteristics of the 
area of freedom, security and justice have been preserved. In addition, the area of 
common foreign and security policy remains an entirely separate area.
14
 Therefore, not 
only will there be intra-pillar legal basis litigation after Lisbon, but also inter-pillar 
conflicts will continue to be at issue before the courts. In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon 
has created new problems for legal basis litigation which may equally ‘replace’ those 
conflicts which apparently have been solved by the Treaty. 
 
IV. Thesis outline 
This thesis will discuss the structure of legal bases and legal basis litigation in three 
Chapters. While these Chapters are inspired by the three pillars, they are not restricted 
to such a distinction since a clear delimitation of the different policy areas has never 
been achieved and additionally has varied over time. Instead, the distinctions drawn in 
this thesis shall be as follows: 
The first Chapter will discuss the structure of legal bases and legal basis litigation under 
supranational EU law, where the courts have been able to develop a sophisticated array 
                                                          
13
 Compare von Bogdandy, A. (1999). “The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a Single 
Organization with a Single Legal System.” Common Market Law Review 36(5): 887-910; De Witte, B. 
(1998). The Pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union: Greek Temple or French Gothic 
Cathedral? The European Union after Amsterdam: a legal analysis. T. Heukels, N. Blokker and M. Brus 
(Eds.). The Hague, Kluwer Law International; and Pechstein, M. and C. Koenig (2000). Die Europäische 
Union. Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
14
 Wessel has argued that “the Union’s pillars are still separate, but inseparable”, Wessel, R. A. (2009). 
The Constitutional Unity of the European Union: The increasing irrelevance of the pillar structure?. 
European Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon. J. Wouters, L. Verhey and P. Kiiver. Antwerp, Intersentia: 
283-306, at page 305. 
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of general criteria which are the determinant factors in the quest for the correct legal 
basis. Since the courts’ scrutiny as regards judicial review is rather limited within the 
intergovernmental policy areas, such criteria have been elaborated far better under the 
former first pillar, which may thus be considered as an important signpost for other 
areas as well. Therefore, the first Chapter also constitutes the foundation for Chapters 
two and three. 
The second Chapter will be discussing the structure of legal bases and legal basis 
litigation in the area of external relations. Traditionally, provisions in this field can be 
found under the common foreign and security policy (former second pillar); however, 
they also appear under supranational EU law, which thus gives this area an inter-pillar 
dimension. The criteria established under Chapter one will be assessed in how far they 
can also apply here or whether the courts had to develop new principles for this cross-
pillar area. 
The third Chapter will be analysing the structure of legal bases and legal basis litigation 
in the area of freedom, security and justice under the intergovernmental (Maastricht and 
Amsterdam) and supranational (Amsterdam and Lisbon) frameworks. Again, the 
previously established criteria under the former first pillar will be examined as regards 
their applicability in this area. 
Since this thesis mainly refers to legal basis litigation, thus the actual jurisdiction of the 
European courts, little attention is drawn on such conflicts which may be solved before 
they reach the courts. As regards the legislative frameworks, this thesis does not attempt 
to provide a thorough overview of the various treaties and their respective changes. 
Instead, it focuses on selected issues which have already generated or will generate 
conflicts between legal bases and therefore could contribute to the main discussion. 
16 
 
CHAPTER I:  
 
Supranational EU Law: General 
Criteria and Paradoxes 
 
I. Introduction 
Legal basis litigation has been best evolved under supranational EU law, thus the 
former first pillar which now can be found under the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). This area is characterised by a diverse set of provisions which 
makes it rather interesting to examine legal basis litigation here: Not only does 
supranational EU law provide the full range of the different types of competences, legal 
instruments and legislative procedures; but it also allows for a thorough judicial review 
process to take place. The provisions of the former first pillar have thus been in the 
centre of the courts’ legal basis litigation, thus having been challenged to determine the 
correct legal basis on numerous occasions. 
In order to provide guidelines for the determination of the correct legal basis for a 
proposed measure the European courts have had to develop general criteria of legal 
basis litigation. In particular, this involves a thorough scrutiny by the Court of the 
contested measure, analysing it according to its aim and content (‘centre of gravity’), 
and evaluating the different legal bases available. These criteria are an attempt to 
achieve more legal certainty and judicial consistency in European law. However, 
various treaty amendments have sometimes blurred the picture and led to rather 
ambiguous outcomes. Further, the courts have diverted from their own established rules 
on various occasions and have therewith created additional confusion in legal basis 
litigation. Nevertheless, it will be shown that these guidelines may also be applied under 
the Treaty of Lisbon; which, although it has attempted to remedy some of the legal basis 
conflicts, still provides sufficient potential for newly emerging problems in legal basis 
litigation. 
The differences in the structure of legal bases and the resulting issue of legal basis 
litigation under the former first pillar shall be in the centre of the discussion in this 
17 
 
Chapter. First, it will scrutinise the causes of legal basis litigation, including an analysis 
of the nature of the competence, legal instruments and legislative procedures. This will 
also include a discussion about new legal basis conflicts which have emerged under the 
Treaty of Lisbon and which are anticipated to play a major role in future cases before 
the courts, as well as a potential development of new criteria of legal basis litigation. 
Second, it will go on to identify the general criteria which have been developed in order 
to provide guidelines as to which legal basis can be used for which type of measure, 
such as the ‘centre of gravity’ theory and the lex specialis derogat legi generali 
principle. Last, there will be some concluding remarks, summarising the findings of this 
Chapter. 
 
V. Differences between legal bases 
Supranational EU law provides a vast variety of different provisions in various policy 
areas. Unfortunately, the delimitation between these provisions is not always clearly 
defined. Therefore, in some cases it may happen that a proposed measure could be 
adopted on two or more legal bases. Choosing one over another legal basis may have 
significant implications: First, there may be different competence types at stake which is 
the determinant factor of whether the Union is competent to act on its own, in parallel 
with the Member States, or only in a supportive function. Second, different legal 
instruments can also lead to legal basis litigation if a provision prescribes the adoption 
of a specific legal instrument. Third, legislative procedures may have an impact on 
which institution may perform which specific role in the legislative process for the 
adoption of a measure. It is thus necessary to look at these differences first as they 
constitute the basis of the courts’ analysis in legal basis litigation. 
 
A. The nature of the competence 
Legal basis litigation may occur if there are two or more potential legal bases which 
differ in terms of the types of competences, i.e. those of the European Union and its 
Member States. The Union’s power to act could be exclusive, concurrent, shared, 
complementary, coordinating, parallel, or joint in relation to the competences of the 
18 
 
Member States.
1
 These different types of competences have evolved over time, in 
particular since the introduction of the Single European Act; however, until the 
introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, they were not codified
2
 and thus were subject to a 
constant shift and re-interpretation in favour of the acquis communautaire. While the 
codification of the types of competences puts an end to this ‘supranationalisation’ of 
competences, most of the legal basis conflicts will nevertheless remain after Lisbon 
since an exact delimitation between competences has not been achieved by the Treaty. 
In addition, new problems of legal basis litigation have emerged after Lisbon which will 
also be discussed in this section. 
 
1. Before Lisbon 
Before the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, there were neither clearly defined, nor 
codified, competence categories to be found in the treaties. The classification of the 
nature of competences has developed over time with the help of the jurisdiction of the 
European courts in legal basis litigation. As could be argued, this approach illustrates a 
high degree of flexibility and adaptability to changes over time. However, as regards 
transparency and legal certainty this approach has resulted in various problems before 
the courts. 
 
a) Exclusive EU competences 
Initially, exclusive competences were limited
3
 and the courts acknowledged such 
exclusivity only in few areas. Most prominently, this was the case with the area of 
common commercial policy. The Court found in its Opinion 1/75 that an exclusive 
                                                          
1
 For a detailed analysis on the different competences and their definition and scope, see Schütze, R. 
(2009). The European Community's Federal Order of Competences - A Retrospective Analysis. 50 Years 
of the European Treaties: Looking Back and Thinking Forward. M. Dougan and S. Currie. Oxford, Hart 
Publishing: 63-92. 
2
 The Treaty did not provide a clear set of competences and their boundaries for all areas falling there 
under; instead the respective competences could only be found by looking at the specific treaty article 
of the policy area in question, specifying a different scope of the nature of competence in every policy 
area. 
3
 Dashwood, A. (1998). "States in the European Union." European Law Review 23(3): 201-216, at page 
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competence had to rest with the Union under the area of common commercial policy (ex 
Article 113 EEC; now Article 207 TFEU).
4
 
[A]ny unilateral action on the part of the Member States would lead to disparities in the 
conditions for the grant of export credits, calculated to distort competition between 
undertakings of the various Member States in external markets. Such distortion can be 
eliminated only by means of a strict uniformity of credit conditions granted to 
undertakings in the Community, whatever their nationality. 
It cannot therefore be accepted that (...) Member States should exercise a power 
concurrent to that of the Community, in the Community sphere and in the international 
sphere. The provisions of [Article 207 TFEU] (...) show clearly that the exercise of 
concurrent powers by the Member States and the Community in this matter is 
impossible. 
To accept that the contrary were true would amount to recognizing that, in relations 
with third countries, Member States may adopt positions which differ from those which 
the Community intends to adopt, and would thereby distort the institutional framework, 
call into question the mutual trust within the Community and prevent the latter from 
fulfilling its task in the defence of the common interest.
5 
While legal basis litigation has still evolved concerning the broader area of common 
commercial policy, this shall be discussed under the external relations in Chapter II. 
Exclusive competences were also found in the area of fisheries policy. In Kramer and 
others,
6
 the Court was asked whether the Union had an exclusive competence to 
regulate fishing quotas according to inter alia ex Article 43 EEC (now Article 43 
TFEU). The Court held that the Union has 
the power to take any measures for the conservation of the biological resources of the 
sea, measures which include the fixing of catch quotas and their allocation between the 
different Member States.
7
 
This was reiterated in Commission v Ireland,
8
 and Zonen and others.
9
 
                                                          
4
 Opinion 1/75, Draft Understanding on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the auspices of the OECD, 
[1975]: ECR 1355. 
5
 Ibid, at paras 14-16. 
6
 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6-76, Cornelis Kramer and others, [1976]: ECR 01279. 
7
 Ibid, at paras 30/33. 
8
 Case 61/77, Commission of the European Communities v Ireland, [1978]: ECR 00417. 
20 
 
The distinction between exclusive and shared competences has further been elaborated 
on in Commission v UK.
10
 Here, the UK had adopted a series of unilateral measures in 
the area of sea fisheries,
11
 which was subsequently challenged by the Commission on 
the grounds that this policy area falls within the exclusive competences of the Union 
with the result that the UK would have breached EU law.
12
 This was also confirmed by 
the Court, which held that the Union had exclusive competences in this area 
within which Member States may henceforth act only as trustees of the common 
interest, a Member State cannot therefore, in the absence of appropriate action on the 
part of the Council, bring into force any interim conservation measures (...).
13
 
Under the exclusive competence areas of the Union, the Member States were thus 
obliged to consult the Commission and to proceed only upon approval with any 
proposed measure. If such approval was rejected in its entirety or in parts by the 
Commission, the Member States were expected to amend or abandon the original 
proposal.
14
 
The Union has further been able to acquire exclusive competences subsequently with 
the help of the ‘doctrine of implied powers’. This allowed the Union to extend its 
exclusive competences externally in areas in which no such exclusivity existed 
internally, to the detriment of Member States’ powers. Subsequently exclusive powers 
will be discussed in Chapter II as they largely concern the external sphere of EU law. 
 
b) Non-exclusive EU competences 
The overly dominant role of the Union competences and its expanding acquis 
communautaire was particularly visible with all areas of non-exclusive competences, 
where it was provided in the old Article 5 EC (now Article 5 TEU) that 
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the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only 
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Shared competences between the Union and its Member States have been said to be 
diverse in nature rather than homogeneous.
15
 As has been claimed by Schütze, other 
competence types may be considered to constitute sub-categories of shared competences 
rather than being classified as distinct on their own: These include in particular parallel 
and joint competences which may in theory be defined separately, however, practically, 
could turn out as mere shared powers.
16
 A certainly distinct type of competence from 
the otherwise exclusive or shared powers can be found in the category of 
complementary competences. This concept comprises the introduction of minimum 
harmonisation measures, allowing each Member State to introduce more stringent 
measures in such an area,
17
 as well as the introduction of incentive measures.
18
 
The distinction of the category of complementary competences was at issue in the 
Fornasar case.
19
 The contested measures
20
 in this case had been adopted by the Union 
under the area of environmental law establishing a list of hazardous waste. While this 
list was considered exhaustive by inter alia the Commission, some national 
governments
21
 objected to such an interpretation requiring certain freedom for Member 
States to supplement this list with additional hazardous waste.
22
 In its judgement, the 
Court confirmed the complementary nature of Union competences in the area of 
environmental policy. While it acknowledged the need for a high level of protection in 
this field, the Court nevertheless took the diversity of Member States’ situations into 
consideration,
23
 and thus denied pre-emption of national powers in this sensitive area.
24
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2. After Lisbon 
With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon there are now three codified competence 
categories available including their respective scope: The Treaty confers exclusive 
competences in the policy areas listed under Article 3 TFEU,
25
 shared competences 
under Article 4 TFEU, coordinating competences according to Article 5 TFEU, and 
competences to support/coordinate/supplement under Article 6 TFEU.
26
 Exclusive 
competences are defined in Article 2(1) TFEU, allowing 
only the Union [to] legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being 
able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union of for the implementation 
of Union acts. 
Under shared competences according to Article 2(2) TFEU 
the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that 
area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union 
has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their 
competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence. 
The Union’s competence to support/coordinate/supplement Member States’ action shall 
not supersede the latter’s competences in the specified areas and must not entail any 
harmonisation of national laws or regulations.
27
 
The codification of competence categories may be considered an achievement, in 
particular in comparison to the pre-Lisbon era. This can be seen, for example, with the 
area of common commercial policy which now falls under the exclusive competence of 
the Union and it is therefore anticipated that this area will create less legal basis 
conflicts than before.
28
 However, it could be argued that Article 3(1) TFEU expands 
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exclusive EU competences compared to those previously recognised by the case law.
29
 
This is significant for future legal basis litigation as these newly defined exclusive 
competences will now be in competition with legal bases which confer upon the Union 
a non-exclusive competence.
30
 In addition, as will be argued, controversies in delimiting 
competences remain and, in addition, new problems have emerged. 
First, the obvious: some policy areas have been allocated two competence categories, 
while others have not been allocated any of the above mentioned. While it could be 
argued that the latter will automatically fall under shared competences due to their 
residual nature,
31
 some policy areas receive an exceptional treatment. Those include 
economic and employment policies,
32
 research, technological development and space,
33
 
development cooperation and humanitarian aid,
34
 and social policy.
35
 In addition, the 
latter is also classified as a shared competence under Article 4(2)(b) TFEU. Such a 
‘double-classification’36 can also be observed for the areas of health,37 and fisheries 
policy.
38
 One may further wonder whether the distinctions made between the customs 
union,
39
 the establishment of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market,
40
 and the internal market;
41
 or the economic policy,
42
 the monetary 
policy,
43
 and the common commercial policy;
44
 will be sufficient in order to ensure a 
clear delimitation of the different competence typologies there under. 
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For example, the Treaty distinguishes between the area of public health and the area of 
human health. The former is regulated by shared competences,
45
 while under the latter 
the Union enjoys a mere competence to support/coordinate/supplement Member States’ 
actions.
46
 As could be argued, this distinction might not always be as straightforward 
and could therefore generate new problems for legal basis litigation. Further, Article 
168(5) TFEU explicitly concerns “measures designed to protect and improve human 
health [...] and measures which have as their direct objective the protection of public 
health”.47 It is thus possible to adopt a measure on this provision without formally 
classifying its objectives into either area. However, this then poses serious problems for 
the actual delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States, 
whether the Union could pre-empt Member States’ competences, or whether the 
measure could entail approximation of Member States’ laws.48 Therefore, it will be vital 
to ensure a clear distinction between both areas in order to be able to classify measures 
in a consistent manner according to their objectives. In the present situation, it might 
however be more obvious to decide for the area of public health and thus for shared 
competences. 
Second, the less obvious: Article 2(6) TFEU provides that the exact scope of the 
competence in relation to one policy area may only be determined after consulting the 
relevant provisions under that area in question. In other words, even if a policy area has 
been placed within one general competence type it may still reveal elements of other 
types when having a detailed look at the specific provisions.
49
 This potentially extends 
the number of actual competence types and complicates the matter of clear competence 
allocations. In fact, this resembles the situation of the pre-Lisbon era and, as could be 
argued, renders such competence categories rather inefficient or even counteracts legal 
certainty. Admittedly, it would have been almost impossible for the European legislator 
                                                          
45
 Arts 2(2) and 4(2)(k) TFEU. 
46
 Arts 2(5) and 6(a) TFEU. 
47
 Emphasis added. 
48
 The latter could be regarded as immaterial in this case since such harmonisation is already explicitly 
excluded under Art 168(5) TFEU. 
49
 Competences diverging from the general categorisation (mainly from the type of shared 
competences) can be found e.g. for the area of freedom, security and justice under Art 79(4) TFEU: “to 
provide incentives and support for the action of Member States”, for social policy under Art 153(1) 
TFEU: “the Union shall support and complement the activities of the Member States”, for consumer 
protection under Art 169(2)(b) TFEU: “measures which support, supplement and monitor the policy 
pursued by the Member States”. The category of shared competences has therefore been described as a 
mere “umbrella term” embracing a number of variations, Schütze, R. (2009), supra note 1, at page 91. 
25 
 
to define stiff boundaries; and while certain flexibility in this regard may be desirable,
50
 
this cannot result in an overlapping of competences to the extent that some policy areas 
explicitly fall within two types of competences.
51
 As can be seen from the above, the 
newly codified system of competences could result in the application of multiple types 
of competences for one policy area.  
 
B. Legal Instruments 
Different legal instruments entail different legal effects, such as direct effect or pre-
emption. This may be an important factor for legal basis litigation if a proposed measure 
could be adopted on the basis of two or more legal provisions each of which prescribes 
a different legal instrument. While the Commission is interested in more harmonising 
effects, Member States favour a maximum degree of discretion for their 
implementation. Initially, the differences between legal instruments were rather rigid; 
however, various judgements and treaty amendments have diluted such a clear-cut 
delimitation. Nevertheless, it is important to analyse legal basis litigation as regards the 
legal instruments at stake, since their different legal effects still exist albeit in a much 
weakened form. In addition, as will be shown, the Treaty of Lisbon has introduced a 
new hierarchy of legal instruments which might lead into new legal basis litigation. 
 
1. The set of legal instruments 
The set of legal instruments available under the first pillar has not been changed by the 
Treaty of Lisbon and has various implications: According to Article 288 TFEU, 
regulations, directives and decision are binding, while recommendations and opinions 
are non-binding instruments.
52
 Regulations are also directly applicable and thus 
equipped with direct effect.
53
 Such direct effect automatically increases the efficiency of 
an EU measure since it does not require further implementing measures within the 
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Member States.
54
 Nevertheless, in Monte Arcosu, the Court found that the contested 
regulation did not have such direct effect on the grounds that some of its provisions 
required the adoption of further implementing measures which was up to the discretion 
of the national state.
55
 
It was also attempted to apply direct effect to other measures, such as directives which 
are only binding “as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed”56. However, the courts have been more reluctant to accept direct effect for 
directives,
57
 clearly favouring national implementing measures,
58
 and therefore only 
accepted an indirect effect of directives.
59
 Most commonly, the Court has reasoned that 
where the Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on Member States the 
obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, the effectiveness of such an act 
would be diminished if individuals were prevented from relying on it in legal 
proceedings and if national courts were prevented from taking it into consideration as a 
matter of Community law in determining whether the national legislature, in exercising 
its choice as to the form and methods for implementing the directive, had kept within 
the limits of its discretion set by the directive (…).60 
In contrast to regulations, directives further lack horizontal direct effect,
61
 as they can 
only have vertical effect.
62
 Thus, in Dori, the Court found that 
(…) a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot 
therefore be relied upon as such against an individual.
63
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This was clarified in the Carp case, where the Court explained that 
(…) even a clear, precise and unconditional provision of a directive seeking to confer 
rights or impose obligations on individuals cannot of itself apply in proceedings 
exclusively between private parties (…).64 
The effects of legal instruments may therefore be considered as the determinant factor 
for the choice of the type of measure to be adopted: The availability of legal instruments 
can have an impact on legal basis litigation if a provision prescribes the adoption of a 
specific legal instrument. The most important conflict between legal instruments 
involves directives and regulations due to their direct and indirect effects. Regulations 
are considered to being a “direct source of rights and duties” by the Court,65 since they 
are directly applicable in all Member States, while directives first have to be 
transformed by the Member States into national law before they can become 
applicable.
66
 While ‘adverse repercussion’ has been acknowledged also for directives,67 
regulations can also have horizontal direct effect which was denied for the application 
of directives: 
The effect of extending that case-law to the sphere of relations between individuals 
would be to recognize a power in the Community to enact obligations for individuals 
with immediate effect, whereas it has competence to do so only where it is empowered 
to adopt regulations.
68
 
On the grounds of these considerations, it could be argued that regulations represent the 
preferred legal instrument under supranational EU law.
69
 Indeed, the statistics compiled 
by von Bogdandy show that 31 per cent of all legal instruments within the European 
Union consist of regulations, while directives amount to a total of 9 per cent only.
70
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The conflict between directives and regulations can be exemplified with the discussion 
in the Massey-Ferguson case.
71
 The case concerned Regulation No 803/68/EEC
72
 which 
was challenged by the Massey-Ferguson GmbH to be validly adopted on Article 352 
TFEU as a legal basis, or, alternatively should have rather been adopted on the basis of 
inter alia Article 115 TFEU. The old version of Article 115 TFEU (ex Article 100 EEC) 
allowed for the adoption of a directive only, while Article 352 TFEU would also allow 
for a regulation to be adopted thereupon. The Council thus justified its decision to have 
chosen Article 352 TFEU as a legal basis on the mere grounds that the adoption of a 
directive would have been insufficient in order to achieve the aims pursued in the 
contested measure: 
In the case of provisions relating to the value for customs purposes, the Council 
considers that, in adopting rules in that connection, it could have based itself on Article 
100. But in this field the Council considers that the power to issue directives provided 
by Article 100 is insufficient.
73
 
This was confirmed by the Court, which concluded in its judgement that “the procedure 
prescribed by Article 100 [EEC] for the approximation of legislation by means of 
directives does not provide a really adequate solution”.74 Whether or not a specific 
provision is chosen as a legal basis for the adoption of a measure may thus also depend 
upon which legal instrument is available there under. 
Another conflict between legal instruments, though maybe less important, has arisen 
between regulations and decisions, in particular those decisions which are addressed to 
Member States. In a preliminary ruling in Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein,
75
 the Court 
was requested to review the effects of a Council decision.
76
 The German government 
had argued that the effects of decisions and regulations in any case have to be 
considered as dissimilar. While the Court did not deny the different effects, it 
nevertheless held that “this difference does not exclude the possibility that the end result 
(...) may be the same as that of a directly applicable provision of a regulation.”77 
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Therefore, state-addressed decisions are considered as “a second form of indirect 
Community legislation.”78 
More recently, however, the distinction between the various legal instruments has lost 
significance for legal basis litigation. This can be best illustrated with the pre-emptive 
effect of directives as compared to regulations. Initially, a pre-emptive effect was only 
found for regulations: In Bollmann, it was held that Member States “are precluded from 
taking steps, for the purposes of applying the regulation, which are intended to alter its 
scope or supplement its provisions.”79 In contrast, directives cannot be considered of 
having had such pre-emptive effect from the beginning.
80
 Subsequently, however, this 
distinction was flattened by the courts, indicating that the effects of both instruments are 
rather similar: On the one hand, regulations were held to pre-empt Member States’ 
actions merely to the extent as it concerns “national law to a different or contrary 
effect”.81 On the other hand, it was held that directives could also be applied to “ensure 
the absolute identity” of provisions across the Member States.82 
As a result of this alignment of the effects of legal instruments, various treaty reforms 
have contributed to a successive omission of the restrictive availability of legal 
instruments.
83
 Most of the legal bases provided for in the Treaty nowadays leave the 
choice of legal instruments to the discretion of the competent institution; they are 
simply required to adopt the appropriate measures.
84
 Any legal instrument may be 
employed for the various legal bases available and has therefore ceased to constitute a 
determinant factor in legal basis litigation. Thus, as can be argued, the choice of the 
legal instrument may have had an impact in early cases on the actual choice of legal 
basis if the latter prescribed a specific legal instrument. It is clear from the above, that 
the Union still has its preferences as regards legal instruments. This, however, has lost 
its significance in recent years for legal basis litigation. 
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2. A new hierarchy 
As regards legal instruments, no significant changes have been made by the Lisbon 
Treaty. The set of legal instruments under Article 288 TFEU matches its predecessor 
under the old Article 249 EC and therefore is not expected to make a significant 
difference. However, the newly introduced hierarchy of legal instruments
85
 according to 
Articles 289, 290 and 291 TFEU certainly has to be considered as a significant change 
which may even lead into new legal basis conflicts which was not the case before the 
introduction of the Reform Treaty. The three levels in the hierarchy of legal instruments 
under the Lisbon Treaty are as follows: First, any binding legal instrument
86
 which has 
been adopted by the legislative procedure
87
 constitutes a legislative act.
88
 A legislative 
act must regulate “essential elements of an area”.89 Second, “non-essential elements of 
the legislative act” may be supplemented or amended by “non-legislative acts of general 
application”, the so-called delegated acts.90 Third, implementing acts may be adopted, 
laying down “uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts”.91 The 
latter two have been formerly known as comitology mechanisms pursuant to ex Article 
202 EC,
92
 which has now been divided up into two separate types of non-legislative 
acts. While this distinction might add some clarity as regards the actual nature of the 
measure (delegated or implementing),
93
 it raises new problems for legal basis litigation 
which shall be discussed in the following. 
Having a closer look at Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, a clear delimitation between the 
provisions may turn out to be rather complicated. In particular, this might be the case in 
situations of a material overlap, i.e. the supplementation or amendment of a legislative 
act having the (side-) effect of also facilitating its very implementation. In other words, 
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it appears rather reasonable to assume that a measure may have more than one purpose. 
Thus, the question arises whether such borderline cases may trigger the application of 
general criteria of legal basis litigation, e.g. the ‘centre of gravity’ theory. This might 
then even challenge the superior legislative act which already defines the delegation of 
power according to its objectives, content, scope and duration.
94
 Otherwise, as could be 
argued, the distinction between delegated and implementing acts could thus be 
prejudiced, in favour or against either provision. 
The choice between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU has further implications on the 
institutions involved. While a delegated act can be adopted by the Commission only and 
may be subject to scrutiny by the European Parliament or the Council,
95
 implementing 
acts may also be adopted by the Council in exceptional circumstances
96
 and are subject 
to control by Member States.
97
 Thus, the compliance with the limitations set out in the 
provisions in question will be an essential pre-requisite for the maintenance of the 
institutional balance. Otherwise, inter-institutional disputes may become inevitable if, 
for example, the Commission gives preference to the adoption of implementing acts 
rather than delegating acts in order to avoid scrutiny by the European Parliament.
98
 
Moreover, the Commission could misuse its powers by delegating to itself 
implementing power (for example with the help of a regulation) and therewith shift the 
institutional balance.
99
 Such a practice would, however, be incompatible with the 
Court’s previous judgement in Parliament v Council, where it held that 
To acknowledge that an institution can establish secondary legal bases, whether for the 
purpose of strengthening or easing the detailed rules for the adoption of an act, is 
tantamount to according that institution a legislative power which exceeds that provided 
for by the Treaty.
100
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In order to avoid such conflicts and possible material overlaps between Articles 290 and 
291 TFEU both provisions have to be understood as distinct constitutional concepts: 
The former from a horizontal perspective concerning the legislation of EU law, the 
latter from a vertical perspective concerning the execution of such law.
101
 This 
distinction may be considered sufficiently fundamental for the Court to strike a balance 
between the two provisions at stake;
102
 however, as could be argued, this will neither 
prevent legal basis litigation on this matter, nor enhance transparency or contribute to a 
simplification of the set of legal instruments.
103
 As a result, certain mechanisms of the 
old comitology system of the pre-Lisbon era could remain significant in order to ensure 
the proper application of and distinction between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.
104
 
Another issue concerning Article 291 TFEU has been identified by Schütze who claims 
that paragraph 2 of the provision could even provide the Union with a general executive 
competence, similar to those under Articles 114 and 352 TFEU.
105
 As a result, all three 
provisions would be available if no other more specific provision can be found as a 
legal basis. Further, the Court would have to establish new principles for a clear 
delimitation between them since this would otherwise lead to greater legal uncertainty 
in legal basis litigation. If Article 291(2) TFEU was indeed to be interpreted as a legal 
basis providing the Union with an executive power, this would certainly strengthen the 
Union’s influence and increase its competences in the intergovernmental sphere. As 
could be argued, this might not be an ideal solution since from a teleological perspective 
certain control seems to have been intended to rest with the Member States.
106
 
Thus, as could be argued, the newly introduced hierarchy of legal instruments could 
cause conflicts for legal basis litigation even in areas where no such conflicts previously 
existed. This could be the case, for example, in the area of fiscal politics. Here, 
secondary legislation has so far been a common approach to legislate in this field and 
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will now have to distinguish between ‘delegated’ and ‘implementing’ acts according to 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. As could be argued, the courts might therefore have to 
apply general criteria of legal basis litigation in order to determine the correct legal 
basis for such measures. One possibility could be the application of the ‘democracy 
maximising’ rationale.107 This would certainly favour the application of Article 290 
TFEU which can be considered to be more democratic than Article 291 TFEU, since the 
latter does not allow for the European Parliament to be involved in the legislative 
process. However, this might lead to a pre-emption of implementing acts and it is 
therefore possible that the courts might even develop new principles of legal basis 
litigation in such situations. Thus, it remains to be seen how the first legal basis 
conflicts in this area will be solved. 
 
C. Legislative Procedures 
Differences in the legislative procedure may also have an impact on legal basis 
litigation. Such differences in the legislative process include in particular voting 
requirements, i.e. qualified majority or unanimity; and the institutional balance, i.e. each 
institution’s degree of involvement in the legislative process.108 Generally, the 
Commission supports legal bases which prescribe qualified majority voting, thus 
avoiding single Member States to be able to block a proposed measure. In contrast, the 
Council prefers unanimity voting as this leaves the Member States with a maximum 
amount of influence in the legislative process. The Parliament’s interest is to ensure the 
maintenance of the institutional balance, i.e. its own influence favouring legal bases 
which require co-decision rather than a mere consultation procedure, the latter being 
preferred by Council and Commission. The following will therefore discuss legal basis 
litigation concerning the different legislative procedures. 
 
1. Voting requirements 
Differences in the requirements for the voting procedure in the Council could be said to 
have been a rather decisive factor as to when a measure is to be adopted on a specific 
legal basis. With the enlargement of the European Union, qualified majority became 
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necessary in order to maintain efficient decision-making. It could be argued that after 
the introduction of the Single European Act there has been a certain tendency of the 
Court to promote qualified majority voting rather than unanimity voting in the Council. 
This can be illustrated, in particular with similar measures which were based upon 
different legal bases due to the promotion of qualified majority voting. 
Before the introduction of the SEA, Article 352 TFEU was a commonly applied legal 
basis for the adoption of various measures. This can be seen, for example, in Massey-
Ferguson,
109
 in which the Court found that a measure regulating the valuation of goods 
for customs purposes was validly based on Article 352 TFEU.
110
 However, after the 
introduction of the SEA, Article 352 TFEU still required unanimity voting and was thus 
put at a disadvantage in comparison to those provisions which required qualified 
majority voting, for example Article 207 TFEU. The courts have thus taken a much 
stricter approach towards Article 352 TFEU in the aftermath of the SEA, favouring 
other legal bases which provided for qualified majority voting. Therefore, in the 
Generalized Tariff case,
111
 which concerned a similar measure
112
 as in Massey-
Ferguson, the Court held that recourse to Article 352 TFEU was only justified if no 
other provision could suffice as a legal basis for the contested measure.
113
 Since the 
Court did find that Article 207 TFEU constituted a sufficient legal basis, the additional 
legal basis of Article 352 TFEU was rejected. 
Within the past four decades or so, various treaty amendments as well as the support 
before the European courts have gradually extended the application of qualified 
majority voting in the Council. However, this does not mean that unanimity has been 
abandoned entirely from the procedural landscape in the EU legislative process: While 
qualified majority voting certainly constitutes the rule after the introduction of the 
Treaty of Lisbon,
114
 the unanimity requirement remains part of the Treaty’s voting 
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procedures,
115
 in particular in those areas which fall under the ‘special legislative 
procedure’. However, in the absence of voting requirements provided for in the legal 
basis, for example in Article 245 TFEU, qualified majority voting applies according to 
Article 238 TFEU.
116
 
 
2. The institutional balance 
The Union aims to interpret any provision which could serve as a legal basis as broadly 
as possible; this is counteracted by the Member States in pursuance of their federal 
interests. While EU and Member States signify the vertical division of powers, Member 
States are also represented in the Council and therefore in addition have an interest in 
the horizontal division of powers amongst the EU institutions. Thus, one underlying 
rationale of Member States’ attempts in the quest for the correct legal basis is the 
maintenance of the institutional balance,
117
 ultimately strengthening the role of the 
Council which represents Member States’ interests.118 As Bradley points out when 
identifying the correct legal basis for a measure, there are occasionally significant 
discrepancies between Commission and Council.
119
 
Originally, the influence of the European Parliament in the legislative process of the EU 
was minimal: The Parliament merely had to be consulted which did not require the 
Council to also follow the former’s opinion. This was often referred to as the 
‘democratic deficit’ of the Union.120 Through various treaty reforms the role of the 
European Parliament has been strengthened: With the introduction of the Single 
European Act (SEA), the already existing consultation procedure was complemented 
with two further procedures, namely the cooperation and the consent procedure. The 
cooperation procedure allows the European Parliament to suggest amendments to a 
proposed measure, while the consent procedure gives the European Parliament an 
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absolute veto power.
121
 These are now part of the ‘special legislative procedure’ which 
requires a partial involvement of the Parliament in the legislative process. 
The co-decision procedure was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty and now 
constitutes the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ according to Article 294 TFEU. This 
procedure requires a compromise between the Council and the Parliament on a proposed 
legislative measure. The introduction of new legislative procedures which would 
increase the influence of the Parliament was thus an attempt to remedy the existing 
‘democratic deficit’ in the European Union. This was also reflected in the courts’ 
judgements which have constantly held that the proper involvement of the European 
Parliament “reflects (...) the fundamental democratic principle that the peoples should 
take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative 
assembly.”122 
In a case concerning the capacity of the Parliament to bring an action for annulment,
123
 
the Court has acknowledged the significance of the preservation of the institutional 
balance: 
The Treaties set up a system for distributing powers among the different Community 
institutions, assigning to each institution its own role in the institutional structure of the 
Community and the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community. 
Observance of the institutional balance means that each of the institutions must exercise 
its powers with due regard for the powers of the other institutions. It also requires that it 
should be possible to penalize any breach of that rule which may occur. 
The Court, which under the Treaties has the task of ensuring that in the interpretation 
and application of the Treaties the law is observed, must therefore be able to maintain 
the institutional balance (...).
124
 
Any proposed legislative measure has to be approved by the Council which has the 
biggest influence as regards the choice of legal basis.
125
 Even though the Commission 
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might have lost some influence in the past,
126
 there is nevertheless certain continuity as 
regards its powers in the decision-making process. The only variable in the equation is 
the role of the Parliament which has equalised powers with the Council if the co-
decision procedure applies; otherwise its role is less influential.
127
 
 
VI. General Criteria of Legal Basis Litigation 
The above analysed differences between legal bases have been the motivation for the 
courts to develop general criteria which could provide some guidance as regards the 
determination of the correct legal basis for a measure. Thus, legal basis litigation of the 
past four decades or so has provided an entire range of general criteria, principles and 
theories which were aimed at increasing legal certainty in complex areas of overlapping 
or competing competences. Ideally, these criteria would lead to one possible solution 
only, ruling out all other options. Unfortunately, however, this is rather self-deceptive 
and as this section will demonstrate, the courts have more than once deviated from their 
own principles, creating exceptions or even new criteria which would undermine 
previous ones. 
First, this section will look at which objective, rather than subjective, factors the courts 
have taken into account when determining the correct legal basis. Second, it will 
elaborate on the courts’ ‘zig-zag’ course between a single and a dual legal basis. Third, 
it will analyse the democracy maximising rationale as it has been developed in the 
Titanium Dioxide case. Fourth, it will discuss the ‘centre of gravity’ theory and its 
exceptions. Fifth, it will also look at the lex specialis derogat legi generali principles, 
particularly focusing on the general competences under Articles 114/115 and 352 
TFEU. 
 
A. Objective Factors 
It was held by the ECJ in the Generalized Tariff case that the 
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choice of the legal basis for a measure may not depend simply on an institution’s 
conviction (...) but must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial 
review.
128
 
In this case, two Council Regulations
129
 were challenged by the Commission on the 
grounds that both measures should have been based on the single legal basis of Article 
207 TFEU, while the Council also ‘intended’130 to apply Article 352 TFEU as a legal 
basis in addition to the afore mentioned. The additional recourse to the latter provision 
would entail unanimity voting in the Council which the Commission attempted to avoid 
by its choice of a single legal basis, requiring only qualified majority voting. The 
Council argued that “it was convinced that the contested regulations had not only 
commercial-policy aims, but also major development-policy aims” which would go 
beyond the scope of Article 207 TFEU and therefore required the additional legal basis 
of Article 352 TFEU.
131
 Referring to Opinion 1/78,
132
 the Court found that the area of 
common commercial policy was sufficiently broad to accommodate not only measures 
with a mere commercial aim but also such instruments which partially target 
development matters.
133
 The Court thus did not follow the Council’s reliance on 
subjective factors; instead, it relied on other factors, such as the actual aims of the 
contested regulations and the scope of the legal provisions in question. Reference to the 
institution’s conviction as a possibility to determine the correct legal basis was however 
gradually omitted after the Generalized Tariff case and more recent cases exclusively 
referred to the principle of basing a measure on objective factors only. 
In UK v Council, a case concerning the choice of the correct legal basis for Council 
Directive 85/649/EEC,
134
 the Court added that a mere Council practice could not 
derogate from treaty rules due to its subjective nature and therefore could not have a 
binding effect on the EU institutions in determining the correct legal basis.
135
 The 
contested measure was based on Article 43 TFEU, but, according to the UK, should 
                                                          
128
 Case 45/86, supra note 111, at para 11. 
129
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3599/85, supra note 112 and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3600/85 of 17 
December 1985 applying generalized tariff preferences for 1986 to textile products originating in 
developing countries (Official Journal 1985, L 352, p. 107). 
130
 The contested measures did not state any express legal basis. 
131
 Case 45/86, supra note 111, at para 10, emphasis added. 
132
 Opinion 1/78, Opinion given pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty 
(International Agreement on Natural Rubber), [1979]: ECR 02871. 
133
 Case 45/86, supra note 111, at paras 19 and 20. 
134
 Council Directive 85/649/EEC of 31 December 1985 prohibiting the use in livestock farming of certain 
substances having a hormonal action (Official Journal 1985, L 382, p. 228). 
135
 Case 68/86, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European 
Communities, [1988]: ECR 00855, at para 24. 
39 
 
have additionally been based on Article 115 TFEU. While the measure was adopted 
with qualified majority voting, the additional recourse to Article 115 TFEU would have 
required unanimity voting in the Council, a practice previously applied by the 
Council.
136
 This reasoning was, however, rejected by the Court on the grounds that this 
could not be considered to be an objective factor when determining the correct legal 
basis. Instead, it found that the contested measure fell within the area of common 
agricultural policy and was therefore validly adopted on the basis of Article 43 TFEU. 
Further subjective factors were equally rejected by the courts: In Commission v 
Council,
137
 it was held to be irrelevant whether an institution desired to increase its 
participation for the adoption of this measure, whether such an institution had already 
been involved in this area of law, or which circumstances led to the adoption of the 
measure in question, in this case Council Regulation 820/97.
138
 The Commission had 
challenged the contested regulation, arguing that Article 114 TFEU was more 
appropriate as a legal basis on the grounds that first, a measure which, as in the present 
case, concerned the protection of human health had to entail the proper involvement of 
the Parliament in the legislative process.
139
 Second, the Parliament pointed out that it 
had already been successfully involved in the legislative process of similar measures 
concerning public health and consumer protection matters.
140
 Third, the Parliament 
stressed the illegal manner in which the contested regulation came into force.
141
 This 
reasoning was criticised by the Council which recalled the principle of objective factors 
to be the decisive aspect when determining the correct legal basis for a measure.
142
 This 
was also followed by the Court, which confirmed that the contested regulation was 
correctly adopted on the basis of Article 43 TFEU, since it was mainly aimed at the 
stabilisation of the market.
143
 
In addition, it is also important to note that an amending measure did not necessarily 
have to be adopted on the same legal basis as the amended measure(s) but that the ECJ 
would still have to scrutinise it accordingly, applying the above criteria since an 
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amending measure may have different objectives than its predecessor. This may be due 
to changes in the legislative procedures which could render previously compatible legal 
bases incompatible after certain treaty amendments. This was illustrated in Commission 
v Council,
144
 in which Council Directive 87/64
145
 had been adopted on the joint legal 
basis of Articles 115 and 207 TFEU, which was challenged by the Commission, arguing 
that it should have rather been adopted on the basis of Article 43 TFEU since both its 
predecessors already had Articles 43 and 115 TFEU as their joint legal basis.
146
 The 
Court, however, did not follow this reasoning. Instead, it recalled that objective factors 
have to determine the correct legal basis only.
147
 Such objective factors would preclude 
the joint legal basis of Articles 43 and 115 TFEU due to an incompatibility of the 
required legislative procedures.
148
 Nevertheless, the contested measure was declared 
void on the grounds that its purpose, which only partly concerned imports, would not 
justify recourse to Article 207 TFEU.
149
 
 
B. Dual Legal Basis 
 A dual legal basis may become necessary if no single legal basis can be found in the 
treaties which provides sufficient competence, or if two or more inseparable objectives 
are accredited to the proposed measure which thus requires a double legal basis. In 
general, such a dual legal basis could be problematic in terms of the possible differences 
between such legal provisions as they have been identified above. Most prominently, 
this concerns differences in the legislative procedures, but also the nature of the 
competence or the legal instruments prescribed could vary. Initially, recourse to a dual 
legal basis was common practice as a result of the ‘Luxembourg compromise’ from 
1966. It provided that 
Where, in the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on a proposal of 
the Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the 
Members of the Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions 
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which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while respecting their mutual 
interests and those of the Community.
150
 
Thus, in order to accommodate both interests, those of the Union and of the Member 
States, it became common practice to have recourse to joint legal bases which would 
ensure the proper acknowledgement of all possible competences at stake. 
For example, in Commission v Council,
151
 the Court had to review the legality of 
Council Decision 87/369
152
 which had been adopted on the triple legal basis of Articles 
32, 207 and 352 TFEU. This was subsequently challenged by the Commission which 
claimed that recourse to the single legal basis of Article 207 TFEU was sufficient. 
However, the Court held that “where an institution’s power is based on two provisions 
(...), it is bound to adopt the relevant measures on the basis of the two relevant 
provisions.”153 Therefore, it found that the dual legal basis of Articles 32 and 207 TFEU 
was justified for the contested measure, while the additional recourse to Article 352 
TFEU was held to be unnecessary.
154
 
However, according to the Council, the ‘Luxembourg compromise’ “was without 
prejudice to its future action”.155 More recently therefore, the European courts have 
tended to deny the application of a dual legal basis for the adoption of an EU measure. 
This was generally justified by the courts with the incompatibility of different 
legislative procedures within a joint legal basis. This was made clear in Titanium 
Dioxide,
156
 which concerned Council Directive 89/428/EEC
157
 adopted on the basis of 
Article 192 TFEU. The Commission challenged the recourse to Article 192 TFEU as a 
legal basis, arguing that the contested directive should have rather been based on Article 
114 TFEU. The former required unanimity within the Council and a mere consultation 
of the European Parliament, while the latter required the cooperation procedure. The 
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Court stated that the “use of both provisions as a joint legal basis would divest the 
cooperation procedure of its very substance” and therefore held that a dual legal basis 
under such circumstances was excluded since this would otherwise undermine the 
powers of the European Parliament.
158
 
This would hold true even if the Council had previously relied on dual legal bases for 
the adoption of such measures. In UK v Council,
159
 Council Directive 86/113/EEC
160
 
was adopted on a single legal basis of Article 43 TFEU, thus diverting from a previous 
Council practice to adopt similar measures on a dual legal basis of Article 43 in 
conjunction with Article 115 TFEU.
161
 This was therefore challenged by the United 
Kingdom; however, the Court did not follow such reasoning. Instead, it scrutinised the 
case according to objective factors and made clear that 
A previous Council practice of adopting legislative measures in a particular field on a 
dual legal basis cannot derogate from the rules laid down in the Treaty. Such a practice 
cannot therefore create a precedent binding on the Community institutions with regard 
to the determination of the correct legal basis.
162
 
As a result, the contested directive was validly based on Article 43 TFEU only, since 
this was sufficient for measures regulating in the area of agricultural policy even if it 
entailed harmonisation of national laws.
163
 This tendency towards a single legal basis 
has also been supported amongst scholars, for example Tridimas who observed that 
“[i]ncreasing the quantity of legal bases cannot improve their quality.”164 
However, the ECJ also pointed out that under certain exceptional circumstances a dual 
legal basis could nevertheless still find approval before the Court, thus establishing a 
compromise between the single-legal-basis and the dual-legal-basis approach. In its 
Opinion 2/00,
165
 the Court was requested to state its opinion about the validity of 
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Council Decision 93/626/EEC
166
 which had been adopted on the basis of Article 192 
TFEU. The Commission, however, claimed that only a dual legal basis of Articles 207 
and 191 TFEU could be considered as the appropriate legal basis for the contested 
decision.
167
 The Court declared that it would accept the adoption of a dual legal basis “if 
it is established that the measure simultaneously pursues several objectives which are 
inseparably linked without one being secondary and indirect in relation to the other”.168 
While the Court in this case nevertheless found that recourse to the single legal basis of 
Article 192 TFEU was justified since it could identify a predominant objective within 
the area of environmental policy,
169
 the Court’s reasoning concerning the exceptional 
acceptance of a dual legal basis was followed in subsequent case law. 
This can be seen, for example, in Commission v Council.
170
 Here, Council Directive 
2001/44/EC
171
 had to be reviewed concerning its dual legal basis of Articles 113 and 
115 TFEU which was challenged by the Commission, arguing that the contested 
directive should have rather been based on the single legal basis of Article 114 
TFEU.
172
 Obviously, the Commission would have preferred a legal basis which merely 
requires qualified majority voting, rather than unanimity voting as was the case with the 
Council’s choice of legal bases. The Court briefly elaborated on the compatibility of 
Articles 113 and 115 TFEU and found that no formal problem would arise since both 
provisions required unanimity voting.
173
 In addition, since the contested measure aimed 
at a certain degree of harmonisation in the area of fiscal policy, recourse to both 
provisions became necessary in order to constitute the correct legal basis. 
As can be observed from this case law, the Court has taken into account the issue of 
procedural differences, trying to avoid approving measures which had been adopted on 
multiple legal bases, especially if this included different procedural requirements. It was 
pointed out on numerous occasions that the “argument with regard to the correct legal 
basis is not a purely formal one” and that the “choice of the legal basis could thus affect 
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the determination of the content of the contested directive(s).”174 It seems, however, that 
in those cases the Court has merely intended to justify its judicial scrutiny and the need 
to find a correct legal basis with the existence of such differences in the procedural 
requirements. For example in Commission v Council,
175
 the Council had adopted 
Decision 87/369
176
 on the basis of Articles 32, 207 and 352 TFEU. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the ECJ found recourse to Article 352 TFEU had been unjustified, it did not 
annul the contested decision. At the time of its adoption and before the introduction of 
the Single European Act (SEA), the old version of Article 32 TFEU (ex Article 28 
EEC) had required unanimity, just like Article 352 TFEU, and therefore did not make 
any difference in the Court’s opinion. The only procedural difference was the 
consultation requirement under Article 352 TFEU, which had taken place; however, this 
was not required under Article 32 TFEU. In its judgement, the ECJ considered the 
incorrect reliance on Article 352 TFEU to supplement Articles 32 and 207 TFEU as 
“only a purely formal defect which cannot make the measure void.”177 
This attitude of the Court hardly changed over the years and in British American 
Tobacco it came to a similar conclusion. This time, the contested measure had been 
adopted on Articles 114 and 207 TFEU, the latter of which was held not to be 
inappropriate as a legal basis since qualified majority was the required voting procedure 
under both provisions and the co-decision procedure required under Article 114 TFEU 
had not been jeopardised by the supplementing legal basis of Article 207 TFEU.
178
 This 
approach, which only looks at the effects of the provisions in question, could be argued 
to have jeopardised the concept of the institutional balance since an inappropriate 
provision could validly be accepted to serve as a legal basis for a measure as long as the 
voting requirements of that provision are in conformity with the anticipated institutional 
consequences of the contested measure. In other words, this suggests that the non-
compliance with institutional requirements are considered as a purely ‘formal defect’ 
only after the Court is assured of the conformity of the voting procedures. 
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C. Democracy Maximising Rationale 
The incompatibility of certain legal bases on the grounds of different legislative 
procedures which thus requires a single legal basis generates the question under which 
criterion the correct legal basis has to be determined. One possibility would be to 
prioritise the most democratic procedure which ensures an adequate influence of the 
European Parliament and therefore the maintenance of the institutional balance. 
The democracy maximising rationale was first established in Titanium Dioxide,
179
 
where the Court had to review the validity of Council Directive 89/428/EEC
180
 which 
had been adopted on the basis of Article 192 TFEU.
181
 The Court found that the 
contested directive had a twofold aim and content: It was inseparably linked with both 
the area of environment and the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
182
 
This being said, the ECJ went on to examine the procedural consequences of each 
provision with the conclusion that if both provisions would have had to serve as a dual 
legal basis the cooperation procedure would have been rendered nugatory: Since Article 
114 TFEU required qualified majority voting as opposed to Article 192 TFEU which 
required unanimity, the latter procedure – as a general rule – would have to be applied. 
This would entail that all procedural requirements under this provision also had to be 
applied, such as the requirement to consult the Parliament rather than the cooperation 
procedure which Article 114 TFEU referred to: 
As a result, use of both provisions as a joint legal basis would divest the cooperation 
procedure of its very substance. 
(...) 
The very purpose of the cooperation procedure, which is to increase the involvement of 
the European Parliament in the legislative process of the Community, would thus be 
jeopardized.
183
 
The Court, thus, gave priority to the safeguarding of a high degree of parliamentary 
participation which, in the ECJ’s opinion, “reflects a fundamental democratic 
principle”.184 
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In two subsequent cases after Titanium Dioxide, the Waste cases,
185
 the Court was again 
asked to determine the correct legal basis in similar settings. In these cases the ECJ 
simply did not consider the contested measures
186
 to be of a twofold aim, but rather 
suggesting that their effects of harmonising the internal market was of an ancillary 
nature,
187
 therefore upholding the validity of the measures which both had been based 
on Article 192 TFEU. Nettesheim described the judgements on Waste to be “one step 
forth and one step back at the same time”.188 It could be argued that this inconsistent 
ruling as regards Article 114 versus Article 192 TFEU has led to even more confusion 
in the quest for reliable criteria in legal basis litigation.
189
 
In Kadi and Al Barakaat, the Court held that 
adding Article [352 TFEU] to the legal basis of the contested regulation enabled the 
European Parliament to take part in the decision-making process relating to the 
measures at issue which are specifically aimed at individuals whereas, under Articles 
[75 TFEU] and [215 TFEU], no role is provided for that institution.
190
 
Contrary to Titanium Dioxide, however, the notion of the Court in Kadi and Al 
Barakaat suggested that the rationale of ‘democracy maximising’ cannot determine by 
itself the correct legal basis but can only be an additional factor once the substantive 
requirements of a provision are fulfilled. This underlying ‘democracy maximising’ 
rationale was repeated more recently in Parliament v Council
191
 as well as touched 
upon, although in an alleviated version, in various cases in which the ECJ has taken into 
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account the possibility that the European Parliament may be deprived of its rights if a 
measure is adopted on a joint legal basis.
192
 
The most recent judgement, however, suggests a different approach of the European 
Court of Justice. In a case concerning the International Fund for Ireland,
193
 the Court 
seems to have adopted the rule of applying the most stringent procedure if more than 
one legal basis require different legislative procedures: The contested measure
194
 was 
adopted on the single legal basis of Article 352 TFEU, which was subsequently 
challenged by the European Parliament, arguing that the third paragraph of Article 175 
TFEU would have better served as a legal basis, in particular with regard to the 
objectives of the contested measure of “strengthening the economic and social cohesion 
of the Community.”195 The Parliament’s choice of legal basis was interpreted by the 
Council as a mere tool “to reduce disparities between the levels of development of 
different regions”, while the contested measure was aimed at “contributing financially 
to an international organisation”, thus Article 352 TFEU sufficiently served as a legal 
basis.
196
 In its judgement however, the Court held that the contested measure should 
have additionally been based on the third paragraph of Article 175 TFEU. Considering 
the different legislative procedures at stake, the Court held that the co-decision 
procedure as well as unanimity should apply, thus enforcing the most stringent 
requirements.
197
 On the one hand, this judgement ensured a high level of parliamentary 
participation and thus ruled in favour of the institutional balance. On the other hand, it 
could be argued that the application of the unanimity rule instead of qualified majority 
voting may be considered as deviant since the overall trend appears to be away from 
unanimity and towards qualified majority voting. However, in the case of an existence 
of more stringent requirements their preservation by courts has to be welcomed and this 
rule may certainly entail some greater clarity concerning procedural differences. 
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D. Centre of Gravity 
In Titanium Dioxide it was explicitly specified for the first time that the above discussed 
objective factors “include in particular the aim and content of the measure.”198 In this 
case, Commission and Parliament argued that the main purpose of the contested 
measure
199
 was the “improvement of conditions of competition in the titanium dioxide 
industry”, thus “concerning the establishment and functioning of the internal market” 
under Article 114 TFEU.
200
 The Council, however, found that the ‘centre of gravity’ 
was “the elimination of the pollution caused by waste from the titanium dioxide 
manufacturing process” and that the contested measure was therefore correctly based on 
Article 192 TFEU.
201
 Looking more closely at the exact aim and content, the Court held 
that no single ‘centre of gravity’ could be found since the measure was inextricably 
linked “with both the protection of the environment and the elimination of disparities in 
conditions of competition.”202 
The main purpose of a measure thus constitutes the ‘centre of gravity’; while a mere 
incidental effect was held not to be decisive for the choice of legal basis. This 
distinction was first drawn in Parliament v Council concerning Council Regulation 
(Euratom) No 3954/87
203
 which had as its main purpose the protection of the population 
against the dangers arising from contaminated foodstuffs and feeding stuffs.
204
 The fact 
that this Regulation also had an ancillary effect of harmonising the conditions for the 
free movement of goods within the EU could not justify an annulment of the contested 
Regulation which was validly adopted on the basis of Article 31 of the EAEC Treaty.
205
 
A similar approach can also be found in Parliament v Council.
206
 This distinction 
between main purpose and incidental effects constituted the so-called ‘centre of gravity’ 
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theory,
207
 under which the legislator adopted a measure according to its main objective, 
not taking into account secondary effects. 
Subsequent case law refined
208
 and extended the ‘centre of gravity’ theory. In Spain v 
Council,
209
 the Court was required to find the correct legal basis for Council Decision 
97/825/EC
210
 within the Union policy on environment. The Council had adopted the 
contested measure on the basis of Article 192(1) TFEU. However, Spain argued that the 
measure should have rather been based on Article 192(2) TFEU. The European Court of 
Justice expressly stated that a dual legal basis could not be accepted if the contested 
measure 
reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold component and if one 
of these is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the 
other is merely incidental.
211
 
It therefore had to go on and scrutinise the exact aim and content of the measure, 
eventually identifying its primary purpose as “the protection and improvement of the 
quality of the waters of the catchment area of the river Danube” while only incidentally 
referring to “the use of those waters and their management in its quantitative 
aspects.”212 The measure was therefore validly adopted on the basis of Article 192(1) 
TFEU. 
More recently, however, in Ireland v European Parliament and Council,
213
 the Court 
seems to have deviated slightly from the common ‘aim-and-content approach’ for the 
‘centre of gravity’ theory in so far as it did not take into account the actual objectives of 
the contested measure. The case concerned Directive 2006/24/EC
214
 which was adopted 
on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. Ireland argued that this basis was incorrect since the 
                                                          
207
 See also Breier, S. (1995). "Der Streit um die richtige Rechtsgrundlage in der Rechtsprechung des 
Europäischen Gerichtshofes." Europarecht 30(1/2): 46-53, at page 50. 
208
 See e.g. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, supra note 190. 
209
 Case C-36/98, Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Union, [2001]: ECR I-00779. 
210
 Council Decision 97/825/EC of 24 November 1997 concerning the conclusion of the Convention on 
cooperation for the protection and sustainable use of the river Danube (Official Journal 1997, L 342, p. 
18). 
211
 Case C-36/98, supra note 209, at para 59. 
212
 Ibid, at para 74. 
213
 Case C-301/06, Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, [2009]: ECR I-
00593. 
214
 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC (Official Journal 2006, L 105, p. 54). 
50 
 
measure’s main objective was the facilitation of “the investigation, detection and 
prosecution of crime, including terrorism” and therefore should have rather been based 
on a former third-pillar provision, which have now been integrated into supranational 
EU law, namely Articles 30, 31(1)(c) and 34(2)(b) (Amsterdam) TEU.
215
 The 
Parliament, however, defended the decision to adopt the contested measure on the basis 
of Article 114 TFEU on the grounds that its ‘centre of gravity’ should be seen in the 
elimination of “obstacles to the internal market for electronic communication 
services”.216 Diverting from its previous practice to scrutinise both aim and content of a 
contested measure, the Court merely relied on its content which was primarily 
concerned with the functioning of the internal market.
217
 The Court thus upheld Article 
114 TFEU as the correct legal basis. As has been argued by van Vooren,  
the ‘aim’ component serves little purpose in the final outcome of deciding the correct 
legal base, and is nothing more than an initial sentiment on what the overall objective 
may be.
218
 
By doing so, as could be argued, the Court has been able to strengthen the acquis 
communautaire and to defend the Union’s scope of influence against that of Member 
States under the intergovernmental pillars.
219
 Whether or not the shift from an ‘aim-and-
content’ approach towards a ‘content-only’ test was actually intended by the Court 
remains unclear.
220
 On any account, with the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon and 
with the integration of the third pillar into the realm of supranational EU law, there 
would no longer be the need to choose either legal basis since a dual legal basis would 
now be possible in such a case.
221
 However, under a different setting in Parliament v 
Council,
222
 the Court seems to have reverted to the ‘aim-and-content’ approach: The 
judgement followed the classical ‘centre of gravity’ theory, thus scrutinising the 
contested regulation according to its objectives as well as its content.
223
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E. Lex Specialis Derogat Legi Generali 
In order to facilitate legal basis litigation, the Court has made an attempt to categorise 
legal bases, in particular, distinguishing between ‘special’ and ‘general’ competences. 
Numerous provisions could fall under the description of a special legal basis; while only 
few constitute general competences, most prominently Articles 114/115 and 352 TFEU. 
According to the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle, a general provision may 
only serve as a legal basis in the absence of more specific provisions (“save where 
otherwise provided in the Treaties”, Article 114(1) TFEU)224 provided that those 
specific provisions could serve as a sufficient legal basis for the proposed measure.
225
 
Thus, while under the ‘centre of gravity’ theory two different provisions with two 
different aims are at stake; the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle concerns two 
different provisions, both of which have the same aim, but one being more specific than 
the other. 
The following sections will analyse the case law concerning the two main lex generalis 
provisions, Articles 114 and 352 TFEU. As can be argued, these provisions could 
almost always serve as a last resort for the Union to claim its competence for a measure 
if no other more specific provision can be found. It is therefore important to examine 
whether the Court has developed any general criteria in order to delimit the scope of 
their application. The focus will be on how the courts have applied the lex specialis 
derogat legi generali principle in order to find the correct legal basis for a measure in 
the specific cases. It will also look at the detailed characteristics of the two general 
provisions in question as well as their distinction between each other. 
 
1. Approximation of Laws under Articles 114 and 115 TFEU 
The Lisbon Treaty has renumbered the old Article 95 EC to Article 114 TFEU. This 
‘new’ provision resembles its predecessor almost entirely throughout.226 Therefore, it is 
anticipated that similar legal basis problems will occur surrounding Article 114 TFEU, 
                                                          
224
 For an analysis of this specific phrase as well as a thorough discussion of the limits of Article 114 
TFEU, see Crosby, S. (1991). "The single market and the rule of law." European Law Review 16(6): 451-
465. 
225
 Cullen, H. and A. Charlesworth (1999), supra note 189, at page 1268. 
226
 Disregarding minor changes, such as the renumbering of other TFEU provisions referred to or the 
renaming of the Community into Union. 
52 
 
as was the case with the old Article 95 EC.
227
 With the integration of the third pillar into 
supranational EU law under the TFEU, this area will now also be subject to 
approximation under Article 114 TFEU.
228
 In how far its scope can also be extended to 
the area of common foreign and security policy will be discussed in Chapter II. 
Article 114 TFEU is a general treaty provisions under which measures could be adopted 
which pursue the aim of approximating the laws in a certain area to the actual 
improvement and the proper functioning of the internal market.
229
 As a legal basis it 
provides the Union with a so-called ‘functional’ or ‘horizontal’ competence.230 This 
means that there is no specific area of law to which it applies, however, as soon as a 
measure has an effect on the internal market it could be adopted on the basis of this 
provision. The “mere finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract 
risk of obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of 
competition” cannot, however, justify recourse to Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis,231 
unless they directly affect the exercise of the fundamental freedoms and thus the 
functioning of the internal market.
232
 The prevention of potential future obstacles to 
trade could also fall under the application of Article 114 TFEU if “the emergence of 
such obstacles [is] likely and the measure in question [is] designed to prevent them.”233 
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It can be observed that measures falling under Article 114 TFEU always pursue two 
objectives: the approximation of laws aimed at the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market on the one hand and the achievement of a more specific objective on the 
other hand, e.g. agriculture, public health, or environment. 
In a series of judgements regarding measures harmonising in the field of agriculture, 
Article 43 TFEU was considered to be the correct legal basis, rather than Article 115 
TFEU, on the grounds of constituting the lex specialis provision, which is also explicitly 
supported by Article 38(2) TFEU.
234
 This can be seen, for example, in UK v Council,
235
 
which concerned Council Directive 85/649/EEC.
236
 Here, the Council’s choice of 
Article 43 TFEU as a legal basis was considered insufficient for the adoption of the 
contested measure, which, according to the applicant, required also recourse to Article 
115 TFEU.
237
 The Court, however, pointed out that a general provision, such as Article 
115 TFEU, “cannot be relied on as a ground for restricting the field of application” of a 
more specific legal basis, such as Article 43 TFEU.
238
 The fact that the contested 
directive also involved harmonisation of national laws in the area of agriculture did not 
necessitate an additional recourse to Article 115 TFEU.
239
 The Court thus gave priority 
to the lex specialis of Article 43 TFEU.
240
 
Another example of a more specific provision in relation to Article 115 TFEU is the 
public health provision under Article 154 TFEU as was held in UK v Council.
241
 This 
case concerned Council Directive 93/104/EC
242
 which was adopted on Article 154 
TFEU under the qualified majority voting procedure. This was challenged by the 
applicant, favouring either Article 115 or Article 352 TFEU as the appropriate legal 
basis for the contested measure since these provisions require unanimity voting and 
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therefore would ensure a greater influence of each Member State.
243
 The Court found 
that Article 154 TFEU “relates only to measures concerning the protection of the health 
and safety of workers” which therefore rendered it a lex specialis in comparison to 
Articles 114 and 115 TFEU.
244
 Since aim and content of the contested directive fell 
within the area of public health, i.e. the protection of health and safety of workers, 
Article 154 TFEU constituted the correct legal basis of the measure.
245
 
However, Article 192 TFEU which concerns the specific area of environmental law was 
held not to have the character of a lex specialis provision in relation to Article 114 
TFEU.
246
 According to Article 11 TFEU, the protection of the environment is relevant 
to all Union policies,
247
 which thus renders recourse to Article 192 TFEU superfluous: 
The Court interpreted Article 192 TFEU to be 
intended to confer powers on the Community to undertake specific action on 
environmental matters, while leaving intact its powers under other provisions of the 
Treaty, even if the measures in question pursue at the same time one of the objectives of 
environmental protection.
248
 
As could be argued, measures pursuing a twofold aim could be subject to highly 
politicised decisions: the Union legislator could, by formulating precisely the objectives 
of a measure in their favour, predetermine its anticipated legal basis which the Court 
would then be able to uphold.
249
 Certainly, the courts claim to take into consideration 
the objective effects rather than the mere subjective motives of a measure, however, it 
remains questionable whether this separation would always be possible to achieve in 
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practice. As a result, it has been argued that there is a certain likelihood of arbitrary 
legal basis litigation.
250
 
In contrast to Article 352 TFEU, the scope of Article 114 TFEU is not of a mere 
residual nature; it can be applied independently in relation to as well as in combination 
with other provisions. As a response to this rather extensive use of Article 114 TFEU, a 
limitation has been inserted in certain provisions in the form of the so-called ‘saving 
clause’.251 For example, the approximation of laws aimed at the protection and 
improvement of human health is excluded following the wording of Article 168(5) 
TFEU. The old version of this provision, Article 129(4) EEC, was subject of judicial 
review in Tobacco Advertising.
252
 Here, the Court had to review the validity of 
Directive 98/43/EC
253
 which was adopted on the basis of Articles 53(2), 62 and 114 
TFEU. Germany challenged the measure in question, arguing that it would rather fall 
within the area of public health which would therefore exclude the application of the 
more general provision of Article 114 TFEU. The Court, however, held that this 
does not mean that harmonising measures adopted on the basis of other provisions of 
the Treaty cannot have any impact on the protection of human health. (...). 
Other articles of the Treaty may not, however, be used as a legal basis in order to 
circumvent the express exclusion of harmonisation laid down in Article 129(4) of the 
Treaty.
254
 
In other words, only if a measure is mainly aimed at the protection of public health, the 
‘saving clause’ can apply and limit harmonisation in this area. However, the Court 
found that in this case the special provision could not derogate from the more general 
one, therefore, as could be argued, effectively reversing the lex specialis derogat legi 
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generali principle into lex generalis derogat legibus specialibus.
255
 What can be 
deduced from this case are two things: First, there is a high threshold for the application 
of ‘saving clauses’.256 Second, the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle can only 
apply in addition to other criteria of legal basis litigation, such as the ‘centre of gravity’ 
theory, and only if the latter fails to generate a concrete result for the choice of the 
correct legal basis and thus leaves the Court with two or more possible options. It could 
therefore be argued that this renders the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle a 
supplementary criterion of legal basis litigation. 
One example of a lex specialis provision where the Court indeed recognised derogation 
from Article 114 TFEU is the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, 
excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation under Article 113 TFEU.
257
 This was 
found in Commission v Council.
258
 In this case, Council Directive 2001/44/EC
259
 was 
under review which had been adopted on the basis of Articles 113 and 115 TFEU, while 
the Commission was of the opinion that only Article 114 TFEU could constitute the 
appropriate legal basis for the contested measure.
260
 By comparing Articles 113 and 114 
TFEU, the Court held that not only does Article 113 TFEU constitute a more specific 
one than Article 114 TFEU, the latter also excludes “fiscal provisions” from its scope to 
harmonise national laws.
261
 Recourse to Article 113 TFEU as a legal basis was thus 
justified and therefore the validity of the contested directive could be upheld.
262
 
In general, it is clear from the foregoing that the Court interpreted the competence of the 
Union to approximate national laws rather extensively. Therefore, the Union has been 
provided with a very general legal basis which it can have recourse to if there is no 
other more specific provision available. The Union has been able to justify its 
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application with the general need to harmonise national laws even if there is only a 
potential risk that obstacles to trade would occur. It has thus been made difficult to 
claim the non-existence of Union competences for harmonisation in a given area of law. 
 
2. Article 352 TFEU – A subsidiary provision 
In the early days until the introduction of the Single European Act (SEA), Article 352 
TFEU had been invoked to serve as a legal basis for numerous measures. This can be 
ascribed to the fact that the Luxembourg compromise
263
 exerted influence upon the 
Council’s decisions when determining the correct legal basis. The compromise entailed 
the entitlement for every Member State to invoke a veto on the grounds of ‘important 
national interest’ in order to postpone the adoption of specific measures if the voting 
procedure required for its implementation was qualified majority.
264
 The Council 
therefore tried to avoid such scenarios by using Article 352 TFEU more often and 
where possible as a legal basis since this provision required unanimity voting. It was not 
until the SEA came into force and qualified majority became the preferred voting 
procedure, that Article 352 TFEU would be invoked less often.
265
 
Like Article 114 TFEU, Article 352 TFEU confers upon the Union a ‘horizontal’ 
competence to issue measures. However, in contrast to Article 114 TFEU, it has been 
considered to be a so-called ‘residual’ or ‘subsidiary’ provision266 which is only 
applicable if Union action is required and the necessary powers cannot be derived from 
the objectives of the Union or the Treaty. In other words, if a different provision in the 
Treaty suffices to provide the legal basis for a proposed measure then recourse to 
Article 352 TFEU would not be necessary. This implies that according to its 
‘subsidiary’ character, Article 352 TFEU should be less prominent than Article 114 
TFEU. Thus, from the very wording of the provision it is rather difficult to draw a clear 
conclusion as to the exact scope of Article 352 TFEU which was thus left to the 
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discretion of the EU institutions. Schütze argues that according to the principle of 
limited powers, “Article [352] had to be treated as an exception to the specifically 
transferred competences and its scope had to be interpreted restrictively.”267 However, 
unfortunately, the provision does not give information about whether it was meant to 
only extend existing EU powers or whether it could even be used to create new 
competences. Neither does it clearly indicate whether Article 352 TFEU could be 
applied only autonomously or whether it was also possible to use it in conjunction with 
other provisions. Its scope could thus be “potentially unlimited”.268 In contrast to this, it 
has also been argued that Article 352 TFEU could be characterised as defining the 
‘outer limit’ of the powers expressly conferred upon the European Union.269 In order to 
shed more light on these questions it is thus necessary to scrutinise the Court’s 
interpretation of the application of Article 352 TFEU as a legal basis. 
The first case in which a legal basis problem as regards Article 352 TFEU emerged was 
in Massey-Ferguson.
270
 Resulting from the rather divergent interpretations of 
Commission and Council as to whether the old version of Article 352 TFEU could be 
relied upon as the legal basis for Regulation No 803/68/EEC,
271
 the case was brought 
before the ECJ. The Commission had argued that the common commercial policy 
provided for a sufficient legal basis in Article 207 TFEU without there being recourse 
necessary to Article 352 TFEU. However, the Court, taking a rather broad interpretation 
of the provision in question, concluded that the Council was allowed to employ Article 
352 TFEU as being the appropriate legal basis since no other provision in the Treaty 
could be found which would have empowered the EU to issue the contested Regulation: 
If it is true that the proper functioning of the customs union justifies a wide 
interpretation of [Articles 28, 31, 32, and 207] of the Treaty and of the powers which 
these provisions confer on the institutions to allow them thoroughly to control external 
trade by measures taken both independently and by agreement, there is no reason why 
the Council could not legitimately consider that recourse to the procedure of [Article 
352] was justified in the interest of legal certainty.
272
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This judgement clearly stands in contrast to the position the Court took only a few years 
later in the Generalized Tariff case
273
 which was decided shortly after the introduction 
of the SEA. Here, the ECJ rejected the necessity to refer to Article 352 TFEU as a legal 
basis.
274
 Therewith, the Court followed its own reasoning underlying Opinion 1/78
275
 of 
a broad interpretation of Article 207 TFEU which anticipated the insignificance of a 
common commercial policy if it was to be restricted “to the use of instruments intended 
to have an effect only on the traditional aspects of external trade”.276 With this extensive 
interpretation, the EU could derive sufficient legislative power from Article 207 TFEU 
without the additional reference to Article 352 TFEU. This approach was supported by 
the ruling in Germany v Council
277
 concerning the scope of the common agricultural 
policy in relation to Article 352 TFEU. The ECJ held that the application of Article 43 
TFEU as a legal basis could not be restricted on the grounds that the proposed measure 
pursued agricultural objectives as well as objectives regulated under different Treaty 
provisions, thus confirming the more and more subsidiary nature of Article 352 TFEU 
in the aftermath of the SEA. 
It was not until Opinion 2/94
278
 that the Court provided some clear indication as to the 
function and scope of Article 352 TFEU. In this opinion, the Court had been requested 
to evaluate whether the existing Treaty provided for a sufficient legal basis for the 
Union to accede to the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR). Since no specific powers authorising the Union to take action in the field of 
human rights could be found in the Treaty, the ECJ considered the application of Article 
352 TFEU. The Court acknowledged that the function of Article 352 TFEU was of a 
gap-filling nature, i.e. to be applicable only in the absence of any express or implied EU 
powers.
279
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That provision, being an integral part of an institutional system based on the principle of 
conferred powers, cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of Community powers 
beyond the general framework created by the provisions of the Treaty as a whole and, in 
particular, by those that define the tasks and the activities of the Community. On any 
view, [Article 352] cannot be used as a basis for the adoption of provisions whose effect 
would, in substance, be to amend the Treaty without following the procedure which it 
provides for that purpose.
280
 
The Court thus observed that a treaty amendment or a modification in a specific area of 
law would go beyond the intended scope of Article 352 TFEU as this would entail 
“fundamental institutional implications for the [Union] and for Member States” which 
would be of a “constitutional significance.”281 What could be deduced from this ruling 
is that while Article 352 TFEU may serve to widen the Union’s competences, it cannot 
be applied to create entirely new areas of competences. Nevertheless, the exact 
distinction between both remains rather unclear. 
To sum up the pre-Lisbon era, it can be observed that Article 352 TFEU has been 
interpreted differently over time. Its indefinite wording allowed for a rather broad 
interpretation and therefore extensive use in the beginning, while the Court enforced the 
subsidiary nature of the competence after the introduction of the Single European Act. 
However, the decreasing application of Article 352 TFEU as a legal basis cannot be said 
to have been at the expense of EU competences as a whole. Instead, the scope of other 
provisions has been widened, such as Articles 43 and 207 TFEU which rendered 
recourse to Article 352 TFEU dispensable. It could thus be argued that by adopting 
measures on the basis of other articles in the Treaty, the EU has not yet exhausted its 
competences since it still has the possibility of having recourse to Article 352 TFEU as 
a last resort. The guidance provided in Opinion 2/94 was certainly intended to limit the 
scope of Article 352 TFEU with the means available. However, it could be argued that 
what has been achieved was no more than another opinion which left its interpretation 
very much to the discretion of the Court and added rather little to the actual 
determination of the outer scope of Article 352 TFEU. It can thus be concluded that 
despite its less prominent character in comparison to Article 114 TFEU, Article 352 
TFEU nevertheless has an almost unlimited scope and could serve as a legal basis of 
last resort, thus being at the Union’s disposal at any time. 
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With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, most of the issues discussed above 
continue to apply to Article 352 TFEU. The main difference the post-Lisbon provision 
has introduced is the restriction in paragraph 4 which clarifies the relationship between 
supranational EU law and the intergovernmental area of common foreign and security 
policy, stating explicitly that Article 352 TFEU cannot be adopted as a legal basis for 
objectives falling outside the scope of the TFEU. The integrated third pillar, however, is 
now capable of being affected by Article 352 TFEU.
282
 The only constraint for applying 
Article 352 TFEU is provided in paragraph 3, providing that a measure “based on this 
Article shall not entail harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations in cases 
where the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.” In general, this applies to all areas in 
the TFEU which grant the Union a competence to support/coordinate/supplement 
Member States’ actions.283 It is, however, anticipated that these changes concerning 
Article 352 TFEU will not significantly limit its scope of application, in particular as 
regards supranational EU law.
284
 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter has discussed the structure of legal bases and legal basis litigation under 
supranational EU law. As can be observed, differences in the structure of legal bases 
may lead to legal basis litigation. Such differences can occur if two or more competing 
treaty provisions require a different degree of involvement from the EU and/or the 
Member States, provide for different sets of legal instruments which have different legal 
effects, or prescribe different legislative procedures which determine the degree of 
involvement of the EU institutions and the voting requirements in the Council. The 
different interests at stake are expressed by the various choices of legal bases and in 
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situations in which there is no clear delimitation provided for within the treaties, such an 
issue can only be settled before the European courts. Legal basis litigation has therefore 
been an important tool to provide further clarification in situations of competing legal 
bases. 
Under the first pillar the courts had the opportunity on various occasions to set a range 
of general criteria which helped to determine the correct legal basis for a measure. 
Those criteria may also set the standard for the other intergovernmental pillars under 
which the courts had less judicial power to scrutinise and therefore were not able to 
develop a similar set of criteria for legal basis litigation. The most significant criteria 
established under the first pillar are the ‘centre of gravity’ theory and the lex specialis 
derogat legi generali principle. However, the courts have not always been consistent in 
their judgements and have thus created legal uncertainty in some areas: the courts 
accepted that a widening of the scope of these criteria was allowed in exceptional 
circumstances. The case in point here is the zig-zag course of the European courts 
between the single-legal-basis and dual-legal-basis approach. At first, a dual legal basis 
was generally allowed which the Court then denied, giving preference to measures 
adopted on a single legal basis. Most recently, the courts have accepted to allow for a 
dual legal basis in exceptional circumstances if more than one objective is found which 
are inseparably linked with each other. This already shows some inconsistency in the 
Court’s case law and in certain circumstances it is therefore rather difficult to anticipate 
the possible outcome of a case if the legal basis of a measure is contested. 
As can further be observed from the above, the courts have recognised the existence of 
procedural differences and their significance as regards legal basis litigation. This holds 
especially true for different voting requirements. While the courts have ensured the 
conformity of voting procedures if a dual legal basis was under scrutiny, different 
institutional requirements have been considered as mere ‘formal defects’. The only 
attempt of the ECJ to take serious account of the objective to protect the institutional 
balance was in Titanium Dioxide in which the ‘democracy maximising’ rationale has 
been developed. Had this principle been followed suit in subsequent cases the 
maintenance of the institutional balance would have had a greater impact in the 
determination of the correct legal basis. However, subsequent cases have either used a 
much alleviated version of the mentioned rationale, taking into account the importance 
of respecting the institutional balance but not considering it as a decisive factor in the 
choice of legal bases; or in other cases after Titanium Dioxide the Court has availed 
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itself of the ‘centre of gravity’ theory instead. In its most recent judgement in which 
different legislative procedures were at stake, the Court has developed the rule of 
applying the most stringent procedure, i.e. unanimity and co-decision rather than 
qualified majority voting and consultation. While it remains to be seen whether the 
latter judgement will be followed suit in subsequent case law, it can be argued that the 
courts have not been consistent when challenged with different legislative procedures. 
Moreover, as has been argued, the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle has not 
been a valuable tool in order to delimit the scope of general competences, such as 
Articles 114 and 352 TFEU. Instead, these articles are considered as a last resort, thus 
widening the reach of EU competences as a whole. Any harmonising measure could be 
adopted upon Article 114 TFEU, the application of which could not even be affected by 
the explicit exclusion of such harmonisation in Article 168 TFEU. Moreover, the rather 
controversial interpretation of Article 352 TFEU before the courts could neither be said 
to delimit EU competences nor to enhance legal certainty. Any restrictive interpretation 
of Article 352 TFEU was in favour of other EU provisions, indicating a rather high 
threshold for its application as well as an extensive scope of EU competences. The 
application of the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle is also limited to the 
extent that only competing provisions with the same aim, but one being more specific 
than the other, could fall there under. The principle may therefore be considered as an 
auxiliary principle which, under certain circumstances, can help to make a choice 
between two or more possible legal bases for a contested measure. It is further 
considered as being weaker in comparison to other criteria of legal basis litigation, such 
as the ‘centre of gravity’ theory: If the correct legal basis can be found by determining 
the ‘centre of gravity’ of a contested measure, the additional application of the lex 
specialis derogat legi generali principle will not be necessary. 
The ‘centre of gravity’ theory can be considered as the most commonly applied criteria 
in legal basis litigation, which may also render recourse to other principles unnecessary 
if a legal basis can be found therewith.
285
 Nevertheless, it appears from the above that 
the ‘centre of gravity’ theory provides a rather flexible approach as regards the choice of 
the correct legal basis. The ‘centre of gravity’ theory provides that the legal basis of a 
measure is to be determined only by its main objective regardless of any ancillary 
effects. However, despite the courts’ attempt to develop some guidance in the form of 
the classical ‘aim-and-content approach’, it nevertheless raises questions of legal 
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 See, in particular, Case C-376/98, supra note 229. 
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certainty since the Court seems to have diverted from that approach on occasion 
towards a ‘content-only’ test. In addition, since it is not possible to categorise the 
provisions in the Treaty so as to avoid a case-by-case approach in the quest for the 
correct legal basis, it could be argued that at least some decisions might be politically 
motivated rather than based on objective factors. The ‘centre of gravity’ theory was 
therefore criticised in academic literature, most prominently by Trüe who has described 
it as an “Etikettenschwindel”, a ‘false labelling’, since the mere looking at aim and 
content would be insufficient to determine the centre of gravity in borderline cases.
286
 
Moreover, as has been claimed by van Vooren, 
Aim and content may be conceptually objective, but the methodologies involved in 
sorting out which supports to the final decision on legal basis are generally quite 
arbitrary.
287
 
Legal basis litigation continues to exist after Lisbon as well as the validity of most of 
the general criteria previously established under the first pillar. In addition, it has been 
argued that new legal basis conflicts are likely to emerge which could thus challenge the 
European courts anew. The major challenges for the post-Lisbon era lie in the 
delimitation of competences between the European Union and the Member States and 
the resulting possibility of competence cocktails as well as the newly introduced 
hierarchy of legal instruments. As has been argued above, the latter could turn out 
particularly crucial in the exact delimitation of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. It is 
anticipated that inter-institutional disputes may evolve over the correct application and 
distinction between the two provisions which might have serious implications on legal 
basis litigation. As has been shown above, the Treaty of Lisbon fails to define clear 
boundaries of competences and even allows for more than one competence type to 
apply to certain policy areas. In practice, this could lead to competence overlaps unless 
the Court is able to identify clear guidelines to distinguish in such cases. It will thus be 
vital to ensure the correct application of the previously established criteria of legal basis 
litigation in order to achieve a high degree of legal certainty in these new areas of 
conflict. 
Overall, as has been shown, the courts have provided certain criteria for legal basis 
litigation under the first pillar which are, however, deficient to some extent and have led 
                                                          
286
 “Die Schwerpunktlösung entpuppt sich somit in vielen ihrer Anwendungsfälle als Etikettenschwindel, 
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ermitteln lassen.”Trüe, C. (2002), supra note 255, at page 543. 
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to inconsistencies in judgements. In addition, as has been argued, institutional choices 
could have an arbitrary character which might prejudice legal basis litigation and lead to 
legal uncertainties. The new challenges of the post-Lisbon era require for a consistent 
application of previously established criteria or even the development of new guidelines 
in some areas in order to ensure a higher degree of legal certainty for the provisions 
under the Reform Treaty. 
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CHAPTER II:  
 
EU External Relations: intra- and 
inter-pillar aspects 
 
I. Introduction 
Having looked at the structure of legal bases and general criteria of legal basis litigation 
under supranational EU law within the former first pillar, this Chapter will look at the 
specific legal bases in EU external relations and their structure as well as discuss legal 
basis litigation in this area. In particular, this will include an examination of whether 
external powers follow the same rules and principles as they have been discussed under 
Chapter I for the internal sphere or whether different rules have been developed 
specifically for the area of external relations. It is anticipated that the external sphere 
differs from the internal sphere in some aspects as regards competences, legal 
instruments and procedures. As will be shown, the courts therefore had to establish 
special criteria in order to provide guidelines for legal basis litigation in this area. 
External relations has in the past been divided and distributed over three pillars, which 
informally continues to be the case after the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon: 
Despite the integration of the former third pillar into the realm of supranational EU 
law,
1
 the field of external relations is still governed by supranational and 
intergovernmental provisions at once. On the one hand, the Union is equipped with 
supranational powers to regulate in the external relations sphere. On the other hand, the 
area of common foreign and security policy has been established which grants Member 
States competences in external relations. This area is of an intergovernmental character 
which, as shall be seen further below, is governed by entirely different rules and 
principles than supranational law. As a result, legal basis litigation in this area may 
easily receive a cross-pillar dimension. In a highly politicised and at the same time 
                                                          
1
 The discussion in this Chapter will refrain from getting into a detailed analysis of the third pillar which 
will be the main focus of Chapter III. The external sphere of the third pillar is understood to be subject to 
similar settings as the second pillar in the pre-Lisbon era, while it has become part of the TFEU and thus 
the supranational regime post-Lisbon. 
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sensitive area,
2
 such as the external relations of the European Union, it is of the utmost 
importance to establish a certain degree of consistency, transparency, and, most 
significantly, legal certainty. Whether or not this has eventually been achieved by the 
Reform Treaty will also be analysed in this Chapter. 
This Chapter will discuss external relations in the European Union before and after the 
introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon. First, it will examine the structure of legal bases in 
external relations under the former first pillar before and after Lisbon, according to the 
scope and nature of such competences, legal instruments and treaty-making procedures, 
including the resulting potential for intra-pillar legal basis litigation. Second, it will 
analyse the structure of legal bases within the common foreign and security policy 
under the former second pillar according to the nature and scope of the competence, 
legal instruments, and decision-making procedures available, including the resulting 
potential for intra-pillar legal basis litigation. Third, there will be a retrospective 
discussion of inter-pillar or cross-pillar conflicts in external relations. This will be 
specifically focusing on legal basis litigation concerning the old Article 47 (Amsterdam) 
TEU. After this, the new Article 40 TEU will be evaluated and its impact on legal basis 
litigation will be illustrated with the help of a hypothetical case scenario. There will also 
be an excursus examining the unity theory and whether or not such a unity has finally 
been accomplished with the entering into force of the Reform Treaty. This will include 
an evaluation of the newly created position of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as the single legal personality. Finally, there 
will be some concluding remarks. 
 
VIII. External Relations under the First Pillar 
One of the assumptions made in the beginning in order to justify the separate 
examination of the specific field of external relations was that there are certain 
                                                          
2
 Cremona observed that third countries could have certain expectations as to the specific outcome in 
determining the legal basis for a measure which may thus prejudice legal basis litigation, Cremona, M. 
(2006). External Relations of the EU and the Member States: Competence, Mixed Agreements, 
International Responsibility, and Effects of International Law. EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2006/22. San 
Domenico, European University Institute, Department of Law, at pages 10 and 11. See also Koutrakos 
who equally states that “[b]y introducing the interests of third parties as an additional factor in the 
process of the choice of legal basis, the Court rendered a process already fraught with problems even 
more difficult to predict.”, Koutrakos, P. (2008). Legal Basis and Delimitation of Competence in EU 
External Relations. EU foreign relations law: constitutional fundamentals. M. Cremona and B. De Witte. 
Oxford, Hart Publishing: 171-198, at page 183. 
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differences in the external sphere concerning the structure of legal bases as well as the 
principles established for legal basis litigation. For example, this is the case with the 
‘doctrine of implied powers’,3 according to which the Union has acquired subsequent 
external competences flowing from powers granted in the internal sphere. In order to 
analyse the specificities of the area of external relations under supranational EU law, 
this section will first discuss the scope of the competence under supranational external 
relations law and the Union’s ways of extending this scope continuously. In the second 
part of this section, the nature of the competence will be analysed, in particular 
highlighting peculiarities of the external relations area in comparison with internal 
competences under supranational EU law. The third and fourth parts will briefly look at 
external legal instruments and treaty-making procedures respectively. 
 
A. The scope of the competence 
Before the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union had several express 
powers in external relations. One of the first and most prominent areas under the realm 
of supranational powers is the area of common commercial policy which was 
introduced under the Rome Treaty. Subsequent areas of EU competences in external 
relations include humanitarian aid and development cooperation. However, while the 
principle of conferral not only applies to the internal sphere, the scope of external 
competences has been extended by the courts to areas which did not confer express 
powers to the Union in a specific area. Instead, the Union has also been granted implied 
competences according to the ‘doctrine of implied powers’4 or ‘doctrine of 
parallelism’5. This has allowed supranational powers in external relations to expand to 
                                                          
3
 Established by the ECJ in Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the 
European Communities (ERTA), [1971]: ECR 00263. See e.g. Temple Lang, J. (1986). “The ERTA judgment 
and the Court’s case-law on competence and conflict.” Yearbook of European Law 6(1): 183-218. 
4
 See e.g. Eeckhout, P. (2004). External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional 
Foundations. Oxford, Oxford University Press, at Chapter 3 ; Koutrakos, P. (2006). EU International 
Relations Law. Oxford, Hart Publishing, at Chapter 3; Holdgaard, R. (2008). External relations law of the 
European community: legal reasoning and legal discourses. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International BV, at Chapter 4; Cremona, M. (2011). External Relations and External Competence of the 
European Union: The Emergence of an Integrated Policy. The Evolution of EU Law. P. Craig and G. de 
Burca. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 217-268. 
5
 Schütze observes that such “[e]xternal powers run ‘parallel’ to internal powers”, Schütze, R. (2007). On 
'Middle Ground'. The European Community and Public International Law. EUI Working Paper LAW No. 
2007/13. San Domenico, European University Institute, Department of Law. See also Schütze, R. (2010). 
Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Mixity as a (Inter)national Phenomenon. Mixed Agreements Revisited: 
The EU and its Member States in the World. C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos. Oxford, Hart Publishing: 57-86, 
at pages 74-77. 
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such an extent that the Union would almost always be able to take extended action 
where it had an internal competence. 
The ‘doctrine of implied powers’ was first established in the ERTA case.6 Here, the 
Court was requested to review the legality of the Council’s proceedings for the 
negotiation and conclusion of an International Agreement on European road transport.
7
 
The Commission argued that the necessary external competence would flow from an 
internal competence of the Union in the field of the common transport policy.
8
 The 
Council, however, claimed that according to the principle of conferred powers such an 
interpretation would not be possible and that any external competence can only flow 
from express provisions in the Treaty.
9
 The Court clarified in its judgement that even in 
the absence of express provisions for the external sphere the Union may draw 
competences from the internal sphere: 
[T]he Community’s authority to enter into international agreements, regard must be had 
to the whole scheme of the Treaty no less than to its substantive provisions. 
Such authority arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty (...) but may 
equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the 
framework of those provisions, by the Community institutions.
 10
 
In its Opinion 1/76, the ECJ clarified that the Union’s authority extended to cases not 
only where it had already exercised its internal powers but that such authority may also 
be derived from the mere treaty provision without there being the need for the Union to 
have exercised its powers previously if “the participation of the Community in the 
international agreement is (...) necessary for the attainment of one of the objectives of 
the Community.”11 
                                                          
6
 Case 22/70, supra note 3. 
7
 Council's proceedings of 20 March 1970 regarding the negotiation and conclusion by the Member 
States of the Community, under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, of 
the Agreement concerning the work of crews of vehicles engaged in European road transport (ERTA). 
8
 Case 22/70, supra note 3, at para 6. 
9
 Ibid, at para 9. 
10
 Ibid, at paras 15 and 16. 
11
 Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels, 
[1977]: ECR 741, at para 4. See also Böhm, R. (1985). Kompetenzauslegung und Kompetenzlücken im 
Gemeinschaftsrecht: Ein Beitrag zur Klärung und Abgrenzung von effet utile, implied powers, resulting 
powers und Lückenklauseln. Frankfurt, Peter Lang. 
70 
 
This was confirmed more recently in Opinion 2/91.
12
 The Court was again requested to 
review the conclusion of an international convention.
13
 The Netherlands and Germany 
argued that since the Union is not a member of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) it subsequently cannot have any competence to conclude the convention in 
question, which would thus be reserved for Member States only. However, the Court 
reiterated the ‘doctrine of implied powers’, stating that 
The (...) Community’s competence does not flow solely from the provisions of the 
Treaty but may also depend on the scope of the measures which have been adopted by 
the Community institutions for the application of those provisions and which are of 
such a kind as to deprive the Member States of an area of competence which they were 
able to exercise previously on a transitional basis.
14
 
The notion of the ‘doctrine of implied powers’ was reiterated and refined by the Court 
in its Opinion 2/94 in which it held that 
The Community acts ordinarily on the basis of specific powers which, as the Court has 
held, are not necessarily the express consequence of specific provisions of the Treaty 
but may also be implied from them. 
Thus, in the field of international relations, at issue in this request for an Opinion, it is 
settled case-law that the competence of the Community to enter into international 
commitments may not only flow from express provisions of the Treaty but also be 
implied from those provisions. The Court has held, in particular, that, whenever 
Community law has created for the institutions of the Community powers within its 
internal system for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the Community is 
empowered to enter into the international commitments necessary for attainment of that 
objective even in the absence of an express provision to that effect (...).
15
 
It follows from the latter reasoning that the Union had implied external competences for 
matters in which it had express internal powers. On the one hand, this establishes 
certain symmetry between the internal and the external sphere. On the other hand, this 
also shows that external relations are governed by different principles than those which 
the Union has to follow internally: With the development of the ‘doctrine of implied 
                                                          
12
 Opinion 2/91, Convention Nº 170 of the International Labour Organization concerning safety in the 
use of chemicals at work, [1993]: ECR I-01061. See also Stadlmeier, S. (1997). “Die ‘Implied Powers’ der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften.” Austrian Journal of Public and International Law. 52(3): 353-388. 
13
 ILO Convention Nº 170 concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work. 
14
 Opinion 2/91, supra note 12, at para 9. 
15
 Opinion 2/94, on the Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1996]: ECR 1759, at paras 25 and 26. 
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powers’ the Union has, in effect, found a way to circumvent the internal principle of 
conferral for the external sphere. It has thus been able to acquire powers not expressly 
conferred to it under the treaties. 
 
B. The nature of the competence 
The previous Chapter has already looked at the nature of the competence of 
supranational EU law in the internal sphere. However, as will be shown, there are 
differences in external relations which will be discussed in the following. In particular, 
such differences can be found under the exclusive and shared competences of the 
Union. In addition, there is also subsequent exclusivity of supranational competences 
which does not exist at all in the internal sphere. 
 
1. Exclusivity 
An exclusive EU competence was first found in Opinion 1/75: Taking into account the 
common interest of the Union, the Court established that the competence concerning 
Article 207 TFEU had to be of an exclusive nature.
16
 While the main provision under 
the Treaty is (and always has been) an exclusive EU competence,
17
 the actual area of 
common commercial policy could be considered much broader and therefore might 
overlap with other EU powers. This has led to legal basis litigation before the courts 
which were called upon to provide clarification in the delimitation of competences in 
this area. 
In its Opinion 1/94,
18
 the Court of Justice was requested by the Commission to deliver 
an opinion on the nature of the Union competence to conclude the Multilateral 
Agreements on Trade in Goods, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). 
These agreements were annexed to the Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO Agreement). While the Council and the Member States claimed 
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 Opinion 1/75, Draft Understanding on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the auspices of the 
OECD, [1975]: ECR 1355. 
17
 Now Art 207 TFEU. 
18
 Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning 
services and the protection of intellectual property (WTO), [1994]: ECR I-05267. 
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that the competence to conclude international agreements in these areas could only be 
shared between the Union and the Member States, they gave permission to the 
Commission to act on their behalf during the negotiations. This was interpreted by the 
Commission as an acknowledgement of its exclusive powers which it believed would 
flow from Article 207 TFEU alone, or in combination with Articles 114 and 352 TFEU. 
The Court first examined the Union’s competence to conclude the Multilateral 
Agreements on Trade in Goods. The exclusivity of the Union’s competence according 
to Article 207 TFEU for Euratom products was undisputed by the Council and the 
Member States, however, this was not the case as regards ECSC products. In particular 
concerning the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Council argued that their effect was 
predominantly internal and thus could not be adopted on the basis of Article 207 
TFEU.
19
 This reasoning was rejected by the Court which considered all Multilateral 
Agreements on Trade in Goods to be covered by the framework of the common 
commercial policy and thus to fall under the ambit of exclusive EU powers.
20
  
Concerning the GATS and TRIPs Agreements, however, the Court took a rather 
different view. The Court exempted cross-frontier supplies from GATS which were 
covered under Article 207 TFEU and therefore fell within the exclusive competence of 
the Union.
21
 However, the Union had only shared competences for “the modes of 
supply of services referred to by GATS as ‘consumption abroad’, ‘commercial 
presence’ and the ‘presence of natural persons’” which were not covered by the 
exclusive competence under the area of common commercial policy.
22
 Article 207 
TFEU also applied to measures to prohibit the release for the free circulation of 
counterfeit goods which were regulated under the TRIPs Agreement.
23
 The Court, 
however, held that other aspects of the TRIPs Agreement were not covered by the 
Union’s exclusive competence under the common foreign and security policy since their 
internal effects outweighed their external effects.
24
 
The Court’s attempt in Opinion 1/94 was thus very much focused on distinguishing 
between the different aspects of policy areas of the WTO Agreement, allocating some 
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 Ibid, at para 28. 
20
 Ibid, at para 34. 
21
 Ibid, at para 53. 
22
 Ibid, at para 47. 
23
 Ibid, at para 55. 
24
 Ibid, at para 57. 
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competences to the Union alone, while others would have to be shared with the Member 
States. On the one hand, from an internal perspective, this may seem very satisfying for 
Member States’ interests which did not have to give up their entire sovereign powers in 
this area for the mere sake of consistency on the external stage. On the other hand, 
however, this very consistency appears highly fractured if it is taken into consideration 
that the WTO Agreement as well as the other multilateral agreements were established 
as a “single undertaking”25 and as such should have been treated as a consistent whole 
rather than in separate pieces.
 26
 Opinion 1/94 was therefore also described as a “missed 
opportunity” of the Court to bring clarity and consistency in the Union’s external 
relations.
27
 
In the aftermath of Opinion 1/94, the situation slightly changed with the introduction of 
the Treaty of Nice which incorporated the conclusion of agreements in the field of trade 
in services in the EU competence under the area of common commercial policy.
28
 
However, the situation remained unsatisfactory,
29
 inter alia since the area was now 
divided into exclusive and shared competences. In particular, the field of trade in 
services remained ambiguous: According to Article 133(5) EC, such agreements were 
considered similar to the general common commercial policy, the only exception being 
that the last indent provided for some kind of residual competence for Member States: 
the right of the Member States to maintain and conclude agreements with third 
countries or international organisations in so far as such agreements comply with 
Community law and other relevant international agreements. 
Thus, since Member States were left with this possibility to conclude their own 
agreements in this area, the competence for trade in services was of a shared rather than 
exclusive nature. Even more striking is that “agreements relating to trade in cultural and 
audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services” could 
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 Bourgeois, J. H. J. (1995). "The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: An Echternach Procession." 
Common Market Law Review 32(3): 763-787, at page 785. 
26
 Schütze described this as “ontological deformations”, arguing that mixed competences in common 
commercial policy were a logical consequence of the initial broad interpretation of the Union’s exclusive 
powers in this area, Schütze, R. (2009). From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of 
European Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press, at pages 167-173. 
27
 Pescatore, P. (1999). "Opinion 1/94 on "Conclusion" of the WTO Agreement: Is there an escape from a 
programmed disaster?" Ibid. 36(2): 387-405, at page 387. 
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 Old Art 133(5) EC, now Art 207(4) TFEU. 
29
 For a critical analysis of the area of common commercial policy after the introduction of the Treaty of 
Nice, see in particular Cremona, M. (2001). "A policy of bits and pieces? The Common Commercial Policy 
after Nice." Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 4: 61-91; Herrmann, C. W. (2002). "Common 
Commercial Policy after Nice: Sisyphus would have done a better job." Common Market Law Review 
39(1): 7-29. 
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only be concluded jointly between the Union and the Member States according to 
Article 133(6) EC. In fact, this codifies mixity in external relations.
30
 Therefore, as 
could be argued, the area of common commercial policy provided only for partial 
exclusivity.
31
 As a result, intra legal basis litigation, i.e. within this policy area, and in 
particular concerning the area of trade in services, was still possible to occur after the 
introduction of and the codification in the Treaty of Nice.  
In Opinion 1/2008, the Court was requested to deliver another opinion on the 
conclusion of these international agreements.
32
 The opinion concerned the proposed 
modifications and withdrawals of commitments under the GATS agreements. After 
negotiations with certain WTO members and a successfully completed certification 
procedure, the Commission proposed to adopt the contested agreements on the basis of 
Article 133(1) and (5) EC, in conjunction with Article 300(2) EC. The Commission 
explained 
that it had negotiated the agreements at issue for and on behalf of the Community and 
its Member States on the premiss that it could not, from the outset, be ruled out that 
those agreements would require approval by Member States. In view of the 
compensatory adjustments actually negotiated, the Commission was, however, of the 
opinion that they did not go beyond the Community’s internal powers and did not lead 
to harmonisation of the laws of the Member States in an area for which the Treaty rules 
out such harmonisation, so that the second subparagraph of Article 133(6) EC would 
not be applicable and conclusion of the agreements at issue would therefore be within 
the exclusive competence of the Community.
33
 
The Commission argued that the contested agreements could only fall under the 
Union’s exclusive competence of the area of common commercial policy. The 
Commission was convinced that only its exclusive competence would allow for the 
necessary consistency and flexibility, both of which are required to ensure the proper 
application of the agreements in question. In addition, the Commission insisted that 
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 Mixity and mixed agreements are discussed further below under shared competences. 
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 See discussion on exclusivity in Cremona, M. (2001), ibid, at pages 83-86. 
32
 Opinion 1/2008, Conclusion of agreements on the grant of compensation for modification and 
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Article 133(6) EC should be interpreted narrowly, thus allowing for an effective 
application of the Union’s powers under the area of common commercial policy.34 
In contrast, the Council as well as some Member States
35
 insisted that recourse should 
be had to Article 133(6) EC which would only allow for a joint competence of the 
Union together with the Member States.
36
 They claimed that the Union’s exclusive 
competences should not be evoked on mere considerations of effectiveness. Instead, 
they found that mixed agreements have proven effective in the past and therefore the 
proper application of Article 133(6) EC cannot be restricted. The Council and the 
Member States argued that since the contested agreements fell within the scope of 
Article 133(6) EC, this provision had to be applied.
37
 
In Opinion 1/2008, the Court reached a similar conclusion as in Opinion 1/94: The 
agreements in question could only be concluded under a shared competence between the 
Union and its Member States since the Commission failed in its claim to conclude the 
agreements solely under the exclusive competence of the Union within the area of 
common commercial policy.
38
 Interestingly, the Court did not apply the ‘centre of 
gravity’ theory in its judgement. Instead, its analysis focused on ex Article 133 EC and 
the specific derogations thereunder. While the ‘centre of gravity’ theory has proven to 
be a useful criterion in legal basis litigation concerning the internal sphere, it has been 
observed by Cremona that it may be rather difficult to be employed as regards 
international agreements due to the multitude of objectives such agreements entail.
39
 
The Treaty of Lisbon provides some increased clarity as regards the area of common 
commercial policy, codifying an exclusive Union competence in this field, internally as 
well as externally.
40
 Article 207(1) TFEU explicitly states that the area of “common 
commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of 
the Union’s external action.” This shall, however, “not affect the delimitation of 
competences between the Union and the Member States” according to Article 207(6) 
TFEU. The wording of this phrase has been rather unfortunate: Even though unlikely, 
such a non-affection rule could render the whole provision subsidiary similar to the 
phrase “[s]ave where otherwise provided in the Treaties” in Article 114 TFEU. As has 
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 Ibid, at paras 44-51. 
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 Opinion 1/2008, supra note 32, at paras 41-43. 
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 Ibid, at paras 55-67. 
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 Ibid, at paras 130-137. 
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 Cremona, M. (2010), supra note 32, at page 687. 
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been observed by Schütze, the drafters of the treaties have probably intended to “find a 
systemic limit in the internal competences of the Union” with this provision.41 As has 
been argued, the Treaty of Lisbon has nevertheless achieved a better coherence in this 
area between internal and external matters.
42
 However, as has also been observed, this 
was only achieved with an increased supranationalisation of the law in this field.
43
 
 
2. Subsequent Exclusivity 
In external relations, the Union has been able to gain subsequent exclusive powers 
through implied competences. The ‘implied powers doctrine’ has been developed by the 
courts under three main lines of argumentation. These shall be discussed in the 
following. 
The first line of argumentation has been developed by the Court in its famous ERTA 
ruling: In the case of the Union exercising its implied competences in a specific field, 
the Court has argued that this power would become exclusive since Member States are 
then pre-empted from exercising their powers.
44
 
(...) it follows that to the extent to which Community rules are promulgated for the 
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, the Member States cannot, outside the 
framework of the Community institutions, assume obligations which might affect those 
rules or alter their scope.
45
 
More recently, in Opinion 1/03, the ECJ had the chance to revise on the nature of EU 
competences in external relations.  In contrast to the ERTA judgement, it found that the 
implied external powers “may be exclusive or shared with the Member States.”46 The 
Court further explained that 
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(...) the Community enjoys only conferred powers and that, accordingly, any 
competence, especially where it is exclusive and not expressly conferred by the Treaty, 
must have its basis in conclusions drawn from a specific analysis of the relationship 
between the agreement envisaged and the Community law in force and from which it is 
clear that the conclusion of such an agreement is capable of affecting the Community 
rules. 
[It is thus necessary to take into account] the area covered by the Community rules and 
by the provisions of the agreement envisaged, insofar as the latter are known, but also 
of the nature and content of those rules and those provisions, to ensure that the 
agreement is not capable of undermining the uniform and consistent application of the 
Community rules and the proper functioning of the system which they establish.
47
 
The Court thus required for a “substantive normative conflict” to be found between the 
agreement concluded by the Member States and for a proper functioning of EU 
legislation in order to establish a supranational competence.
48
 While this may be 
considered as a slight curtailing of the original even broader ERTA ruling, it 
nevertheless can be observed that the Union’s competences in external relations, 
whether explicit or implied, are rather extensive and as such have been construed widely 
before the courts. 
Under the second line of argumentation, the Court delivered Opinion 1/76
49
 which was 
concerned with the rationalisation of the economic situation of the inland waterway 
transport industry. The respective geographical area included the Netherlands, Germany 
and Switzerland. With particular regard to the latter, the establishment of common rules 
in the area of common transport policy would have hardly been sufficient and therefore 
required an international agreement between the respective states.
50
 Thus, an implied 
EU power was found to be justified if it is “necessary for the attainment of one of the 
objectives of the Community.”51 More recently, a more restrictive interpretation of the 
Union’s exclusive competences can be found in the Open Skies cases. In its rulings, the 
Court of Justice pointed out that such exclusive competence may only flow from an 
internal objective if this was “inextricably linked” to the external relations field.52 
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The third line of argumentation considered that if the Union had hitherto not exercised 
its powers at the internal level Member States could not be excluded from acting in the 
field in question.
53
 In other words, this meant that the external competences would have 
to be shared between the Union and the Member States. This was clarified in the 
Court’s Opinion 1/9454 which particularly analysed the scope of implied exclusive 
competences in the external sphere.
55
 Here, the Court was requested to determine the 
nature of the Union’s implied competence to conclude multilateral agreements on trade 
in goods.
56
 While the Commission argued that the Union’s exclusive competence could 
be implied from its internal competences in the field or from the need to achieving a 
Union objective, the Council objected to this on the grounds that the Union’s 
competence cannot be exclusive to conclude such agreements but can only be shared 
between the Union and the Member States.
57
 The judgment in Opinion 1/94 thus 
defined the outer boundaries of the ‘doctrine of implied powers’: the Union may only 
acquire such powers if it is “not possible to achieve that objective by the establishment 
of autonomous common rules”.58 The Court found that this was not the case here since 
the 
attainment of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services for nationals of 
the Member States is not inextricably linked to the treatment to be afforded in the 
Community to nationals of non-member countries or in non-member countries to 
nationals of Member States of the Community.
59
 
Thus, the Union could not acquire implied exclusive powers to conclude agreements in 
the external sphere, such as the GATS and the TRIPs Agreements. The Court held that 
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such competences could only be shared between the Union and the Member States.
60
 
Nevertheless, as could be argued, the Court has failed in its Opinion to provide clear 
guidelines as to the exact demarcation between the different competences of the 
European Union on the one hand and the Member States on the other,
61
 as well as to 
significantly delimit the expansion of exclusive EU competences in the external 
sphere.
62
 As with the ERTA judgement, Opinion 1/94 was subsequently relativized in 
Opinion 1/03 in which the Court found that both exclusive as well as shared 
competences may be possible in external relations.
63
 
With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union has been granted exclusive 
competence to conclude international agreements, according to the newly introduced 
Article 3(2) TFEU.
64
 While the different types of competences are now static for the 
internal sphere of EU law,
65
 they could still be considered to be rather dynamic for the 
external sphere: 
The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international 
agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is 
necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its 
conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.
66
 
This, in fact, is the codification of the three lines of argumentation of the ‘doctrine of 
implied powers’ which provides the Union with an exclusive competence for the 
external sphere.
67
 A similar wording can be found in Article 216(1) TFEU. The 
introduction of these two provisions has been criticised by Koutrakos who claims that 
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the Lisbon Treaty fails to capture the subtlety and the dynamic nature of the Court’s 
interpretation of competence, risks introducing generalisations in an area which least 
requires them, and raises serious questions as to the ramifications of its provisions.
68
 
It has further been argued that this codification could have the effect of a disposal of 
implied competences, thus increasing the scope of exclusive Union competences which 
would lead to a tremendous diminishing of mixity in external relations.
69
 Nevertheless, 
there remains some ambiguity concerning these two provisions: As has been argued by 
Eeckhout, Article 216(1) TFEU does not explicitly state the nature of the competence in 
question, i.e. exclusive or shared, which could potentially generate new legal basis 
conflicts since it would contradict the exclusive competence provided for in Article 3(2) 
TFEU.
70
 On any account, subsequently exclusive competences and their codification in 
the Treaty of Lisbon are a special peculiarity of external relations which differs from the 
internal sphere where such possibility has never existed due to the strict interpretation of 
the principle of conferral. 
 
3. Shared Competences 
Similar to the internal sphere, shared powers of the Union in external relations means 
that Member States are also competent to take the necessary measures. An example of 
an area of shared competences in external relations is the field of humanitarian aid,
71
 as 
was held in Parliament v Council:
72
 The Court 
pointed out that the Community does not have exclusive competence in the field of 
humanitarian aid, and that consequently the Member States are not precluded from 
exercising their competence in that regard collectively in the Council or outside it.
73
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With the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon a new competence has been 
introduced in the TFEU concerning the field of humanitarian aid: Article 214(1) TFEU 
defines humanitarian aid as providing  
ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are victims 
of natural or man-made disasters, in order to meet the humanitarian needs resulting 
from these different situations. 
The Treaty still leaves some doubt as to the exact nature of the competences in this 
field. While the third sentence of Article 214(1) TFEU suggests that European Union 
and Member States have shared powers to “complement and reinforce” each other’s 
action, Article 4(4) TFEU rather gives the impression of a parallel nature of 
competences,
74
 since it explicitly excludes the possibility of a pre-emptive effect of EU 
actions on Member States’ powers.75 The same wording was used to define the nature of 
competences in the field of development cooperation,
76
 and in the areas of research, 
technological development and space, suggesting a similar parallelism of powers 
between the Union and the Member States since pre-emption is excluded.
77
 If these 
provisions are indeed to be distinguished from shared competences, this would allow for 
potential legal basis conflicts to arise between them due to their distinct nature. 
However, as could also be argued, shared competences in the external sphere are being 
distinguished from shared competences internally. 
This becomes apparent looking at one of the peculiarities of external relations: In areas 
of shared competences, international agreements are concluded jointly between the 
Union and the Member States, which constitutes so-called ‘mixed agreements’78. This 
mixity is of a ‘compulsory’ or ‘obligatory’ nature as shared competences in external 
relations legally require for a joint conclusion of international agreements.
79
 In contrast, 
shared competences under the internal sphere allow for autonomous action of the 
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Union.
80
 So-called ‘facultative mixity’ in external relations can only be found under the 
parallel or concurrent competences of the Union.
81
 As could be argued, this practice 
may have weakened the Union’s capability to a more pro-active role in external 
relations.
82
 As regards their legal effects in the European legal order, ‘mixed 
agreements’ are being treated just as other international agreements falling under the 
exclusive competence of the European Union.
83
 
Examples of mixed agreements include the above discussed WTO Agreements and the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Another noteworthy mixed agreement is the Cotonou 
Agreement: Signed in December 2005, the European Consensus on Development
84
 
constitutes a revealing document, providing a certain amount of guidance in this inter-
pillar area. In pursuance of the Millennium Development Goals set out by the UN, the 
European Community and the Member States agreed on a slight suprantionalisation of 
this area, thus making such international aid more effective. The Agreement points out 
the Union’s “comparative advantages” in the areas of trade and regional integration; 
environment and the sustainable management of natural resources; infrastructure, 
communications and transport; water and energy; rural development, territorial 
planning, agriculture and food security; governance, democracy, human rights and 
support for economic and institutional reforms; conflict prevention and fragile states; 
human development; and social cohesion and employment. An example of such a 
development cooperation agreement is the Cotonou Agreement,
85
 which was just 
recently revised for the second time.
86
 This Agreement was concluded with the aim 
to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP 
States, with a view to contributing to peace and security and to promoting a stable and 
democratic political environment.
87
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It further focuses on the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty “consistent with 
the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP 
countries into the world economy.”88 
The significance of this Agreement may be somewhat diluted considering the non-
exclusiveness of the Union’s powers in these areas. This means that there is a de facto 
parallelism of external competences in this area, allowing for the EU as well as the 
Member States to conclude individual bilateral agreements on development cooperation 
with third countries.
89
 While the latter could be considered to be less significant and less 
effective, they could nevertheless undermine the effectiveness of an agreement of 
greater scope such as the Cotonou Agreement. On the other hand, it can also be argued 
that the intergovernmental approach could be more adequate to give consideration to the 
sensitive nature of development policy. In any case, however, it can be assumed that the 
parallel nature of external powers in this field, even though comprehensive for a 
European lawyer, may be rather confusing for third countries entering into negotiations 
with the European Union. 
As can be observed, the exact nature of the competence in the field of development 
cooperation is rather unclear, which remains the case in the post-Lisbon era.
90
 While 
Article 208(1) TFEU suggests shared competences, Article 4(4) TFEU could imply 
certain parallelism in development cooperation. In any case, since pre-emption is 
excluded, Member States may take action in the field irrespective of whether or not the 
Union exercises its powers. This means that in cases such as the Cotonou Agreement, 
the Member States will still be able to conclude their individual agreements with third 
countries, notwithstanding and alongside the agreement concluded by the Union. 
As regards mixity after Lisbon, it can be observed that the codification and allocation of 
additional exclusive competences to the European Union as well as a better delimitation 
of competences in shared policy areas could decrease the significance of mixed 
agreements.
91
 However, mixity will certainly not vanish from the external relations 
                                                          
88
 Art 1 second indent of the Cotonou Agreement. 
89
 “[Art 133 EC] shall not affect the right of the Member States to maintain and conclude agreements 
with third countries or international organisations in so far as such agreements comply with Community 
law and other relevant international agreements.” Article 133(5) fourth indent EC, emphasis added; See 
also Holland, M. (2002), supra note 281, at page 21. 
90
 See also Craig, P. (2010). The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, at page 394. 
91
 See de Baere, G. (2008). Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, at pages 69 and 70. 
84 
 
sphere of EU law.
92
 Within all areas of shared competences mixed agreements are 
possible, unless the agreement in question fulfils the requirements set out in Article 3(2) 
TFEU and thus falls under the exclusive competence of the Union. This certainly 
indicates a tendency towards more harmonisation as regards international agreements by 
encroaching upon Member States’ competences. 
 
C. Legal Instruments 
Under supranational EU law, internal legal instruments are also available externally. 
They have the same legal status and effects as has already been discussed above. 
However, in addition, legal instruments in external relations also include international 
agreements. According to Article 216(1) TFEU 
The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international 
organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is 
necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the 
objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or 
is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope. 
As has already been argued above, this could be considered as the codification of the 
‘doctrine of implied powers’, a strategy which was pursued by the European courts 
before the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon in order to grant the Union additional 
competences in the external sphere. In addition, Article 217 TFEU also enables the 
Union to conclude international “agreements establishing an association involving 
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure.” 
According to Article 216(2) TFEU international agreements “are binding upon the 
institutions of the Union and on its Member States.” Whether or not such an agreement 
also becomes directly effective has to be decided by the courts on a case-by-case 
analysis, employing a ‘two-stage test’.93 In general, the courts first have to establish the 
capability of the agreement in question to entail such direct effect or the lack of any 
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contrary evidence.
94
 In the International Fruit case,
95
 the Court was requested in a 
preliminary ruling to evaluate on the compatibility of Regulations No 459/70,
96
 
565/70
97
 and 686/70
98
 with Article XI of the GATT
99
 Agreement. For the alleged 
incompatibility it had to be necessary for the latter to bind the Union as well as to confer 
rights on its citizens.
100
 The Court established that this capability of direct effect of an 
international agreement and thus the requirement for the first part of the test has to 
include an analysis of “the spirit, the general scheme and the terms” of the agreement in 
question.
101
 In this case, the Court found that Article XI of the GATT Agreement was 
not capable of entailing direct effects and therefore the contested regulations could not 
be incompatible with international law. As has been argued by Schütze, the evaluation 
on the first part of the test is purely ‘political’ in nature and may therefore lead to 
arbitrary results.
102
 
Second, in order to be considered directly effective, the specific provisions must be 
“unconditional and sufficiently precise” which has to be analysed “in the light of both 
the object and purpose of the Agreement and of its context.”103 This is equivalent to the 
test in the internal sphere whether or not an instrument can have direct effect.
104
 So far, 
the courts have refused such direct effect only in a few cases as, for example, for the 
WTO agreements in Germany v Council.
105
 The Court clarified in Portugal v Council 
its reasoning for rejecting such direct effect for WTO agreements: 
To accept that the role of ensuring that Community law complies with those rules 
devolves directly on the Community judicature would deprive the legislative or 
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executive organs of the Community of the scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by their 
counterparts in the Community’s trading partners.106 
Another example in which direct effect was rejected concerned the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea as has been held in the Intertanko case: On the grounds that this 
convention does not so much confer rights on individuals as it does on costal states and 
ships, it could not have any direct effect.
107
 
Concerning the scope of direct effect, the Court has stated in Walrave, referring to 
regulations and agreements, that “to limit the prohibitions in question to acts of a public 
authority would risk creating inequality in their application.”108 The Court further 
clarified in Case C-438/00 that an international agreement can have direct effects on 
private parties:
109
 Here, a non-discrimination rule included in the Association 
Agreement between the Union and Slovakia had to be scrutinised according to its 
scope.
110
 It was held that the provision in question had  
effects vis-à-vis third parties inasmuch as it does not apply solely to measures taken by 
the authorities but also extends to rules applying to employees that are collective in 
nature.
111
 
Thus, international agreements have horizontal direct effect, which may be considered 
as taking the form of “external regulations”.112 In comparison, a mere vertical direct 
effect would be tantamount to external directive and therefore preclude the direct 
enforceability of the agreement in a private setting.
113
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D. Treaty-making Procedures 
Treaty-making procedures for the Union’s external relations competences are laid down 
in Article 218 TFEU. The Council has been entrusted with the principal role to 
“authorise the opening of negotiations, adopt negotiating directives, authorise the 
signing of agreements and conclude them.”114 The European Commission is entitled to 
submit recommendations to the Council, unless “the agreement relates exclusively or 
principally to the common foreign and security policy” in which case the right to 
initiative rests with the High Representative.
115
 As has been observed by Eeckhout 
The division of labour as regards CFSP and non-CFSP matters between the High 
Representative and the Commission appears to reflect the methodology which the Court 
of Justice has developed for delimiting different legal bases in the Treaties: that of the 
main or principal purpose or component of the measure.
116
 
This, in fact, signifies the potential for new intra legal basis conflicts in this area: As 
could be argued, the Commission and the High Representative are likely to battle for the 
right of initiative and in which sphere of competence the predominant purpose of a 
measure falls. 
Voting in the Council is required to follow the qualified majority procedure according 
to Article 218(8) TFEU. Exceptionally, this provision requires unanimity if this is 
specified in the field covered by the agreement, for association agreements, agreements 
falling under Article 212 TFEU, as well as for the Union’s accession agreement to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.
117
 As could be argued, this could generate intra legal basis litigation as 
regards the correct delimitation between cases falling under the qualified majority 
voting and those exceptionally requiring unanimity. Eeckhout again distinguishes 
between CFSP and non-CFSP matters, the former being restricted to unanimity voting 
only.
118
 International agreements may be challenged according to the procedure set out 
in Article 218(11) TFEU. If requested by any Member State, the Parliament, the 
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Council or the Commission, the European Court has to scrutinise the agreement’s 
compatibility with the treaties.
119
 
The European Parliament is generally entitled to be “immediately and fully informed at 
all stages of the procedure” according to Article 218(10) TFEU. In addition, the 
Parliament has to be consulted before the Council can proceed to adopt a decision 
concluding an agreement.
120
 Consent of the Parliament is required in a few cases set out 
in Article 218(6)(a) TFEU.
121
 In particular the fifth option of this provision shows some 
congruency with the internal sphere: The Parliament’s consent is required if the 
proposed agreement falls within an area which internally would also require at least 
consent.
122
 Nevertheless, symmetry between the external and internal sphere is not 
entirely fulfilled: As can be observed, this is still lagging behind the standards to be 
complied with in the internal sphere where the Parliament’s role is extended to the co-
decision procedure in certain circumstances. This has been described as the “structural 
‘democratic deficit’ in the procedural regime for international agreements”.123 Intra 
legal basis litigation could occur as regards the delimitation between consultation and 
consent procedures: While the European Parliament will have an interest in a maximum 
of influence, thus the requirement to give its consent, the Council will have an interest 
in a rather quick procedure, thus favouring mere consultation of the Parliament. 
 
E. Intra-pillar Legal Basis Litigation 
As regards legal basis litigation under supranational external relations, conflicts usually 
arise between areas of the Union’s exclusive powers and such areas where it has only a 
shared competence with the Member States. Obviously, the Union prefers the adoption 
of international agreements upon a legal basis excluding Member States’ involvement, 
while the latter attempt to ensure their inclusion in the legislative process. As has 
already been identified above, a significant area of legal basis conflicts in external 
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relations is the field of common commercial policy. Not only has it generated intra legal 
basis litigation, i.e. within the same provision, as can be seen for example in Opinion 
1/2008,
124
 but also intra-pillar legal basis litigation, i.e. with other provisions under the 
former first pillar. 
In Portugal v Council,
125
 Council Decision 94/578/EC
126
 was challenged on the grounds 
of an incorrect legal basis. The contested decision was adopted on the basis of Articles 
207 and 211 TFEU in conjunction with Article 167 TFEU, thus under the joint areas of 
common commercial policy, development cooperation and culture. Portugal, however, 
claimed that Article 352 TFEU should have been considered an additional legal basis 
necessary for the conclusion of the contested decision. While the Council was able to 
adopt the contested measure under a mere qualified majority voting, the additional 
recourse to Article 352 TFEU would have required unanimity voting. Portugal, being 
unfavourable of the decision in question, was thus denied its power to veto under the 
former procedure.
127
 
Portugal argued inter alia that Article 352 TFEU was a necessary legal basis for the 
adoption of measures concerning human rights. Such human rights provisions were 
incorporated in the contested decision. Portugal observed that 
the fact that respect for fundamental rights ranks among the general principles whose 
observance is mandatory in the Community legal order does not justify the conclusion 
that the Community is competent to adopt measures in that field, whether internal or 
external.
128
 
While Article 211 TFEU was sufficient only for cooperation agreements with human 
rights as a general objective, Portugal argued that the contested decision was essentially 
concerned with the respect for human rights.
129
 The Council, however, explained that 
the human rights objective was considered an “essential element of development 
policy”130 and therefore Article 211 TFEU was a sufficient legal basis. The Court 
recalled general principles of legal basis litigation concerning the residual nature of 
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Article 352 TFEU and the ‘centre of gravity’ theory.131 It held that the inclusion of a 
human rights objective did not go beyond the competences found in the legal bases on 
which the contested measure had been adopted and therefore an additional recourse to 
Article 352 TFEU was not justified.
132
 
Another example of intra-pillar legal basis litigation can be found as regards different 
competences. Since the area of common commercial policy generally falls within the 
exclusive competences of the Union, it usually conflicts with other shared competences, 
such as the area of environmental policy. In its Opinion 2/00,
133
 the Court was asked to 
elaborate on the Commission’s questions referring to the correct choice of legal basis as 
well as the nature of Member States’ competences and their involvement in the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. This agreement was negotiated as a result to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, signed in 1992 and adopted on the basis of Article 
192 TFEU. The Commission essentially claimed that the protocol in question should 
have rather been adopted on the basis of an exclusive Union competence provided by 
Article 207 TFEU in order to ensure a coherent and effective application of a common 
objective of the Union; more specific, however incidental, matters could be covered by 
the additional legal basis of Article 191 TFEU.
134
 In general, the Commission relied on 
a broad interpretation of the concept of the common commercial policy and insisted that 
The fact that provisions governing international trade in certain products pursue 
objectives which are not primarily commercial (...) cannot (...) have the effect of 
excluding the Community’s exclusive competence and justifying recourse to, for 
example, Article 175 EC where the measures in question are intended specifically to 
govern the Community’s external trade (...). In reality, measures regulating international 
trade often pursue a wide range of different objectives, but this does not mean that they 
must be adopted on the basis of the various Treaty provisions relating to those 
objectives.
135 
The Council as well as the Member States defended their choice of legal basis of Article 
192 TFEU on the grounds that the protection of the environment constituted the main 
aim and purpose of the contested protocol. This was also confirmed by the Parliament, 
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which, however, did not entirely reject an additional recourse to Article 207 TFEU due 
to the protocol’s international reach.136 
In its judgement, the Court looked at general principles of legal basis litigation, such as 
the objective factors and the ‘centre of gravity’ theory.137 More specifically, the Court 
considered that the interpretation of an international agreement should be in conformity 
with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which reads that 
a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.
138
 
The Court found that the Protocol pursued an environmental objective and therefore 
could be adopted on a legal basis within that area. Thus, the Court did not follow the 
Commission’s reasoning of a broad interpretation of the concept of the common 
commercial policy. Instead, it confirmed the protocol’s main aim to rest within the 
environmental policy area, while having only incidental international effects.
139
 The 
competence to conclude the protocol in question was therefore shared between the 
Union and the Member States according to Article 192 TFEU.
140
 Thus, while the Court 
affirmed the legal basis used, it once more did not provide any more information 
concerning the actual demarcation of powers between the Union and the Member 
States. It merely held that both share competences in their capacities to conclude the 
Protocol in question. 
In another case,
141
 concerning the Energy Star Agreement,
142
 the Court was again 
requested to find the correct legal basis in either common commercial policy or 
environmental policy. The Agreement was adopted under the environmental policy on 
the legal basis of Article 192(1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 218 TFEU. This was 
subsequently challenged by the Commission which argued that the main objective of 
the contested agreement was to facilitate trade and therefore should have rather been 
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adopted under the area of common commercial policy on the basis of Article 207 
TFEU.
143
 The Council denied any such effects on international trade evolving from the 
contested measure, arguing that the main aim of the Agreement is “to reduce energy 
consumption by stimulating the supply of, and demand for, energy-efficient 
equipment.”144 
Again, the Court looked at the general criteria of legal basis litigation, finding that the 
contested agreement pursues both commercial as well as environmental objectives. 
However, when looking at the effects of the measure in question, the Court observed 
that 
It is true that in the long term, depending on how manufacturers and consumers in fact 
behave, the programme should have a positive environmental effect as a result of the 
reduction in energy consumption which it should achieve. However, that is merely an 
indirect and distant effect, in contrast to the effect on trade in office equipment which is 
direct and immediate.
145
 
Thus, according to the ‘centre of gravity’ theory, the Court held that the Agreement 
should fall under the common commercial policy and should have therefore been 
adopted on the basis of Article 207 TFEU. 
In general, different competences in external relations have led to intra-pillar legal basis 
litigation, in particular under supranational EU law. It is evident from the above that 
there is no clear demarcation to be drawn between the different legal bases. In addition, 
international agreements usually pursue two or more objectives which have made it 
even more challenging for the courts to apply general criteria of legal basis litigation, 
such as the ‘centre of gravity’ theory which may lead to diverging results on a case-by-
case analysis. 
 
IX. External Relations under the Second Pillar 
The second pillar was established in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the 
framework of which was subsequently changed under the Treaties of Amsterdam and 
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Nice. However, those changes have left the area of common foreign and security policy 
almost unaffected; both in explicit terms as well as in the way these rules have been 
interpreted in the decision-making processes within the institutions. The few significant 
changes have rather codified existing practices or have contributed to their 
facilitation.
146
 Hardly any newly introduced rules can be said to have restricted Member 
States in their sovereign rights over common foreign and security policy.
147
 It is 
important to note here that the area of common foreign and security policy has been 
rather remote from scrutiny of the European Court of Justice which thus impeded legal 
basis litigation in the former second pillar. The lack of judicial control in this area is 
being maintained under the Treaty of Lisbon which provides that the Court  
shall not have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the common foreign 
and security policy nor with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions.
148
 
However, as could be argued, there is a potential for legal basis conflicts even within 
the CFSP area due to the two exceptions provided for in Article 275 TFEU under which 
the Court of Justice may nevertheless scrutinise the compliance with Article 40 TEU as 
well as the legality of restrictive measures according to Article 263 TFEU.
149
 This 
section will therefore analyse the second pillar as regards its distinctiveness from 
supranational EU law before and after Lisbon, in particular looking at the available 
safeguard mechanisms so as to maintain the autonomy of this area of law as well as the 
compliance with such rules in practice. It will start by looking at the competences 
available under the common foreign and security policy and how this differs from 
Union competences. Second, it will analyse the specific nature of the set of legal 
instruments available under the former second pillar in comparison to supranational 
instruments. Third, CFSP decision-making procedures will be scrutinised as to their 
distinctiveness from legislative procedures available under the TFEU. Last, there will be 
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an evaluation of the findings as regards their influence on the actual relationship 
between the two pillars. It is anticipated that the former second pillar remains distinct 
from the supranational EU law to a large extent, despite the introduction of the Reform 
Treaty. 
 
A. CFSP competences 
1. The scope of the competence 
The scope of the competence under the area of common foreign and security policy has 
largely remained the same as before the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 
2(4) TFEU declares that there is a Union competence in the area of common foreign and 
security policy: 
The Union shall have competence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on 
European Union, to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, 
including the progressive framing of a common defence policy.
150
 
Article 24 TEU provides that the Union’s competence under the field of CFSP 
shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, 
including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a 
common defence. 
Article 42(2) TEU comprises a ‘saving clause’ concerning Member States’ relations 
with international organisations: 
The policy of the Union (...) shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and 
defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain 
Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the 
common security and defence policy established within that framework. 
Subparagraph six of the same Article contains another ‘saving clause’ concerning the 
relationship between Member States: 
Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have 
made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most 
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demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union 
framework. 
The general objectives of the common foreign and security policy after Lisbon are 
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law.
151
 
It can be argued that the Union’s competence under the second pillar has always been 
construed widely with certain flexibility for Member States’ self-determination. The 
new treaty fails to clarify the scope of CFSP competences and its concrete delimitation 
from supranational external competences per se. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that this 
situation may be remedied by the introduction of the new Article 40 TEU which will be 
discussed further below. 
 
2. The nature of the competence 
While the EU Treaties do not provide a clear statement as to the actual type of the 
Union’s competence, Article 24 TEU entitles the Union to some kind of competence 
only which may be interpreted in several ways. 
It could be argued that CFSP competences are shared between the Union and the 
Member States according to Article 4(1) TFEU which provides that any competence 
conferred by the Treaties “which does not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 3 and 
6” TFEU shall be of a shared nature. The area of common foreign and security policy is 
only mentioned in Article 2(4) TFEU, however, neither in Article 3 TFEU relating to an 
exclusive Union competence nor in Article 6 TFEU as regards the Union’s 
complementary powers. It could thus be argued that the Treaty of Lisbon has introduced 
shared competences under the former second pillar. This would suggest that CFSP 
measures would be directly applicable as well as superior as regards national laws. 
However, this would also mean that the Union could pre-empt Member States’ powers 
according to Article 2(2) TFEU which arguably cannot have been intended to apply to 
the area of common foreign and security policy by the drafters of the Treaty of 
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Lisbon.
152
 Whether or not such an interpretation is intended is only relevant in so far as 
the courts will follow a teleological interpretation when deciding such cases which is, of 
course, highly desirable. Otherwise, Member States’ powers would be vulnerable to 
pre-emption whenever the Union decides to exercise its powers. This approach can 
therefore only be rejected and it is recommended that the ECJ should not interpret CFSP 
competences as being shared between the Union and its Member States. 
It could further be argued that the CFSP competences are of a sui generis nature.
153
 It is 
anticipated from further below that there is only a limited possibility of interaction of 
Union law under the common foreign and security policy with the laws of the Member 
States after Lisbon. Thus, the possibility of pre-emption of CFSP competences is rather 
unlikely and therefore the nature of CFSP competences will not be shared between the 
Union and the Member States. Since the Treaty of Lisbon has preserved a certain degree 
of independency and distinctness of the former second pillar, especially as regards the 
area of security policy, the nature of the competence under the CFSP Title can thus be 
described as more intergovernmental rather than supranational. While this could be 
considered as evidence for a parallel competence under the new Treaty on European 
Union, it might equally constitute an exception from the otherwise sui generis 
competences in the area of common foreign and security policy. Therefore, it is 
suggested here that the Lisbon Treaty has established a sui generis competence for the 
area of common foreign and security policy which is rather distinct from other EU 
policy areas under the TFEU.
154
 The significance of this distinction lies with the 
specificity of CFSP provisions for which it is vital to be protected from encroachment 
from TFEU provisions, in which case the intergovernmental exercise of competences 
would be jeopardised. 
Having a closer look at the specific provisions under the former second pillar after 
Lisbon, a distinction could be made between the area of foreign policy on the one hand 
and the area of security policy on the other: The former has allocated a dominant role to 
the Union and a supporting role to the Member States, which are obliged to comply 
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with the Union’s actions and to refrain from acting against the Union’s interests.155 
Thus, rejecting the concept of shared competences for the area of common foreign and 
security policy, this could be an indication of the existence of parallel powers.
156
 For 
example, Article 28(2) TEU provides that decisions adopted under this provision “shall 
commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their 
activity.” This would support the classification of CFSP provisions as parallel 
competences.
157
 In contrast to this, the area of security policy confines the competences 
of the Union to a complementary or supporting nature: The Union may make 
recommendations to the Member States but it can neither prejudice their specific 
policies nor prevent them from adopting more stringent measures.
158
 This certainly 
supports the argument that competences under the area of common foreign and security 
policy cannot be classified as shared between the Union and the Member States, 
however, should rather be considered as parallel or even sui generis in nature. 
 
B. Legal Instruments 
1. Before Lisbon 
A distinct set of legal instruments had been developed under the common foreign and 
security policy since the establishment of the pillar structure under Maastricht.
159
 Before 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, available measures have comprised 
principles and general guidelines, common strategies, joint actions, and common 
positions.
160
 While the nature of general guidelines, common strategies and other CFSP 
instruments, such as declarations,
161
 were only vaguely defined in the old Article 13 
(Amsterdam) TEU, the EU Treaty provided some more guidance as to the nature of 
joint actions and common positions: According to the old Article 14(1) (Amsterdam) 
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TEU joint actions were defined as to “address specific situations where operational 
action by the Union is deemed to be required.” Further, Article 14(3) (Amsterdam) TEU 
provided some indication as to the legal effects of such joint actions, requiring that they 
“shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their 
activity.” It could be argued that this obligation entailed legal effects for Member States 
since it required them to take action or refrain from any contradictory action 
respectively, although the actual form of this action was left almost entirely for the 
discretion of the Member State in question. Compliance with joint actions was also 
required in Article 20 (Amsterdam) TEU which, unfortunately, was drafted in similarly 
vague terms. The question which arose was what would happen if a Member State acted 
contrary to the objectives set out in a joint action or if it did not take any action in a 
situation in which a joint action would require it to do so. Although direct effect for 
joint actions was not explicitly excluded under Article 14 TEU,
162
 such vertical direct 
effect would be difficult to establish considering the lack of judicial review
163
 in the 
area of common foreign and security policy.
164
  
The uncertainty surrounding joint actions as regards their binding or non-binding nature 
respectively thus led to criticism
165
 and to far-fetched speculation whether this CFSP 
legal instrument could even be interpreted to resemble to a certain extent Regulations 
and Directives as regards the obligation imposed upon Member States with the adoption 
of such instruments.
166
 However, this cannot be seen as to have constituted sufficient 
evidence for a similar status of joint actions with legal instruments available under 
supranational EU law, especially when taking into account the lack of direct effect of 
former second pillar measures. Such a comparison is further unconvincing since the 
European courts have never mentioned such a possibility to read Article 14 
(Amsterdam) TEU in a similar vein as any Union legal instrument. 
Article 15 (Amsterdam) TEU regulated common positions which “shall define the 
approach of the Union to a particular matter (...).” Similar to the legal effects of joint 
actions, Article 15 (Amsterdam) TEU provided that “Member States shall ensure that 
their national policies conform to the common positions.” This ‘conformity’ 
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requirement, though equally imprecisely worded, has been said to have been even more 
significant in practical terms in the case of common positions than it is for joint 
actions.
167
 Further, there was also an external dimension to the scope of common 
positions: Member States were required to sustain the objectives of such common 
positions in international organisations and at international conferences.
168
 Similar to 
joint actions, however, it would be difficult to establish direct effect for common 
positions on the grounds that the ECJ had no powers to scrutinise in the area of common 
foreign and security policy. 
It can thus be argued that the set of legal instruments previously available under the 
second pillar was intergovernmental in nature due to its lack of direct effect. The 
legislative amendments under Amsterdam and Nice have led to a codification and a 
better definition of the available forms of cooperation between the Member States. The 
intergovernmental character, however, was preserved which can be largely attributed to 
the fact that no direct or indirect effect could be implied. The result of this interpretation 
is that the area of common foreign and security policy has remained as a rather remote 
area, particularly in comparison to the laws and principles available under the Union 
pillar. 
 
2. After Lisbon 
With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, the set of legal instrument slightly 
changes: While general guidelines continue to exist as an independent instrument after 
Lisbon,
169
 (joint) actions and (common) positions are now part of the accumulative 
instrument of decisions.
170
 Arrangements for the implementation of such decisions 
constitute a third sub-category of instruments.
171
 Common strategies have disappeared 
under the new set of legal instruments after Lisbon. These changes have been criticised 
by de Witte who claims that Lisbon does not simplify the system of legal instruments.
172
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First, this is due to the fact that the newly introduced CFSP instrument of a decision 
comes in three versions (actions, positions and arrangements), two of which were 
previously independent instruments (joint actions and common positions). This could 
lead to confusion in so far as it might not always be immediately clear as to which type 
of decision is meant. Second, there is further risk of confusion as regards the decision 
available under the TFEU and the decision available for CFSP competences. CFSP 
decisions and TFEU decisions might differ in scope and applicability which makes it 
even more regrettable that the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon have not been able to 
convert this distinctiveness into the actual denomination of the instruments.
173
 
It is thus not entirely clear whether the set of legal instruments available under the 
common foreign and security policy has remained distinct from the legal instruments 
available under the TFEU. On the one hand, it could be argued that apart from the mere 
labels of the instruments, the main difference in their nature is that TFEU instruments 
have a binding effect on Member States, while CFSP instruments remain without such 
direct effect. The adoption of legislative acts, which would be directly applicable, is 
explicitly excluded under the CFSP area.
174
 Member States could therefore remain 
independent since they are free to choose whether and to which extent they are willing 
to comply with the adopted CFSP measures, which is not the case with TFEU 
instruments. This would be evidence of the intergovernmental character of the former 
second pillar after Lisbon and would require the protection of the provisions under the 
common foreign and security policy from encroachment from TFEU provisions. 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that these decisions available under the area 
of common foreign and security policy should be considered as a mere sub-category or 
special form of the general instrument of a TFEU decision. The drafters of the Lisbon 
Treaty might have chosen the same name in order to facilitate the alignment of these 
instruments which are likely to have the same legal characteristics in practice, i.e. 
directly effective if the provisions are clear, unconditional and precise.
175
 The set of 
legal instruments available under the first pillar has in the past already shown a 
tendency for assimilation to the extent that the differences between legal instruments 
have been blurred,
176
 a development which may now have been extended to CFSP 
instruments alike. Under this scenario, the intergovernmental character will be lost and 
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CFSP instruments would receive binding character. It remains questionable whether 
such an enormous step towards supranationalisation in the area of common foreign and 
security policy can be enforced in practice instantly. On any account, it will trigger legal 
basis conflicts where the courts will have the chance to give direction, one way or the 
other. 
As regards international agreements, the Union is empowered to conclude such 
agreements “with one or more States or international organisations” according to Article 
37 TEU under the area of common foreign and security policy. This CFSP instrument 
has to be considered as the same as international agreements under Title V of Part Five 
TFEU. According to Article 216(2) TFEU such agreements “are binding upon the 
institutions of the Union and on its Member States.” Further, as has been shown above, 
international agreements can also entail direct effect under certain circumstances, 
applying a ‘two-stage test’ on a case-by-case analysis. 
 
C. Decision-making Procedures 
Decision-making procedures under the common foreign and security policy largely 
characterise the intergovernmental nature of the former second pillar. The 
distinctiveness of decision-making procedures has contributed to the maintenance of the 
CFSP as a remote area under the sovereignty of Member States and their competent 
authorities. 
 
1. The institutional balance 
A major difference which distinguishes the area of common foreign and security policy 
from supranational EU law is the distribution of competences between the institutions. 
Previously, the main institutional actor in the decision-making processes under the 
second pillar used to be the Council which had the duty to ensure the compliance with 
the general CFSP objectives as was set out in Article 11 (Amsterdam) TEU. The 
Council also ensured “the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the 
Union”,177 and, in particular, could take the necessary decisions, recommended common 
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strategies, and adopted joint actions and common positions.
178
 Any Member State had 
the right of initiative to bring in a proposal for such measures.
179
 After the introduction 
of the Treaty of Lisbon, Member States remain the main actors which shall together 
with the High Representative
180
 of the Union put into effect the CFSP which shall be 
defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council.
181
 The right of 
initiative in the area of common foreign and security policy as well as the common 
security and defence policy is now mainly vested in the High Representative.
182
 
The Council also remains the main actor for the conclusion of international agreements, 
according to Article 218(2) TFEU which provides that the “Council shall authorise the 
opening of negotiations, adopt negotiating directives, authorise the signing of 
agreements and conclude them.” The European Parliament’s influence continues to be 
of a specific nature under the CFSP area,
183
 being exempted from Article 218(6) TFEU 
which otherwise requires the Parliament’s consent under specific circumstances, thus 
maintaining the mere consulting procedure for CFSP provisions. The Commission’s 
influence remains limited to make recommendations and proposals for international 
agreements.
184
 
Thus, the influence of other European institutions, apart from the Council, has always 
been rather limited under the second pillar. For example, the Commission has a limited 
capacity to submit proposals, which, after the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, may 
even have to be jointly with the High Representative.
185
 Further, the involvement of the 
European Parliament in CFSP matters does not go beyond the mere consultation 
requirement.
186
 Most prominently, however, is the lack of judicial scrutiny for CFSP 
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matters. The European Court of Justice remains to have no jurisdiction under the second 
pillar after Lisbon except where it is required to review the compliance with the new 
Article 40 TEU.
187
 
 
2. Voting requirements 
Another important indicator for the intergovernmental nature of the former second pillar 
is the availability of voting procedures in favour of individual Member States. It is 
explicitly provided in the new Article 24(1) second indent TEU that specific rules and 
procedures will continue to apply to CFSP provisions. While qualified majority voting 
has been promoted under supranational EU law for a long time, unanimity in the 
Council remains the rule under the common foreign and security policy.
188
 This 
unanimity requirement highlights the integrity of Member States and thus contributes to 
the intergovernmental character of CFSP measures. The Treaty further provides for 
Member States to opt-out from certain measures as well as emergency brakes if at least 
one third of the Member States
189
 abstain from a proposed measure. 
Nevertheless, qualified majority voting has also been promoted under the common 
foreign and security policy and may apply in exceptional circumstances listed in Article 
31(2) TEU.
190
 It is observed that the Treaty of Lisbon has introduced a distinction 
between two different types of qualified majority voting: ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ 
qualified majority voting.
191
 While under the ‘ordinary’ voting procedure a majority of 
“at least 55% of the members of the Council (...), comprising at least 65% of the 
population”192 would be sufficient, the ‘special’ qualified majority requires “at least 
72% of the members of the Council”193. The ‘ordinary’ qualified majority applies if the 
Council acts upon a proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the 
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Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Otherwise, the ‘special’ qualified 
majority applies. Accordingly, the exceptions listed in Article 31(2) TEU have to be 
distinguished: The first exception requires the ‘special’ qualified majority, while 
exceptions number two and four entail the ‘ordinary’ voting procedure. The third 
exception listed under Article 31(2) TEU could require either procedure. 
It could be argued that the distinction between those different types of qualified 
majority voting for the exceptions listed under Article 31 TEU in the area of common 
foreign and security policy may have further implications for legal basis litigation in 
future cases.
194
 In particular, the first and second options under Article 31(2) TEU could 
trigger such legal basis conflicts. Here, the European Council and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy are likely to quarrel 
over their right of initiative which would have an impact on each Member State’s 
weight in the subsequent voting procedure. While Member States would have an 
interest in a decision to be adopted under the first indent of Article 31(2) TEU and thus 
the requirement of at least 72% of the members approving the proposed decision in the 
Council, the Union could prefer a lower threshold for measures to be adopted in this 
area and thus would rather the decision to be adopted under the second indent. It is 
difficult to anticipate the outcome of such a legal basis conflict and any further 
developments on these matters will hopefully induce increased clarity. 
 
D. Intra-pillar Legal Basis Litigation 
Intra-pillar legal basis litigation within the area of common foreign and security policy 
does not exist. There are several reasons for that: First, as has been demonstrated in the 
analysis above concerning the structure of legal bases in this area, there are hardly any 
differences between the provisions as regards the scope and the nature of the 
competences, legal instruments, or decision-making procedures. It could be argued that 
the provisions found in the area of foreign policy differ from provisions under the area 
of security policy as regards the nature of the competence. Nevertheless, this has not led 
to any intra-pillar legal basis litigation in this area because, second, the European Court 
of Justice does not have any competence for legal review over the area of common 
foreign and security policy according to Article 275 TFEU. It may only do so in 
exceptional situations in which CFSP provisions conflict or interfere with supranational 
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law, which then receives an inter-pillar dimension. This will be discussed in the 
following. 
 
X. Inter-pillar conflicts in External Relations 
Since the area of external relations has never been restricted to one pillar only, the 
delimitation of competences has been rather difficult. As a result, cross-pillar conflicts 
have emerged which has led to cross-pillar litigation in the area of external relations. As 
has been observed above, the problem concerning the protection of CFSP provisions 
from encroachment lies with the insufficient definition of the nature of competences in 
this area. Such competences are not entirely safe from pre-emption since there is a slight 
possibility that the European courts do not follow a teleological approach taking into 
account the intention by the drafters of the Treaty. Instead, the courts could interpret 
Article 4(1) TFEU in such a way that CFSP competences have to be shared between the 
Union and the Member States. In such a case the scope of the provisions under the 
common foreign and security policy could easily be jeopardised. 
It is therefore necessary to examine the courts’ litigation in these cases. First, in most 
cases the courts are required to decide for one legal basis since a cross-pillar legal basis 
may not be possible. This section will thus analyse the means of delimiting 
supranational and intergovernmental competences before and after the Treaty of Lisbon, 
as well as scrutinise the relationship between CFSP and non-CFSP provisions. Second, 
this section will look at inter-pillar mixity which has occurred in some cases. In a third 
part, an excursus will be provided discussing the EU’s unity theory and whether or not 
such a unity has finally been achieved with the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
A. Legal Basis Litigation 
Legal basis litigation in the area of external relations has been a rather great challenge 
for the European courts due to the cross-pillar dimension of this area. This section will 
discuss some prominent policy areas which have been particularly threatened by cross-
pillar conflicts in the past as well as analyse the new treaty framework and anticipate 
possible developments in external relations. It will first discuss legal basis litigation 
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under the old Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU followed by an analysis of the current 
Article 40 TEU and its anticipated impact on future legal basis litigation in external 
relations. 
 
1. Before Lisbon: Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU 
The European Union had safeguarded its own competences by introducing the old 
Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU which “aims [...] to maintain and build on the acquis 
communautaire”.195 Wessel argued that “the development of CFSP (...) should not only 
respect the acquis communautaire, but that it should even be at its service.”196 
According to the old Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU, Member States could take action as 
long as this did not encroach upon the powers which were conferred on the Union.
197
 
This meant that as soon as a proposed measure could be adopted under the former first 
pillar, it could no longer be adopted under the intergovernmental pillars.
198
 Any such 
measure would be in breach of Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU and therefore be declared 
void before the courts. Before the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, there was only 
one case on the infringement of Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU under the second pillar, 
namely the ECOWAS
199
 case on the compatibility of a CFSP measure with 
supranational EU law. Before analysing this case, however, this section will first discuss 
two other cases which have arguably also been influenced by Article 47 (Amsterdam) 
TEU to the extent that if a Union competence had been applicable this would have taken 
priority. 
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a) PNR and Kadi cases 
The scope of CFSP competences was challenged in the Agreements on ‘PNR’ data. In 
the course of a series of measures adopted in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
the United States entered into negotiations with the European Union with an aim to 
ensuring that US customs authorities were provided with electronic access to all 
Passenger Name Records (‘PNR’ data) on flights to, from, or across US territory. 
Following these negotiations, the EU subsequently adopted two decisions: Decision 
2004/535 on the adequate protection of personal data contained in the Passenger Name 
Record of air passengers transferred to the United States Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection, and Decision 2004/496 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the 
European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer 
of PNR (Passenger Name Record) data by Air Carriers to the United States Department 
of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. 
In the joined cases concerning ‘Passenger Name Records’ (PNR),200 the European 
Parliament brought forward an action at law as regards the improper conclusion of the 
EU-US Agreement on PNR on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. While the Council as 
well as the Commission had been confident that there existed some supranational 
competence to conclude the agreement which could justify Article 114 TFEU as being 
the appropriate legal basis;
201
 the European Parliament had argued against that, claiming 
there was no EU competence to be relied upon.
202
 In its judgement, the ECJ 
distinguished between the mere collection of PNR data, the processing of which is 
“necessary to provide a service”, as opposed to “data processing regarded as necessary 
for safeguarding public security and for law-enforcement purposes.”203 While only the 
former would fall within the competence of the Union, the Court considered the latter to 
be at issue here and thus held that the contested decisions had been wrongly adopted on 
the first pillar legal basis of Article 114 TFEU. In a rather swift appraisal, the Court thus 
gave preference to the European Parliament’s reasoning and concluded that the Union 
did not have any such competence as to conclude the PNR Agreement in question.
204
 
The Court failed to provide any guidelines as to which principles had been taken into 
consideration or how similar cases in the future should be dealt with. It is thus not 
                                                          
200
 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council of the European Union (C-
317/04) and Commission of the European Communities (C-318/04) (PNR), [2006]: ECR I-04721. 
201
 Ibid, at paras 53, 64 and 65. 
202
 Ibid, at paras 51 and 63. 
203
 Ibid, at para 57. 
204
 Ibid, at paras 67-70. 
108 
 
entirely clear as to whether the ECJ applied the ‘centre of gravity’ theory to a wider 
scale, i.e. the cross-pillar dimension.
205
 
The Court further remained silent as to which alternate provision could have been used 
as an appropriate legal basis for the measures in question. As can be perceived from an 
earlier decision before the CFI
206
 “the fight against international terrorism and its 
funding is unarguably one of the Union’s objectives under the CFSP, as they are defined 
in Article 11 EU (...).”207 Since this also constituted the primary objective of the 
measures on PNR data, it can be assumed that a CFSP provision would have been more 
appropriate as a legal basis in the case at hand. This mainly objective-driven approach 
was criticised by Cremona who argued that the effects of a measure should also be 
taken into account. According to her, the effects of the contested decisions in the PNR 
cases could be better attributed to Article 114 TFEU, i.e. the proper functioning of the 
internal market.
208
 This view can be contrasted with Mitsilegas’ opinion who clearly 
argued in favour of the Court’s reasoning, notwithstanding a certain degree of 
inconsistency in comparison to other (unchallenged) internal and international 
agreements.
209
 
Hillion and Wessel argued that the PNR judgements represented a first attempt of the 
Court to acknowledge the possibility that Community law can also encroach upon the 
provisions laid down in the Treaty on European Union.
210
 Although this might be a 
desirable interpretation, this view has to be criticised, since the Court has made no 
statement in its judgement which would allow for such a conclusion. Had the Court 
intended to protect the ‘acquis intergouvernemental’, it would have certainly articulated 
this intention, also in regard of the significance of such a ruling. However, the brevity of 
its judgement as well as subsequent case law suggest that importance should be attached 
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to the PNR case only insofar as the conclusion of the agreement was excluded from the 
scope of Article 114 TFEU but not that it could possibly amount to an exception from 
the Court’s preference of the ‘acquis communautaire’. This is also in conformity with 
the argument put forward by Herrmann who states that the judgement should not be 
overestimated as regards the delimitation of competences between the EC and the 
EU.
211
 
The Court’s reasoning in the PNR cases can be contrasted with a similar case, in which 
it was held that Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in 
connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services 
or of public communications networks was correctly adopted upon Article 114 
TFEU.
212
 Here, the ECJ found that the contested measure as its main objective laid 
down rules covering “the activities of service providers in the internal market”, as 
opposed to “rules governing the activities of public authorities for law-enforcement 
purposes” which was at issue in the PNR judgements.213 It can thus be observed, that 
the Court again focused on the objectives rather that the effects of the contested 
measure. However, depending on the very objective of a measure, the Union could have 
the necessary competences for the measure to be adopted on the basis of a supranational 
provision. 
In the Yusuf
214
 and Kadi
215
 cases the CFI, and on appeal in Kadi and Al Barakaat
216
 the 
ECJ, had to analyse to what extent Article 352 TFEU could be applied not only to 
complement EU competences but also to accomplish an objective falling under the area 
of common foreign and security policy. The cases originally concerned the annulment 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001
217
 which had been adopted on the basis of 
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Articles 75 and 215 TFEU, and subsequently Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002
218
 
which had been adopted not only on Articles 75 and 215 TFEU but was further 
supplemented by the legal basis of Article 352 TFEU.
219
 While the originally contested 
regulation was aimed at the interruption or reduction of economic relations with a third 
country involved in international terrorism and therefore was validly adopted on the 
dual legal basis of Articles 75 and 215 TFEU,
220
 the subsequently contested regulation 
had directed such action against individuals and organisations established within the 
EU. The Council had therefore considered it necessary to include Article 352 TFEU as 
an additional legal basis in order to establish a supranational EU competence.
221
 The 
CFI first considered whether Article 352 TFEU could have been used as the sole legal 
basis for Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 and found that this would have gone 
beyond the scope of the provision in question. 
[N]either the institutions not the Member States [are authorised] to rely on the 
‘flexibility clause’ of [Article 352 TFEU] in order to mitigate the fact that the 
Community lacks the competence necessary for achievement of one of the Union’s 
objectives. To decide otherwise would amount, in the end, to making that provision 
applicable to all measures falling within the CFSP and within police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters (PJC), so that the Community could always take action 
to attain the objectives of those policies. Such an outcome would deprive many 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union of their due ambit and would be 
inconsistent with the introduction of instruments specific to the CFSP (common 
strategies, joint actions, common positions) and to the PJC (common positions, 
decisions, framework decisions).
222
 
However, recourse to Article 352 TFEU in order to supplement Articles 75 and 215 
TFEU was held to be justified since this could in fact be considered as Union action 
implemented under the first pillar after the adoption of a second-pillar common position 
or joint action of the Council.
223
 On appeal, the ECJ took a rather different approach and 
held that the requirement in Article 352 TFEU to pursue an objective of the Union 
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“cannot on any view be regarded as including the objectives of the CFSP.”224 However, 
the Court identified an implied instrumental objective underlying Articles 75 and 215 
TFEU, thus nevertheless justifying recourse to Article 352 TFEU.
225
 Neither the CFI 
nor the ECJ judgement provided a clear definition of the scope of supranational EU 
competences, the establishment of which “requires a leap of faith”226 considering the 
facts in the current case. On any account, the courts have widened supranational EU 
powers into the sphere of the second pillar despite its earlier denial of such a 
possibility;
227
 this could therefore be considered to constitute an encroachment upon 
Member States’ powers. In addition, it could be argued that the courts failed to provide 
for a clear delimitation of powers between the pillars in external relations.
228
 
 
b) The ECOWAS judgement 
The contested measures in the ECOWAS
229
 case were Council Decision 
2004/833/CFSP
230
 and Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP.
231
 Both of the contested 
measures had been adopted on the basis of a CFSP provision, i.e. the contested joint 
action had Article 28 TEU as its legal base and the contested decision was based on the 
contested joint action in conjunction with Article 31 TEU. The Commission had relied 
upon a ‘fixed’ boundary between the powers of the Union on the one hand and those of 
the Member States on the other. It had argued that by adopting the contested measures, 
the Council had infringed Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU since the EU would have had a 
supranational competence to take such action on the basis of Article 208(1) TFEU 
which provides that the Union shall have a complementary power with the Member 
States in the field of development cooperation. The Commission had argued that such a 
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shared competence between the Union and the Member States entailed that the Union 
could not act independently even if such powers had not been exercised.
232
 This had 
been argued against by the Council which had denied the existence of a ‘fixed’ 
boundary between the powers of the Union and those of the Member States.
233
 In 
particular, the United Kingdom had argued that encroachment upon a supranational 
competence in an area of shared powers is only possible if the contested measure had a 
pre-emptive effect.
234
 The Council had observed that interpreting the powers of the 
Union under the area of development policy broadly, would undermine the sole 
competences conferred upon the Union concerning the preservation of peace and the 
strengthening of international security which constitute, according to the Council, the 
main objective of the contested measures.
235
 The Council had further claimed that the 
scope of the acquis communautaire would be potentially unlimited if the Union had the 
power to adopt measures of which only the ancillary effects would be covered with the 
supranational competence.
236
 
Before judging on their aim and content, the Court had to analyse the application of 
Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU concerning the two contested measures. For this, the ECJ 
considered it irrelevant whether there was a potential encroachment of a shared or 
exclusive supranational competence, but only the existence of such powers as 
decisive.
237
 The Court further recalled its ‘centre of gravity’ theory applied in previous 
cases and that a dual legal basis may be admitted under exceptional circumstances. 
However, taking into account the cross-pillar nature of the measure, the Court held that 
[U]nder Article 47 [Amsterdam] EU, such a solution is impossible with regard to a 
measure which pursues a number of objectives or which has several components falling, 
respectively, within development cooperation policy, as conferred by the EC Treaty, 
and within the CFSP, and where neither one of those components is incidental to the 
other. 
Since Article 47 [Amsterdam] EU precludes the Union from adopting, on the basis of 
the EU Treaty, a measure which could properly be adopted on the basis of the EC 
Treaty, the Union cannot have recourse to a legal basis falling within the CFSP in order 
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to adopt provisions which also fall within a competence conferred by the EC Treaty on 
the Community.
238
 
By examining the aim and content of the contested measures, the Court found, contrary 
to the opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi who had concluded that their main 
purpose lay within the area of security, that there was a twofold component “neither of 
which can be considered to be incidental to the other, one falling within supranational 
development cooperation policy and the other within the CFSP.”239 The ECJ therefore 
concluded that the contested measures were in breach of Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU 
since they encroached upon the competences conferred on the Union under Article 
208(1) TFEU. 
This case clearly shows a tendency for measures with cross-pillar objectives to be 
adopted on the basis of a supranational provision rather than under the former second 
pillar. The provisions of the latter might therefore, as could be argued, be undermined. 
“The original sin of overall EU external action”, as has been argued by Eeckhout, “is 
that the CFSP supplements the first pillar with a less intrusive policy, and yet is 
intended to cover all areas of foreign and security policy”,240 according to Article 24 
TEU.
241
 Wessel, however, criticised this provision for being ‘misleading’, insofar as the 
area of common foreign and security policy was not intended to encroach upon the 
competences of the other pillars. He further expressed his preference of a lex specialis 
rule protecting the ‘acuqis communautaire’ in the case of conflicts.242 This in turn was 
criticised by Baratta who argued that such a rule would jeopardise the relationship 
between the pillars.
243
  
As can be seen from the analysed judgement, the former first pillar had preference over 
the second pillar in the Court’s judgement. It seems, however, unclear from the wording 
of the judgement whether the Court intended to deny the application of the ‘centre of 
gravity’ theory in its entirety for cross-pillar measures or whether it merely rejected the 
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exceptional adoption of a dual legal basis which is possible under the first pillar if the 
‘centre of gravity’ test unfolds a twofold objective of the contested measure. If the 
former is the case, a lex specialis treatment of supranational powers could be assumed 
according to which measures would have to be adopted under the first pillar even if 
their objectives only touched upon Union competences. However, if the judgement has 
to be understood in line with the latter assumption, the application of the ‘centre of 
gravity’ theory would imply a similar approach as was developed under the first pillar 
with the only exception that there would be no possibility to accept a dual legal basis 
even if the measure pursues a twofold objective since a cross-pillar legal basis is 
excluded under Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU. In such a case, supranational law would 
then prevail over the application of intergovernmental provisions. 
It is clear from the above that there was a primacy of supranational law over Member 
States’ law. It is also clear that the old Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU provided the 
European courts with a valuable tool to review the compatibility of EU law as well as to 
preserve the acuqis communautaire. However, as could be argued, the preferential 
treatment of supranational EU law might have affected Member States in their capacity 
to validly exercise their powers laid down under the Treaty on European Union. For 
example, Dashwood doubted that the authors of the Treaty on European Union could 
have intended 
to allow the scope and effectiveness of the CFSP, as explicitly there defined, to be 
restricted by Article 47, above all when considerations of the security of the Union, or 
of international peace and security, are in play.
244
 
Similarly, Wessel argued that 
apart from guarding, the Court should prevent the misuse of the acuqis communautaire 
in cases where an unconditional compliance with the preservation of the acquis 
communautaire would lead to a complete negation of the key provisions in the Union 
Treaty. 
However, he also acknowledged the lack of alternatives in this regard.
245
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2. After Lisbon: Article 40 TEU 
The second pillar has previously been described as only supplementing the first pillar 
due to its subordinate nature of policies.
246
 This artificial prioritisation between the 
pillars led to certain difficulties as regards legal basis litigation which resulted in the 
expansion of supranational EU law, i.e. the encroachment of former first pillar 
provisions on the powers and competences available under the area of common foreign 
and security policy. These problems will be addressed by the Treaty of Lisbon. The new 
Treaty has brought the second pillar on an equal footing with the first pillar,
247
 thus 
abolishing the previously unequal treatment of the pillars. While this might remedy the 
existing uncertainties as regards the actual status of second pillar provisions, it does not 
render legal basis litigation dispensable. On the contrary, legal basis litigation will be 
even more crucial considering the fact that under Lisbon both pillars have been moved 
closer together, thus making it more difficult to distinguish between them and to decide 
which set of provisions shall apply. 
Concerning the institutional and procedural differences between the two pillars, the 
Treaty of Lisbon significantly changes the relationship between the first and the second 
pillar by amending the former Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU in so far as the ‘acquis 
communautaire’ no longer receives the sole protection from the Treaty.248 The new 
“infrastructure” after Lisbon provides for a protection in both directions under the new 
Article 40 TEU, replacing the previous “one-way street”. The new provision reads as 
follows: 
The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the 
application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down 
by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the 
application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down 
by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter. 
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As can be seen, this new article also provides for a reverse way of protection, i.e. the 
protection of the ‘acquis intergouvernemental’ in the second paragraph.249 The above 
mentioned ‘one-way street’ thus is now open for both ways since the entering into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon. The new provision introduces what has been described as a 
“Chinese wall”250 between EU law and the area of common foreign and security policy. 
This has brought former second pillar provisions on an equal footing with those under 
the TFEU which could be interpreted in two different ways. 
First, it has been suggested that this would imply that all general criteria of legal basis 
litigation established under the former first pillar would also apply for CFSP provisions 
after Lisbon.
251
 While the application of Article 352 TFEU for CFSP matters is 
explicitly excluded,
252
 such general criteria could favour the application of other TFEU 
provisions rather than those under the common foreign and security policy. For 
example, the application of the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle could 
implicate that the area of common foreign and security policy would be considered as 
lex generalis in comparison to other more specific areas in the TFEU,
253
 e.g. common 
commercial policy, development policy, etc. This would imply a rather residual nature 
of CFSP provisions,
254
 which, arguably would run counter to the hierarchical 
equalisation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty between the supranational powers under 
the TFEU and intergovernmental CFSP competences.
255
 
As regards the ‘centre of gravity’ theory, van Elsuwege convincingly argues that this 
theory may fail to apply due to a lack of specific CFSP objectives set out in the Lisbon 
Treaty.
256
 It could be argued that this could again be interpreted as to prioritise TFEU 
provisions. This could lead to a similar if not worse situation than under the previous 
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framework.
257
 It would be possible for EU competences to encroach upon CFSP powers 
which would endanger the latter’s special character and ultimately render such 
provisions nugatory. It could also be argued that the application of any of the general 
criteria of legal basis litigation could not exclude the infringement of the new Article 40 
TEU which prohibits an encroachment on either side. Therefore, it is recommended that 
this approach shall not be followed by the courts. 
A second approach suggests that instead of applying general criteria of legal basis 
litigation in “cross-pillar”258 cases, such measures could be split into two measures one 
of which should be adopted on a CFSP legal basis, while the other could be adopted 
upon a TFEU legal basis;
259
 both measures could be linked with each other with the use 
of cross-references.
260
 Obviously, if the Court finds that the objectives of a measure are 
inseparably linked a choice has to be made for either legal base.
261
 However, it lies 
within the discretionary power of the Court to minimise such cases since it could be 
argued that a splitting of a measure may almost always be possible if it is being 
conducted in the appropriate manner. While there would be a certain risk that this could 
increase bureaucracy which may further decrease transparency, this approach might be 
better suited to ensure the proper application of CFSP provisions and thus protect the 
significance of their special character as well as the integrity of Member States’ powers. 
It is therefore recommended that this second approach shall be followed by the 
European courts. 
Therefore, the ECOWAS case might have to be reconsidered after Lisbon, as has been 
argued by Cremona
262
 as well as Dashwood.
263
 This does not mean, however, that a 
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similar measure under the new treaty framework would be annulled. In the contrary: It 
could be argued that such a measure would have been held invalid not just on the 
grounds that it would encroach upon supranational EU powers, but also that if the EU 
was to take action this would infringe the second paragraph of the new Article 40 TEU. 
This means that this measure could not be properly adopted any more in its entirety on 
the basis of either pillar. Instead, there would be an increased need to take separate 
action, one measure to be adopted in the field of CFSP and another one under 
supranational EU law.
264
 This shall be illustrated in the following case scenario. 
In a ‘resurrected’ scenario of the ECOWAS case,265 a decision defining actions to be 
undertaken by the Union concerning its contribution to combating the destabilising 
accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons could be adopted on the basis 
of Article 28 TEU. The Council would act by unanimity (Articles 25(b)(i) and 31(1) 
TEU). Member States shall be bound by the decision in the positions they adopt and in 
the conduct of their activity (Article 28(2) TEU). There is no need to consult the 
European Parliament and the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction. 
The competing legal basis under the TFEU upon which the measure could also be 
adopted is Article 208. Here, the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ would apply.266 Under 
this procedure codecision and qualified majority voting are prevailing.
267
 According to 
Article 288 TFEU such a decision is binding in its entirety and the European Court of 
Justice has full jurisdiction. 
If general criteria of legal basis litigation as established under the first pillar apply in 
order to determine the correct legal basis for this decision choosing between Article 28 
TEU and Article 208 TFEU, it could be argued that the provision under the TFEU 
always prevails: In a ‘centre of gravity’ test the Court of Justice could attribute more 
weight to Article 208 TFEU, arguing that this provision plays a greater role for the 
decision to be adopted upon. Only if this principle is properly applied, i.e. unprejudiced 
from the side of the European institutions, the centre of gravity would not necessarily 
fall within TFEU competences. Further, considering the ‘democracy maximising’ 
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rationale,
268
 this principle would normally support the application of a TFEU provision 
since this would ensure a greater involvement of the European Parliament.  
The application of the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle could generate two 
different results. On the one hand, this principle would counteract CFSP provisions. In 
the case of an international development agreement, there could be a legal basis conflict 
between development policy and CFSP provisions. While the Commission is more 
likely to support the application of the former, the Council would plead in favour of the 
latter. The European Court of Justice could interpret the area of common foreign and 
security policy as lex generalis also with regard to Article 24(1) TEU which provides 
that the CFSP “shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the 
Union’s security”.269 Any development policy provision, such as Article 208 TFEU, 
could then be considered to be a lex specialis which would derogate from the 
application of the more general CFSP provisions. Thus, the ECJ could reject CFSP 
provisions to serve as legal bases on the ground of the lex specialis derogat legi 
generali principle if it considers other TFEU provisions to be more specific.
270
  
On the other hand, though less probable, the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle 
could also support the application of CFSP provisions. These could be considered to be 
more specific than the general provisions to harmonise in the field. While there would 
be a possibility to harmonise in the area of common foreign and security policy,
271
 
having recourse to Article 114 TFEU, this provision could be rejected on the grounds of 
the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle if other provisions available in the 
Treaty on European Union are considered to be more specific. Recourse to the residual 
competence of Article 352 TFEU is explicitly excluded under paragraph 4 which 
provides that it cannot be applied for CFSP measures. 
On any account, it is vital to ensure the proper functioning of the provisions under the 
common foreign and security policy. The former second pillar remains distinct from the 
TFEU to a large extent, thus protecting the integrity of Member States in this area. If 
general criteria of legal basis litigation apply the specific CFSP character is likely to be 
jeopardised. TFEU provisions could encroach upon those under the area of common 
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foreign and security policy with the effect of ultimately rendering the latter nugatory.
272
 
Therefore, the European Court of Justice has to ensure the adequate application of the 
provisions under the new Treaty on European Union after Lisbon, in particular the new 
Article 40 TEU. In the concrete example here, if no single legal basis can be agreed 
upon without encroaching upon another policy area and thus infringing the new Article 
40 TEU, the measure in question has to be split into two parts. Thus, one part of the 
measure concerning the common foreign and security policy objectives could be 
adopted on the basis of Article 28 TEU. The other part relating to the development 
policy objectives could then be adopted on the basis of Article 208 TFEU. Both 
measures can be linked with each other by inserting cross-references where necessary. 
Thereby, an encroachment of either policy area is being avoided and the proper 
application of the new Article 40 TEU is being guaranteed. It appears that in such a case 
the function of the new Article 40 TEU can be described as a ‘two-way street’ rather 
than a ‘Chinese wall’, allowing for a limited interaction between the two areas by cross-
referencing but nevertheless providing sufficient protection against encroachment. 
It could thus be argued that the Lisbon Treaty has brought about a clearer delimitation 
of competences between the pillars. With the newly introduced Article 40 TEU, the 
Court has been provided with a better guideline which will further improve legal 
certainty. It could be argued that the previous ECOWAS judgement has put the integrity 
of former second-pillar measures at risk, which is no longer the case after Lisbon. The 
division of any such measure into two measures, one adopted under the CFSP and the 
other falling under TFEU competences, will certainly constitute a different challenge, 
considering for example the additional effort, bureaucracy and the possible confusion 
with an increase of the number of measures in the European political landscape. 
However, as regards legal basis litigation, the new provision will most likely have the 
effect of partly clarifying the actual relationship between the former first and second 
pillars. 
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B. Inter-pillar Mixity 
In contrast to the common form of ‘classical’ mixed agreements,273 there is also ‘inter-
pillar mixity’274. It has been argued by Neframi that mixity poses a real threat to “the 
assertion of the identity of the Union on the international scene” and thus justifies the 
need for unity within the EU.
275
 While there are a number of international agreements 
concluded under the Treaty on European Union on the basis of both intergovernmental 
pillars,
276
 it can be observed that the conclusion of international agreements involving 
both, supranational and intergovernmental EU law, is rather rare. International 
agreements based on the former second and third pillars include the Agreement between 
the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the security 
procedures for the exchange of classified information,
277
 agreements of the European 
Union with Australia and the United States of America on the procession and transfer of 
the so-called ‘PNR’278 and Financial Messaging Data,279 as well as the Agreement 
                                                          
273
 See above. 
274
 On an interesting contribution about the different forms of ‘inter-pillar mixity’ and their implications, 
see Wessel, R. A. (2010). Cross-pillar Mixity: Combining Competences in the Conclusion of EU 
International Agreements. Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in the World. C. 
Hillion and P. Koutrakos. Oxford, Hart Publishing: 30-54. 
275
 Neframi, E. (2010). "The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its scope through its application in the field of EU 
External Relations." Common Market Law Review 47(2): 323-359, at page 354. 
276
 For an in-depth analysis of intergovernmental agreements in external relations, see Rosas, A. (2011). 
“The status of EU law of international agreements concluded by EU Member States.” Fordham 
International Law Journal 34(5): 1304-1345. 
277
 Council Decision 2005/296/CFSP, JHA of 24 January 2005 concerning the conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Union and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the 
security procedures for the exchange of classified information (Official Journal 2005, L 094, p. 0038). 
278
 See Council Decision 2006/729/CFSP/JHA of 16 October 2006 on the signing, on behalf of the 
European Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on 
the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (Official Journal 2006, L 298, p. 0027); Council Decision 
2007/551/CFSP/JHA of 23 July 2007 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement) (Official Journal 2007, L 204, p. 0016); Council Decision 
2008/651/CFSP/JHA of 30 June 2008 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement 
between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of European Union-sourced 
passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs Service (Official Journal 
2008, L 213, p. 0047).  
279
 See Council Decision 2010/16/CFSP/JHA of 30 November 2009 on the signing, on behalf of the 
European Union, of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on 
the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States 
for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (Official Journal 2010, L 8, p. 0009). 
122 
 
between the European Union and Japan on mutual legal assistance in criminal 
matters.
280
 
A significant area in which both the Union as well as the Member States pursue 
common objectives is the field of development cooperation.
281
 This congruency was 
found between Article 208 TFEU
282
 and Article 24 TEU. Both require the development 
and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. It was pointed out that the difference between the two 
provisions could be seen in the actual level of importance to the different set of 
objectives: While the above mentioned objectives are listed as paramount to common 
foreign and security policy, it could be considered as merely secondary to the Union’s 
external relations objectives.
283
 This however, should be neglected here as being a mere 
formality since in a legal basis dispute such a classification is rather irrelevant. While it 
also has to be acknowledged that EU powers in the field of development cooperation are 
not exclusive,
284
 this does not derogate from the fact that Articles 208 TFEU and 24 
TEU may be seen as conflicting legal bases. As a result, the only notable international 
agreement with a supranational-intergovernmental dimension is the Agreement between 
the European Union, its Member States and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss 
Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of 
the Schengen acquis.
285
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The question thus arises why ‘cross-pillar mixity’, in particular the combination of 
supranational and intergovernmental competences, has been used on such few occasions 
at the international scene. A rather ‘functional view’ taken by Hillion suggests that 
‘classical’ mixed agreements, even though concluded by the European Union and the 
Member States, may nevertheless be “inspired by the objectives” of the CFSP, and may 
also “include areas of cooperation that correspond to the external dimension of the 
cooperation in justice and home affairs”.286 Thus, by fulfilling the objectives of the 
Union, the Member States should be considered as its legitimate representatives 
externally, resulting in a de facto ‘cross-pillar’ dimension.287 In its early Ruling 1/78, 
the Court pointed out that the actual delimitation of competences in external relations 
and in particular mixed agreements is a matter of purely internal interest:
288
 
It is not necessary to set out and determine, as regards other parties to the Convention, 
the division of powers in this respect between the Community and the Member States, 
particularly as it may change in the course of time. It is sufficient to state to the other 
contracting parties that the matter gives rise to a division of powers within the 
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Community, it being understood that the exact nature of that division is a domestic 
question in which third parties have no need to intervene.
289
 
Mixed agreements in the classical sense can therefore be seen as an alternative to the 
actual ‘cross-pillar mixity’: Instead of using intergovernmental competences by 
explicitly referring to a legal basis under the second or third pillar, the ECJ derogates 
from a rather awkward ‘cross-pillar’ dual legal basis by allowing the Union to draw its 
missing competence from the cooperation with the Member States in order to conclude 
international agreements. 
 
C. Excursus: The Unity Theory – A self-fulfilling prophecy? 
From the early days of the existence of the three-pillar system, von Bogdandy argued in 
favour of a unity theory, which meant that the law under the intergovernmental pillars 
was considered to be comparable to the law under the first pillar, both methods, the 
‘intergovernmental method’ and the ‘Community method’, thus forming part of one 
single legal order.
290
 According to von Bogdandy, the advantages of this concept were 
evident in the enhancement of political accountability and legal responsibility, “in the 
practical simplification and consolidation of the law concerning the European 
institutions”, as well as in the “decrease of political controversy”.291 In an earlier 
contribution with Nettesheim, he already pleaded for the unity theory to apply for the 
Maastricht framework,
292
 which was then reinforced in von Bogdandy’s later 
contribution after Amsterdam. Both argued in favour of a single European organisation 
on the grounds that the same institutions are responsible in the decision-making 
processes in all three pillars, even though with different capacities. 
In a similar vein, de Witte supported this unity theory, the only difference being that he 
rather referred to the European Community as a sub-organisation having its own legal 
existence.
293
 Further, he denied the concept of a “Greek temple” with the three 
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prominent pillars. Instead, de Witte suggested the concept of a “French gothic 
cathedral” which, according to him, was to illustrate better the integrated approach 
which united the three pillars into a single European system.
294
 
An opposing view was taken by Koenig and Pechstein who argued that the law of the 
intergovernmental pillars would be comparable to international law, thus proposing a 
dualistic view of European law with two separate legal orders. This was justified with a 
teleological interpretation of the legislative framework of the European Union arguing 
that the drafters of the Treaty on European Union could have easily included the second 
and the third pillar into the framework of the European Community. However, since 
they decided otherwise, this had to be taken into consideration and therefore the 
‘intergovernmental method’ had to be distinguished from Community law. The main 
difference pointed out by Koenig and Pechstein was a general lack of direct/indirect 
effect of provisions under the intergovernmental pillars.
295
 Instead, the Treaty merely 
required cooperation between the Member States.
296
 
It shall be argued here that the latter approach by Koenig and Pechstein appears rather 
convincing from a chronological point of view as well as at its time of writing. The 
pillar structure was established as such, differentiating between a Community and an 
intergovernmental approach, both of which were intended to be rather divergent in 
nature. However, this initial shape of the intergovernmental pillars has changed over 
time due to the treaty amendments of Amsterdam and Nice as well as the interpretation 
before the European courts. Thus, it is submitted that the assumptions made as regards 
the definition of the intergovernmental method has certain consequences for legal basis 
litigation in the European Union. Defending the separation approach for the early stages 
of the pillar structure under Maastricht and beyond, the competences available under the 
different legal orders could not be considered as competing with each other, thus 
preventing cross-pillar legal basis litigation. 
Whilst denying the unity theory under previous treaty frameworks, the introduced 
Treaty of Lisbon has altered the shape of the EU in such a way which may finally 
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support this concept as having fulfilled its own ‘prophecy’:297 It could be claimed that 
the intergovernmental pillars have lost their actual intergovernmental character by 
having been integrated into and thus become part of the European Union; this could 
now be considered as a single legal order. This would then allow for the competences 
available under the whole EU framework to enter into competition with each other and 
thus make legal basis litigation possible. 
However, as has been discussed above, there is no unlimited interaction between all EU 
competences due to the new Article 40 TEU. This provision divides the law of the 
European Union into two parts: supranational EU law comprising the former first and 
third pillars, and intergovernmental EU law comprising the area of common foreign and 
security policy. A better protection mechanism ensures that the two areas of law do not 
infringe each other: No EU measure may ever override any kind of CFSP measure, and 
vice versa. It will further be impossible to adopt a measure on a dual legal basis 
involving one supranational EU provision and one intergovernmental CFSP provision 
since the former second pillar is still composed of special features different to and 
incompatible with those under the TFEU, including an entirely distinct set of legal 
instruments as well as decision-making procedures. This clearly supports the view that 
the CFSP area still represents a sui generis part within the European legal order. 
 
1. Legal Personality 
An essential indicator for the existence of a single legal order is the availability of a 
single legal personality. There has always been the question whether the European 
Union has any legal personality, expressly or implied.
298
 Under the old treaty 
framework, only the European Community was equipped with legal personality 
according to the old Article 281 EC. In addition, the old Article 24 (Amsterdam) TEU 
also provided for an intergovernmental power to conclude international agreements. 
This implied a legal personality, separate from the one conferred upon the European 
Community under the former first pillar. 
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According to the new Article 47 TEU, the Union now has legal personality. As such, it 
has the capacity to “conclude agreements with one or more States or international 
organisations”.299 It has been argued that this “would remove some of the difficulties of 
so-called “inter-pillar mixity”.”300 Further, it will be possible for the Union to be held 
accountable for its actions on the international scene; the EU has also received other 
privileges and immunities comparable to those of other international organisations.
301
 
Moreover, with the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, the former second pillar has 
lost its separate legal personality.
302
 As a result, any international agreements concluded 
under the enclave of the former second pillar are deemed as being concluded under the 
European Union. Thus, the only European actor on the international scene is the 
European Union, and occasionally individual Member States. This increases 
consistency and legal certainty for contractual partners in third countries. However, the 
Union´s competences under the CFSP differ somewhat from other external competences 
under the TFEU. As has been discussed above, the competences available under the 
common foreign and security policy are of a sui generis nature, lacking direct effect and 
supremacy, and thus remain intergovernmental even after the introduction of the 
Reform Treaty. 
 
2. Bridging the gap – The High Representative 
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is the 
new institutional position created by the Treaty of Lisbon in external relations. The 
introduction of a High Representative was aimed at a “better coherence between foreign 
policy decisions (...) and deployment of instruments in the field of external relations”, 
thus “replacing the current Troika.”303 This personal union “combining the functions of 
HR for CFSP with those functions currently carried out by the Relex Commissioner” 
was a compromise between a mere synergy and a full merger option.
304
 Thus, the High 
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Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy constitutes an 
institutional bridge between the former first and the second pillar of the Union.
305
 
Appointed by the European Council and with the consent of the President of the 
Commission,
306
 the High Representative is responsible to “conduct the Union’s 
common foreign and security policy”,307 as well as to “ensure the consistency of the 
Union’s external action” being one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. The latter 
function would entail responsibilities within the Commission for “external relations and 
for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action.”308 Further, as the chair of 
the Foreign Affairs Council,
309
 the High Representative “shall contribute through his 
proposals towards the preparation of the common foreign and security policy” and at the 
same time “shall ensure implementation of the decisions adopted by the European 
Council and the Council.”310 In CFSP matters, the High Representative represents the 
Union, by conducting “political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf” as 
well as by expressing “the Union’s position in international organisations and at 
international conferences”,311 thus organising the coordination of Member States’ action 
in such forums.
312
 If a rapid decision is needed, the High Representative may “convene 
an extraordinary Council meeting within 48 hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter 
period.”313 
The High Representative is assisted by a European External Action Service.
314
 The 
High Representative is further accountable to the Commission when exercising his or 
her powers therein and bound by Commission procedures as long as such action is 
consistent with his other duties concerning the common foreign and security policy and 
the Foreign Affairs Council.
315
 The High Representative’s position can be terminated by 
a qualified majority vote in the European Council with the approval of the President of 
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the Commission.
316
 Like any other member of the Commission, the High Representative 
may be asked to resign by the President of the Commission.
317
 Such a resignation from 
his or her responsibilities within the Commission may also be requested by the 
European Parliament by voting on a motion of censure according to Article 234 
TFEU.
318
 
Criticism was already brought forward in the early process creating the position. 
Opponents of a ‘personal union’319 expressed some concern as regards the threat this 
position would cause to the ‘principle of collegiality’. They also denunciated the 
exorbitant scope of activities the High Representative would be responsible for.
320
 
Further, the “double-hatted”321 position of the High Representative, uniting the former 
CFSP High Representative and the former EC Commissioner, would be capable of 
“suffering somewhat from multiple personality disorder”, as has been argued by de 
Baere.
322
 The only indication as to how such internal disparities can be resolved is 
provided in Article 18(4) TEU requiring the High Representative’s loyalty to the 
Commission procedures as long as consistency with his other duties is ensured. It has 
been argued that this suggests a slight favouritism of these other responsibilities, mainly 
the obligations concerning the common foreign and security policy.
323
 However, this 
still leaves sufficient scope for interpretation. Being accountable to both, the Council 
and the Commission, the High Representative could rather be seen in a position of 
mediation between the two institutions in case of discrepancies.
324
 It is then, however, 
questionable whether it is possible to ensure strength of a leadership role which would 
be required for the position of the High Representative. The schizophrenic nature of this 
position is rather unlikely to be of an advantage in reality. 
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A further problem is the exact delimitation of competences between the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the newly 
created position of the President of the European Council. As has been argued by 
Bitterlich, progress will depend on the avoidance of friction between these two positions 
since they are both responsible for the external representation of the Union as well as to 
which extent Member States are willing to transfer certain competences to them.
325
 
Despite the possibility of internal inconsistency concerning the High Representative, the 
Lisbon Treaty ensures with the introduction of this institution an increased 
harmonisation in the field of EU external relations which could enhance and facilitate 
the Union’s representation internationally.326 Internally, however, the exact division of 
competences might become even less transparent. 
 
XI. Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter has looked at the structure of legal bases and legal basis litigation in EU 
external relations. It has examined whether the same principles apply as under the 
internal sphere of supranational EU law. As has been shown, the area of external 
relations constitutes a special field of EU law with some distinct rules and principles. In 
addition, the field of external relations is spread over both constitutional regimes: the 
supranational as well as the intergovernmental policies. Their specific characteristics 
were analysed in the first two parts of this Chapter. The last part has discussed cross-
pillar conflicts in external relations as a result of the distribution of this area. 
Under supranational EU law, the area of external relations differs from the internal 
sphere in several aspects: Most notably, this concerns the ‘doctrine of implied powers’ 
which was established by the courts to enable the Union to acquire additional 
competences not explicitly conferred upon it by the treaties. Therefore, in most areas of 
supranational external relations the European Union will be competent to take action, 
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the only question being upon which legal basis in the TFEU this can be done. This has 
led to an increased pre-emption of Member States’ competences in these areas. 
However, the constant shift and re-interpretation of the different competences at stake 
have contributed rather little to legal certainty in EU external relations. Ultimately, this 
development has favoured exclusive competences and has increased their influence. 
Nevertheless, the back and forth pivoting is evidence of the indecisiveness in the courts’ 
judgements when confronted with specific legal basis problems, for example those 
surrounding Article 207 TFEU. Further, there may be different competence types in one 
and the same policy area which can lead to an overlapping of competencies and thus 
create intra legal basis litigation. With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon even 
more competences have been expressly ‘supranationalised’. Other institutions, such as 
the European Parliament have less influence in the external legislative process than 
internally, as can be seen for example with international agreements. In addition, there 
is the possibility of mixed agreements, i.e. the joint action of Union and Member States, 
which differs from the internal arrangements for shared competences. 
In contrast, the area of common foreign and security policy has had a special status 
under EU law since its incorporation in the treaties: The most important indication for 
this has been the lack of judicial control in this area, which has mainly prevented intra-
pillar legal basis litigation to take place. However, as has been identified above, there is 
still a potential for legal basis conflicts even after the introduction of the Reform Treaty. 
As can be observed, most of the peculiarities of the former second pillar remain under 
Lisbon. The new Treaty largely preserves the intergovernmental character of CFSP 
provisions. Most prominently, the decision making procedures previously in place 
under the second pillar have – with a few minor changes – been incorporated in the 
Lisbon Treaty, which to a large extent differ from those legislative procedures available 
under the TFEU. The CFSP area is thus composed of special features different to those 
under the TFEU. While the old Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU has allowed for a constant 
encroachment upon Member States’ powers, the new Article 40 TEU better ensures the 
delimitation of competences in this area. It nevertheless brings CFSP matters on an 
equal footing with the provisions laid down under the TFEU which could lead to an 
emergence of new problems, such as whether this would imply the application of 
general criteria of legal basis litigation. 
Overall, it can be argued that with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty legal basis 
litigation will continue to exist due to instrumental and procedural differences between 
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the different policy areas of CFSP and TFEU as well as different types of competence 
between the various legal bases. However, contrary to the previous treaty structure in 
place, the Lisbon Treaty has the potential to bring about more clarity, i.e. with the new 
Article 40 TEU. It is suggested that the application of the new Article 40 TEU could 
serve as a dividing line between the different competence areas. As has been argued, the 
preferred interpretation of this provision shall allow for a splitting of measures which 
could otherwise be adopted on multiple legal bases falling into two or more different 
policy areas. The different parts could then be linked with each other through the use of 
cross-references. This would increase legal certainty and help to avoid competence 
overlaps between the different policy areas. It is therefore recommended that the 
European courts send an early signal of delimited competences under the Treaty of 
Lisbon which would ensure increased legal certainty for future conflicts in legal basis 
litigation. 
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CHAPTER III:  
 
The area of freedom, security and 
justice 
 
I. Introduction 
Having looked at the structure of legal bases and legal basis litigation under the area of 
common foreign and security policy in the previous Chapter, this Chapter will be 
discussing another formerly intergovernmental policy area: The area of freedom, 
security and justice.
1
 In particular, this will include an examination of the rules and 
principles employed in the former third pillar as compared to supranational EU law on 
the one hand and the area of external relations on the other. It is anticipated that the area 
of freedom, security and justice has undergone a distinctive development, thus 
impacting on the structure of legal bases as regards competences, legal instruments and 
procedures. In addition, the courts have established special criteria for legal basis 
litigation in order to regulate this area. 
The area of freedom, security and justice is regulated under Title V of Part Three TFEU. 
Before the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, this area had undergone major 
modifications since its first appearance under the third pillar. The third pillar, 
comprising the area of justice and home affairs (JHA), was introduced by the Maastricht 
Treaty which entered into force in 1993. Over time, the third pillar was amended by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 and by the Treaty of Nice in 2003. These changes brought 
about an integration of third pillar provisions and an alignment with the rules and 
principles under former Community law, most significantly the so-called 
‘communitarisation’ of the policy area of asylum, migration and judicial cooperation in 
civil matters, which reduced the third pillar to the area of police and judicial cooperation 
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in criminal matters (PJCC).
2
 In general, the modified decision-making framework as 
well as its accompanying judicial interpretation contributed to a subtle diminishing of 
the intergovernmental powers and competences under the third pillar and the extension 
of supranational law. The attempt to remedy the initial shortcomings of the third pillar, 
such as opacity and inefficiency, created further confusion and legal uncertainty as 
regards its actual scope of application. 
In general, it has been observed that with the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon the 
Union has gained further competences, without any retrocession of Union competences 
to the Member States.
3
 In particular, this can be seen concerning the incorporation of the 
third pillar into the general framework of the former first pillar. At the same time, and in 
order to make the Union more democratic, qualified majority voting has been extended 
throughout the treaties as well as an enhanced influence of the European Parliament.
4
 It 
will be argued that, regardless of the fact that the area of freedom, security and justice 
has been formally incorporated into the TFEU under the new Title V of Part Three, this 
area has not been fully integrated and thus remains distinct from the other parts of the 
TFEU. This is particularly significant since the preservation of differences between the 
previous policy areas may result in further legal basis litigation problems as well as a 
certain risk of competence overlaps. Further, with no protection mechanisms in place, 
Union law could continue to expand its influence by encroaching upon the 
intergovernmental characteristics which have been preserved in Title V of Part Three 
TFEU, thus violating the integrity of Member States and ultimately undermining such 
provisions. This Chapter thus seeks to identify possible legal basis conflicts in the 
sphere of freedom, security and justice as a result of a retained distinctiveness in the 
integrated third pillar after the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty. 
To this end, this Chapter will conduct a chronological analysis of the three major steps 
from the third pillar until the integrated Title V of Part Three TFEU. The first section 
will discuss the former third pillar, its characteristics as well as its relationship with the 
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former first pillar. The discussion shall focus on the area of justice and home affairs 
(Maastricht) as well as the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
(Amsterdam), both of which have experienced a diminishing nature of their 
intergovernmental powers due to the continued extension of the acquis communautaire. 
The second part will examine the previously separated area of visas, asylum, 
immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters which was integrated in the former 
first pillar after the introduction of the Treaty of Amsterdam. It will identify 
intergovernmental features which have been preserved under Title IV of Part Three EC 
and which require special treatment. It will also look at the relationship between Title 
IV of Part Three EC and other provisions under the EC Treaty, in particular as regards 
legal basis litigation. The third section will analyse the current treaty framework under 
Lisbon and the integrated area of freedom, security and justice as regards the degree to 
which the provisions hereunder have remained distinct from the majority of TFEU 
provisions. It will further discuss the application of general criteria of legal basis 
litigation under Title V of Part Three TFEU and the possible delimitation of the 
provisions thereunder. Finally, some concluding remarks will summarise the findings of 
this Chapter. 
 
II. Justice and Home Affairs (Maastricht) and Police and 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Amsterdam) 
Before the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, the third pillar consisted of the area of 
justice and home affairs (Maastricht)
5
 and later remained the area of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters (Amsterdam).
6
 Both areas have ‘suffered’ from an 
increasing encroachment from EU law which diminished the scope of third pillar 
provisions, despite the restriction of judicial review to preliminary reference procedures 
upon request.
7
 While intra-pillar legal basis litigation was therefore rather limited under 
the former third pillar, the provisions thereunder were integrated with two ‘waves’ into 
the realm of the acquis communautaire which will be discussed in the sections further 
below. This section will focus on the distinctive intergovernmental character of third 
pillar provisions and their relationship with the laws under the former first pillar. It will 
                                                          
5
 For the general framework under Maastricht, see Peers, S. (2011). EU Justice and Home Affairs Law. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, at pages 10-17. 
6
 For the general framework under Amsterdam, see ibid, at pages 17-41. 
7
 Art 35 (Amsterdam) TEU. 
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analyse the structure of legal bases as regards the nature and scope of the competence 
under the former third pillar, legal instruments and decision-making procedures. It will 
then go on to discuss the delimitation between the former third pillar with supranational 
EU law in cross-pillar conflicts and legal basis litigation as regards ex Article 47 
(Amsterdam) TEU. 
 
A. The Structure of Legal Bases under the Third Pillar before 
Lisbon 
Before the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, the third pillar was intergovernmental 
in character, similar to the provisions available under the former second pillar. As will 
be shown, the distinctive structure of legal bases is evidence of the area’s 
intergovernmental nature, despite a few supranational features which appeared under 
the former third pillar over time. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the structure of the 
legal bases under this policy area, highlighting differences to both supranational law 
under the former first pillar and intergovernmental law under the former second pillar: 
This section will be analysing the former third pillar according to first, its nature and 
scope of the competence, second, legal instruments, and third, decision-making 
procedures. 
 
1. The nature and scope of the competence 
The nature of the competence of third pillar matters before Lisbon can be described as 
intergovernmental in most instances, or even sui generis, similar to the nature of the 
competence under the area of common foreign and security policy in the second pillar:
8
 
Member States coordinated their powers through closer cooperation and common 
action.
9
 Harmonisation in this field was restricted to the establishment of “minimum 
rules”.10 Nevertheless, such action was required to be “without prejudice to the powers 
of the European Community”.11 While this could be an indicator for parallel 
competences in the field, a general supranational power had been denied by the courts
12
 
and therefore this statement signifies merely the lack of interaction between 
                                                          
8
 See Chapter II. 
9
 Art 29 (Amsterdam) TEU, third and fourth indent. 
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 Arts 29 fifth indent and 31(1)(e) (Amsterdam) TEU. 
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 Art 29 (Amsterdam) TEU, first indent. 
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 See discussion below. 
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supranational and intergovernmental powers in this area. This shows a high self-
determination and autonomy of Member States under the former third pillar which may 
therefore be described as intergovernmental or even sui generis. 
The objectives of Title VI (Amsterdam) TEU were listed in Article 29 (Amsterdam) 
TEU, which included 
a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing 
common action among the Member States in the fields of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing and combating racism and 
xenophobia. 
Common action in the field of police cooperation was defined in Article 30 
(Amsterdam) TEU and common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters in 
Article 31 (Amsterdam) TEU. The intergovernmental character of the third pillar 
secured a reasonable independence of this area of law from other more regulated areas, 
especially the EC Treaty, since Title VI (Amsterdam) TEU was excluded from 
supremacy, direct effect
13
 and pre-emption. Further, Article 33 (Amsterdam) TEU 
comprised a so-called ‘saving clause’, providing that the provisions under Title VI 
(Amsterdam) TEU 
shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with 
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security. 
 
2. Legal Instruments 
Third pillar legal instruments were defined in Article K.6 (Maastricht) TEU, and later in 
Article 34 (Amsterdam) TEU, which included common positions,
14
 framework 
decisions,
15
 decisions,
16
 and conventions.
17
 In comparison to first pillar legal 
instruments, those available in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters did not entail direct effect which was the main characteristic of their 
intergovernmental nature. However, framework decisions and decisions had a binding 
effect upon Member States which was confined in the case of framework decisions: 
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 However, an indirect effect was implied by the courts in Pupino, which will be discussed further 
below. 
14
 Art 34(2)(a) (Amsterdam) TEU. 
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 Art 34(2)(b) (Amsterdam) TEU. 
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 Art 34(2)(c) (Amsterdam) TEU. 
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138 
 
They were only binding “as to the result to be achieved”, leaving the choice of form and 
methods to the national authorities to decide.
18
 As such, it was observed that framework 
decisions
19
 resembled the first pillar legal instrument of a Directive,
20
 except that the 
latter entailed direct effect.
21
  
This was also stressed by the courts in the famous Pupino judgement.
22
 In this case, an 
Italian nursery teacher had committed a number of offences against her pupils causing 
physical injuries and traumas. The teacher was subsequently accused of abuse of 
disciplinary measures under Article 571 and the causing of serious injuries under 
Articles 582, 585 and 576 of the Italian Criminal Code.
23
 Due to the young age of the 
witnesses in this case, the Public Prosecutor’s Office proposed to apply the special 
procedure for taking evidence early according to Article 392(1a) and also requested 
special arrangements to be made according to 398(5a) of the Italian Code of Criminal 
Procedure.
24
 The question referred to the ECJ concerned the compliant interpretation of 
these Articles with Community law, and more specifically their conformity with 
Articles 2, 3, and 8 of the Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA on the standing of 
victims in criminal proceedings.
25
 Looking at the nature of Article 34(2)(b) 
(Amsterdam) TEU, the Court found that:  
It should be noted at the outset that the wording of Article 34(2)(b) EU is very closely 
inspired by that of the third paragraph of Article 249 EC. (...). 
The binding character of framework decisions, formulated in terms identical to those of 
the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, places on national authorities, and particularly 
national courts, an obligation to interpret national law in conformity.
26
 
The Court explained the underlying rationale, arguing that in the teleological context 
(...) it is perfectly comprehensible that the authors of the Treaty on European Union 
should have considered it useful to make provision, in the context of Title VI of that 
                                                          
18
 On a more thorough analysis as to the legal effects of third pillar instruments see Hinarejos, A. (2008). 
"On the Legal Effects of Framework Decisions and Decisions: Directly Applicable, Directly Effective, Self-
executing, Supreme?" European Law Journal 14(5): 620-634. 
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 Case C-105/03, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino, [2005]: ECR I-05285. 
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 Ibid, at para 12. 
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treaty, for recourse to legal instruments with effects similar to those provided for by the 
EC Treaty, in order to contribute effectively to the pursuit of the Union’s objectives.27 
However, it could be argued that if the drafters of the Treaties had indeed intended such 
a high degree of similarities between the legal instruments of the first and the third 
pillars they would have not had to make the effort of defining two entirely different 
pillars with two different sets of legal instruments. Instead, they could have referred to 
one and the same set of legal instruments, pointing out the relevant exceptions under 
each pillar. Since the drafters, however, had not opted for the latter alternative, it has to 
be assumed that they intended to highlight a certain degree of peculiarity of third pillar 
legal instruments and their legal effects.
28
 Yet the ECJ did not take into consideration 
that this intergovernmental character of the third pillar required some kind of protection. 
On the contrary, Community law was interpreted extensively and it was implied that 
framework decisions should be indirectly effective by arguing that the Court’s 
jurisdiction which was defined in Article 35 (Amsterdam) TEU “would be deprived of 
most of its useful effect” if such framework decisions could not also be invoked by 
individuals “in order to obtain a conforming interpretation of national law before the 
courts of the Member States.”29 This interpretation clearly identified Community 
features in the otherwise intergovernmental third pillar which was counteractive its 
original purpose. 
This ruling in Pupino, which gave indirect effect to framework decisions, was criticized 
on the grounds that it weakened the intergovernmental nature of the third pillar, “both as 
regards the legal effect of EC measures and more generally, as regards the existence of 
the basic rules underpinning that legal order.”30 Further, it was pointed out that the 
cooperation envisaged under the third pillar (horizontal relationship between the 
Member States and their police and judicial authorities) and the one envisaged under 
Community law (vertical relationship between the EC and the Member States) were 
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 Ibid, at para 36. 
28
 Similarly, Fletcher argued that since there cannot be found any textual support for the Court’s 
interpretation it appeared “that the Court (...) once again had to invoke rather inventive means to justify 
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distinct; however, the Court interpreted the former in the same way as the latter.
31
 It 
could thus be argued that the Pupino judgement constituted a landmark ruling in favour 
of the acquis communautaire to the very detriment of the acquis intergouvernemental in 
the third pillar.
32
 Retrospectively, however, this ruling may be seen as a rather logical 
step towards an integrated third pillar.
33
 
This trend was also followed in the more recent Segi judgement which extended the 
notion in Pupino to common positions. The Segi case concerned a Basque organisation 
which was included in a terrorist list annexed to Common Positions 2001/931, 2002/340 
and 2002/462, identifying it as an integral part of the terrorist group E.T.A. While the 
ECJ acknowledged that “a common position is not supposed to produce of itself legal 
effects in relation to third parties”,34 such legal effects would occur in conjunction with 
Article 37 (Amsterdam) TEU which provided that Member States were under an 
obligation to defend common positions if they were to take part in international 
organisations or at international conferences. This shows a certain tendency of the 
European courts towards standardisation of EU law rather than to safeguard a high 
degree of intergovernmental integrity and self-determination of Member States. While it 
has to be acknowledged that the rulings of Pupino and Segi increased the effectiveness 
of third pillar legal instruments, the actual purpose of a distinction of provisions on 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters in a separate pillar was rather 
ignored by the courts. 
 
3. Decision-making Procedures 
The intergovernmental nature of the provisions on police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters could also be observed as regards the decision-making procedures in 
this field. First, the Commission’s monopoly of initiative for first pillar legal 
instruments
35
 did not include legal instruments under the third pillar where the 
Commission did not enjoy such exclusivity: The Commission had the right to submit 
proposals under the third pillar, just as any other Member State. However, the fact that 
each individual Member State was able to propose a measure showed the 
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intergovernmental self-determination under the third pillar, although it could be argued 
that this was partly diminished due to the Commission’s interference. 
Second, decision-making under the third pillar was also largely influenced by its general 
intergovernmental character. In particular, the unanimity requirement in the Council, 
which was the dominant institution in the third pillar, signified the prominence of each 
Member State’s opinion and the enforcement of measures only if all members 
participated: According to Article 34(2) (Amsterdam) TEU, this concerned the adoption 
of common positions,
36
 framework decisions,
37
 decisions,
38
 and conventions.
39
 As a 
derogation from this rule, qualified majority voting was allowed for measures 
implementing decisions according to Article 34(2)(c) (Amsterdam) TEU, and measures 
implementing conventions could be adopted by a majority of two thirds according to 
Article 34(2)(d) (Amsterdam) TEU. There was thus a potential for legal basis litigation 
between ‘ordinary’ decisions and conventions and their implementing measures. 
Further, the European Parliament’s role was rather limited under Title VI (Amsterdam) 
TEU. Article 39(1) (Amsterdam) TEU merely required the Parliament to be consulted if 
the Council aimed to adopt a framework decision, decision or convention. Enhanced 
cooperation was introduced by the Treaty of Nice.
40
  
With the introduction of the passerelle clause in Article 42 (Amsterdam) TEU, which 
provided that a matter may be referred to the competences of the Community if the 
Council unanimously so decides, the third pillar allowed for some flexibility, however, 
only in the direction favouring the Community method. Baker and Harding described 
the passerelle clause as a “source of instability” within the third pillar as it complicated 
and rendered “unstable the substantive content of its regime, in turn obfuscating its 
constitutional objectives and coherence.”41 Further, they compared the third pillar with a 
“temporary antechamber – a loose zone of convenience, where politically sensitive 
areas of policy are opportunistically collected together for intergovernmental handling 
until mature enough for Community treatment.”42 Indeed, it seemed as if the passerelle 
clause did not add to the value of the intergovernmental character of the third pillar. 
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Instead, it was further evidence of its diminishing powers and of the resulting expansion 
of the powers under the EC Treaty. 
Third, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice was limited as to the constraints 
provided in Article 35 (Amsterdam) TEU.
43
 In general, the ECJ could 
give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and 
decisions, on the interpretation of conventions (...) and on the validity and interpretation 
of the measures implementing them.
44
 
However, this was contingent upon a prior declaration from each Member State to 
accept such jurisdiction.
45
 It also appeared that common positions escaped from judicial 
scrutiny of the Court since they were not explicitly mentioned in Article 35 
(Amsterdam) TEU. Further, the ECJ did not have jurisdiction, neither as regards “the 
validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law 
enforcement services of a Member State”, nor as regards their responsibilities, such as 
“the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.”46 The 
Court could “review the legality of framework decisions and decisions in actions 
brought by a Member State or the Commission”47 and it also had jurisdiction “to rule on 
any dispute between Member States regarding the interpretation or the application of 
acts adopted under Article 34(2)”48 (Amsterdam) TEU. 
In practice, however, the Court’s competences were interpreted widely, so as to prevent 
an entire area of European law to escape from judicial review.
49
 In Spain v Eurojust the 
Court acknowledged that it was not possible to derive additional judicial competences 
from Article 230 EC.
50
 However, the Court stressed the importance of effective judicial 
protection (effet utile): 
(...) in a community based on the rule of law which (...) requires that all decisions of a 
body with legal personality subject to Community law be amenable to judicial review, it 
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must be observed that the acts contested in this case are not exempt from judicial 
review.
51
 
The Court’s reasoning could be criticised on the grounds that it did not differentiate 
between Community principles on the one hand as opposed to principles available 
under the intergovernmental third pillar on the other. In essence, it applied Community 
law in an area which was clearly distinct from the acquis communautaire. A similar line 
of argument was found in Segi in which the ECJ based its judicial competence upon 
Article 6 (Amsterdam) TEU, claiming that 
(...) the Union is founded on the principle of the rule of law and it respects fundamental 
rights as general principles of Community law. It follows that the institutions are 
subject to review of the conformity of their acts with the treaties and the general 
principles of law, just like the Member States when they implement the law of the 
Union. 
While the Court acknowledged in Pupino that it had less judicial powers under the third 
pillar than under the first pillar,
52
 it nevertheless accepted the application of Article 234 
EC on Title VI (Amsterdam) TEU to give preliminary rulings, subject to the limits 
provided in Article 35 (Amsterdam) TEU.
53
 
It could thus be observed that the peculiar decision-making procedures established 
under the third pillar, especially the limited jurisdiction of the European courts, were 
interpreted widely so as to allow for a subtle supranationalisation. The 
intergovernmental character of the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters was not protected before the courts. The ECJ’s aim to further extend its powers 
and to rule in the interest of the supranationality was not reconcilable with the special 
interests of Member States for self-determination and autonomy in certain areas of law. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the by-passing of such intergovernmental principles 
led to an undermining of the provisions under Title VI (Amsterdam) TEU. 
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B. Legal Basis Litigation in cross-pillar conflicts: Article 47 
(Amsterdam) TEU 
Before the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the old Article 47 (Amsterdam) 
TEU not only defined the relationship between the first and the second pillar,
54
 but also 
regulated the relationship between the first and the third pillar in the same way. In 
contrast to the area of CFSP, the Union has challenged the integrity of the third pillar 
more often and, as a result, has encroached upon this field to a greater extent.
55
 
Primarily, approximation of criminal laws under the third pillar was limited to a 
progressive adoption of “measures establishing minimum rules relating to the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the fields of organised crime, 
terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.”56 In addition, the Council could adopt measures 
for the progressive establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice, provided 
for in Article 61(a) EC. Nevertheless, a general EU competence to harmonise in the area 
of criminal law was consistently denied by the courts,
57
 however, subject to certain 
exceptions. In the early Casati case, the ECJ pointed out that “criminal legislation and 
the rules of criminal procedure are matters for which the Member States are still 
responsible.”58 This appears to suggest certain flexibility for subsequent cases, leaving 
an option for a possible transferral of such responsibilities into the sphere of 
Community competences. The Court further made it clear in Casati that 
Community law also sets certain limits in [criminal law] as regards the control measures 
which it permits the Member States to maintain in connection with the free movement 
of goods and persons.
59
 
This was affirmed in Cowan, in which the Court held that national “legislative 
provisions may not discriminate against persons to whom Community law gives the 
right to equal treatment or restrict the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community 
law.”60 The Court, reaffirming the general rule of Member States’ responsibility, held 
                                                          
54
 See discussion in Chapter II. 
55
 See also Peers, S. (2011), supra note 5, at pages 108-117. 
56
 Art 31(1)(e) TEU, emphasis added. 
57
 E.g. by means of general harmonisation provisions, such as Articles 94, 95, and 308 EC. 
58
 Case 203/80, Criminal proceedings against Guerrino Casati, [1981]: ECR 02595, at para 27, emphasis 
added. 
59
 Ibid, at para 27, second sentence. 
60
 Case 186/87, Ian William Cowan v Trésor public, [1989]: ECR 00195, at para 19. 
145 
 
that criminal law may indeed “be affected by Community law”,61 however, remained 
silent as to the actual scope of such an EC interference. Title VI (Amsterdam) TEU also 
appears to have had a lower legal value than provisions under the EC Treaty. One 
indication for this was the opening of the first Article under this Title which read: 
“Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community”.62 The most prominent 
indication, however, was Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU which provided that “nothing in 
this Treaty shall affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities”. Especially 
the latter Article proved to be crucial for the intergovernmental competences under the 
third pillar since the European courts interpreted certain of the competences of police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to rest with the Community. While the 
Union received express powers to legislate in the field of criminal law with the 
introduction of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
63
 the ECJ further implied the application of 
EU competences in cases of harmonisation of criminal laws (Airport Transit Visa 
case)
64
, the introduction of environmental penalties (Environmental Crime case)
65
 and 
penalties under the framework of the common transport policy (Ship Source Pollution 
case)
66
. These cases shall now be discussed in turn. 
 
1. Airport Transit Visa 
The Airport Transit Visa case
67
 was the first case in which the Court had to review the 
compatibility of a measure adopted under Title VI of the (Maastricht) TEU (justice and 
home affairs) with the provisions under the EEC Treaty. The contested measure in this 
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case was a Joint Action
68
 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 
(Maastricht) TEU which had as its main objective the regulation of entry for third-
country nationals into the European Union by establishing a system of airport transit 
visa.
69
 The Commission had argued that the contested measure encroached upon the 
powers of the European Community in so far as Article 100c (1) EEC provided the 
Community with the necessary competence to harmonise this area of law, therefore 
rendering such action taken by the Council void.
70
 Ex Article 100c (1) EEC stated that a 
visa system was to be established for third-country nationals who were “crossing the 
external borders of the Member States.” The Commission interpreted this requirement 
as constituting a physical or geographical entry into the Member State’s territory thus 
being fulfilled by third-county nationals who have landed on an airport within the EU.
71
 
The Council, however, justified its chosen legal basis on the grounds that such crossing 
of external borders had to be interpreted in a legal sense which would not be fulfilled by 
the mere landing on an airport and transit through its international zones: In order to 
legally enter the European Union, a third-country national had to cross the border 
control point since only after this legal entry one could benefit from the advantages of 
the internal market, which the implementation of the airport transit visa system aimed to 
protect.
 72
 
The Court,
73
 following the Council’s reasoning, held that ex Article 100c EEC had to be 
interpreted to serve as a legal basis for a measure concerning the legal entry into one of 
the Member States and thus the free movement within the EU.
74
 However, the Court 
distinguished the concept of airport transit visa, stating that it did not involve the legal 
element of crossing the EU’s external borders and therefore did not fall within the scope 
of ex Article 100c EEC: 
The airport transit visa is concerned with the situation of a passenger arriving on a flight 
from a third country and remaining in the airport of the Member State in which the 
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aircraft landed in order to take off in the same or another aircraft bound for another third 
country. The requirement of such a visa [...] therefore presupposes that the holder will 
remain in the international area of that airport and will not be authorised to move within 
the territory of that Member State.
75
 
Thus the Joint Action did not encroach upon the competences of the European 
Community and was validly adopted on the basis of Article K.3 (Maastricht) TEU. As 
can be observed from the general tenor of the judgement, the Court merely relied on the 
literal phrasing of Article 100c (1) EEC in its interpretation and held that there was thus 
no Community power. If, however, this provision had provided enough competence for 
the Community to regulate airport transit visas, the Joint Action would have been held 
to infringe Article M (Maastricht) TEU on the grounds that it encroached upon the 
powers of the Community and thus would have been void.
76
 
 
2. Environmental Crime 
The second case, which was on environmental penalties,
77
 also concerned a measure 
adopted on the basis of Title VI (Amsterdam) TEU and its therewith alleged 
encroachment upon Community powers through the infringement of Article 47 
(Amsterdam) TEU. The Council had based its Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA
78
 on 
Articles 29, 31(e) and 34(2)(b) (Amsterdam) TEU while the Commission maintained 
that such a measure should have been adopted on the legal basis of Article 175(1) EC. 
The Commission, while admitting that there was no Community competence as regards 
criminal law, had argued that the purpose and content of the contested measure was to 
be considered to fall within the scope of environmental policy and thus in the sphere of 
the application of the EC Treaty.
79
 Supported by the European Parliament, it had mainly 
based its reasoning on the increased effectiveness which could be achieved if the 
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Community was competent to take the necessary action,
80
 thus implying the existence 
of a Community competence to harmonise in the field of criminal law.
81
 The 
Commission had further observed that the provisions of the contested measure falling 
under criminal law as opposed to those which have environmental objectives were 
inseparably linked with each other and therefore the Commission pleaded to have the 
entire framework decision annulled.
82
 
The Council, in support of the Member States, primarily relied on the criminal law 
objective of the decision, justified its adoption under those provisions which provided 
for the sole competence to reside with the Council. It further stated that the 
environmental law component of the framework decision was merely to supplement 
Community law in that area.
83
 Only the Netherlands had argued that Community action 
should be accepted if the two components were inseparably linked with each other and 
such action proved to be necessary for the effective implementation of such a measure. 
If, however, it was shown that the two different components in the contested measure 
could be separated, the sole competence for a criminal law measure should remain with 
the Member States.
84
 
Without precedent, the ECJ was thus required to deliver a judgement on the relationship 
between EU criminal law and EC environmental law and to ascertain whether the 
Council, by adopting the contested measure under Title VI (Amsterdam) TEU, had 
encroached upon Community powers. The Court began by recalling the importance of 
the protection of the environment under Community law.
85
 Moreover, it observed that, 
according to its title and the first three recitals, the contested measure clearly aimed for 
the protection of the environment.
86
 It then looked at the criminal law component of the 
contested measure and found that as such no Community competence could be 
established, however: 
[This] does not prevent the Community legislature, when the application of effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national authorities is 
an essential measure for combating serious environmental offences, from taking 
                                                          
80
 This was criticised as a “naive belief” by Faure, M. (2004). "European Environmental Criminal Law: Do 
we really need it?" European Environmental Law Review 13: 18-29, at page 21. 
81
 Case C-176/03, supra note 65, at para 25. 
82
 Ibid, at para 23. 
83
 Ibid, at paras 26-35. 
84
 Ibid, at paras 36 and 37. 
85
 Ibid, at paras 41-43. 
86
 Ibid, at para 46. 
149 
 
measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member States which it considers 
necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it lays down on environmental 
protection are fully effective.
87
 
It thus followed the Commission’s reasoning on effectiveness88 and considered the 
environmental objective to constitute the main purpose of the contested decision which 
therefore could have been adopted on the legal basis of Article 175 EC. It further held 
that 
[t]hat finding is not called into question by the fact that Articles 135 EC and 280(4) EC 
reserve to the Member States, in the spheres of customs cooperation and the protection 
of the Community’s financial interests respectively, the application of national criminal 
law and the administration of justice. It is not possible to infer from those provisions 
that, for the purposes of the implementation of environmental policy, any harmonisation 
of criminal law, even as limited as that resulting from the framework decision, must be 
ruled out even where it is necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness of Community 
law.
89
 
Thus, the Court concluded that the Council by adopting the contested framework 
decision had infringed Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU since it encroached upon the 
competences conferred on the European Community under Article 175 EC and, as a 
result, the measure had to be annulled in its entirety. It was argued that this judgement 
left unclear the question as to its extent: There was no indication whether the judgement 
had to be understood in a general criminal law sphere thus conferring upon the 
Community a general competence in this area, or whether it had implications only and 
insofar as environmental objectives were at stake.
90
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3. Ship Source Pollution 
The most recent case concerning the interrelation between the third and the first pillar is 
the Ship Source Pollution case.
91
 At issue in this case was Council Framework Decision 
2005/667/JHA
92
 which had been adopted on the basis of Articles 31(1)(e) and 34(2)(b) 
(Amsterdam) TEU. The Commission had brought an action against this measure on the 
grounds of an invalid choice of legal basis, the application of which infringed Article 47 
(Amsterdam) TEU, thus encroaching upon the powers conferred on the Community. 
The Commission had argued that the main purpose of the contested measure was aimed 
at the improvement of maritime safety and the protection of the environment and could 
have therefore been validly adopted on the basis of Article 80(2) EC, as was Directive 
2005/35/EC
93
 which was intended to be supplemented by the contested framework 
decision.
94
 As regards the criminal law component, the Commission relied on the 
preceding judgement in the Environmental Crime case,
95
 claiming that the Community 
had an ‘ancillary criminal law competence’96 which it could exercise if such action 
proved to be more effectively taken under Community law. 
This reasoning had been supported by the European Parliament which had also 
observed that the contested framework decisions in the two cases coincided as regards 
their aim and content and differed only in the defined type and level of the declared 
criminal penalties.
97
 However, the Council had pointed out that both cases differed 
essentially since the area of transport policy did not constitute an objective as 
fundamental as the environmental objective at issue in the Environmental Crime case. 
As regards Directive 2005/35/EC, the Council had submitted that since the Commission 
had opted not to include certain provisions, it was left to the Member States to take 
action in order to supplement that Directive.
98
 It had also argued that if the Community 
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was granted to take action in the field of criminal law, this would undermine the 
provisions under Title VI (Amsterdam) TEU.
99
 
The Court, however, did not accept the reasoning of the Council. Instead, it followed its 
previous judgement in the Environmental Crime case. It began by stressing the 
significance of the area of transport policy, likewise those provisions on environmental 
protection.
100
 The ECJ further observed a balance between the objective of transport 
policy and the criminal-law component in the contested measure,
101
 similar to the 
balance in its previous case between the latter and the protection of the environment. It 
recalled from its previous judgement that notwithstanding the fact that there was no 
general Community competence in the field of criminal law, such action could not be 
excluded if the circumstances required an effective implementation of such a measure 
which could only be achieved at Community level.
102
 
For the first time, the Court thus acknowledged the possibility that certain provisions on 
the type and level of criminal penalties could not be considered to fall within the 
Community competence. Those provisions were inextricably linked with the other 
provisions of the contested measure which the Court found to be in breach of Article 47 
(Amsterdam) TEU since they could have been validly adopted on the basis of Article 
80(2) EC.
103
 The Court concluded that the Council, by adopting the contested measure, 
had encroached upon the competences of the Community and therefore the framework 
decision had to be annulled in its entirety.
104
 By also linking this judgement with an 
environmental objective which had to be dealt with under the first pillar, the Court still 
left uncertain whether or not the Community would have the competence to regulate in 
the field of criminal law if such a link did not exist.
105
 
 
4. Evaluation 
These cases illustrate the increasing encroachment of the ‘acquis communautaire’ onto 
the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the pre-Lisbon period. 
The Community succeeded in extending its powers which left Member States with a 
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weakened tool to adopt measures under the third pillar.
106
 It holds indeed true that the 
Community was equipped with more effective means, i.e. measures having direct effect, 
which were guaranteed in the EC Treaty, which was not the case with the Treaty on 
European Union.
107
 However, by defending the ‘acquis communautaire’ and by arguing 
that any action taken by the Member States would have the effect of encroaching upon 
EC powers, the Community was, as could be claimed, in fact substantially encroaching 
upon the powers conferred upon the Union under the third pillar.
108
 Further, although 
the Court’s reasoning might sound justified when it held that action taken under the 
Community was more effective, this effectiveness could not be declared to be a legal 
basis principle concerning cross-pillar measures.
109
 Neither did it provide any clear 
answer on the actual delimitation of the pillars. Instead, the Community was able to 
extend its powers with the help of such vague terms like ‘effectiveness’ attributed to EU 
policies,
110
 such as transport and environment protection, to the detriment of legal 
certainty in these areas.
111
 
 
III. Visas, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil 
matters (Amsterdam) 
With the introduction of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the area of Justice and Home 
Affairs was split into two parts: The area of Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
which constituted the sole remainder of the third pillar,
112
 and the area of visas, asylum, 
immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters which was integrated into the first 
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pillar under the new Title IV of Part Three EC.
113
 This latter integration into the realm 
of supranational law from the previous intergovernmental sphere of the former third 
pillar will have to be analysed as to how the structure of legal bases has changed and 
whether or not certain intergovernmental features were preserved under this enclave. If 
this can be answered in the affirmative, then there was a potential for legal basis 
litigation with the otherwise supranational law under the EC Treaty. It will be 
interesting to analyse such legal basis cases as regards the courts’ acknowledgement of 
the area’s partly distinctive character and the choice of principles applied. The existence 
of such legal basis litigation would additionally be a significant signpost for the 
integration of the remainder of the former third pillar after the introduction of the Treaty 
of Lisbon. 
 
A. The Structure of Legal Bases under Title IV of Part Three EC 
With the integration of the area of visas, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation 
in civil matters under the new Title IV of Part Three EC, it appeared as if this field had 
undergone a complete ‘communitarisation’ with the same rules and principles 
applicable to it as for other EC provisions. However, a closer look at the provisions 
under this title reveals that some of its previously intergovernmental character was 
partly preserved. Most importantly, this concerns ex Article 68 EC which provided for 
several exceptions as regards the otherwise full scrutiny by the European Court of 
Justice.
114
 The aim of this section will therefore be to analyse and discuss the preserved 
special status of Title IV of Part Three EC within the first pillar. In particular, this will 
include the voting requirements as well as the institutional balance, since the nature of 
the competence as well as the set of legal instruments seem to have been adjusted to the 
acquis communautaire. Therefore, the main focus of this section will be on the 
distinctive legislative procedures available under Title IV of Part Three EC. 
In general, according to ex Article 67 EC, a transitional period of five years applied to 
all provisions under Title IV of Part Three EC. During this time unanimity voting, the 
consultation procedure, and a shared right of initiative between the Commission and the 
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Member States was accepted. After the transitional period, however, most of the 
provisions under Title IV of Part Three had to adjust to the legislative procedures set out 
in ex Article 251 EC (now Article 294 TFEU) that required qualified majority voting, 
the co-decision procedure, and a monopoly of initiatives by the Commission.
115
 Yet, 
this did not cover the entire area under Title IV of Part Three EC. Most prominently, 
matters on legal migration
116
 and family law
117
 were exempted from this rule, thus 
preserving the intergovernmental features of unanimity voting and consultation 
procedure until the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon.
118
 
Another peculiarity was ex Article 64(1) EC which provided that “with regard to the 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security” Member States’ 
responsibilities shall not be affected by the provisions of Title IV of Part Three EC. 
Further, paragraph two of this article provided for emergency measures to be 
implemented for a maximum of six months in order to a “sudden inflow of nationals of 
third countries”. In addition, according to ex Article 69 EC, the United Kingdom, 
Ireland,
119
 and Denmark
120
 were granted a special status as regards Title IV of Part 
Three EC, i.e. a general opt-out from measures adopted under these provisions. In 
general, opt-outs can be described as intergovernmental features as they allow certain 
flexibility and self-determination for Member States as opposed to the otherwise 
harmonised supranational areas. Thus, Member States would always favour legal bases 
allowing them to maintain their own rules by opting-out from EU law. This therefore 
constitutes a potential for legal basis litigation. 
Concerning these opt-outs on matters on visas and immigration, two judgements were 
delivered on 18 December 2007.
121
 In these cases, the UK challenged Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004
122
 and Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004
123
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respectively. Both measures were subject to the Schengen Protocol
124
 and had been 
based on Article 77(2)(a) TFEU; Regulation No 2007/2004 had additionally been based 
on Article 74 TFEU. The Council took the opinion that the UK would thus be excluded 
from adoption of these measures. However, the UK inter alia argued that the contested 
measures were only “Schengen-related” and therefore could not exclude the UK’s 
participation per se.
125
 
In its two judgements, the Court found that the Council’s decision to classify the 
contested regulations as “developing the provisions of the Schengen acquis” was 
comparable to the choice of legal basis since this classification “had a direct effect on 
the determination of the provisions governing the procedure for the adoption of that 
regulation”.126 The Court thus recalled the general criteria of legal basis litigation of the 
consideration of objective factors, in particular the aim and content of a measure.
127
 
According to these factors, the Court held that 
checks on persons at the external borders of the Member States and consequently the 
effective implementation of the common rules on standards and procedures for those 
checks must be regarded as constituting elements of the Schengen acquis.
128
 
The contested regulations were thus correctly classified under the Schengen Protocol 
which could exclude the UK from participation in the adoption of the measures in 
question. 
As can be observed, the integrated area of visas, asylum, immigration and judicial 
cooperation in civil matters was largely ‘communitarised’ and aligned with other 
provisions under the EC Treaty, especially after the transitional period of five years 
after the introduction of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Nevertheless, a few exceptions 
preserved a partly intergovernmental character of decision-making procedures until the 
enforcement of the Treaty of Lisbon. As could be argued, the peculiarity of these 
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provisions was a vital feature of the characteristics of Title IV of Part Three and 
consequently, it has to be analysed whether the European Court of Justice was able to 
protect this area from encroachment. Therefore, the following discussion will be on 
legal basis litigation in this area and, in particular, on the delimitation of competences 
between Title IV of Part Three and the remaining provisions under the EC Treaty. 
 
B. Legal Basis Litigation between the EC and the area of visas, 
asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters 
Only few cases have dealt with legal basis litigation between the EC legal bases and the 
area of visas, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters. A possible 
explanation for this lack of legal basis litigation could lie in the marginal overlap 
between the two areas. One of these rare cases is the Metock case.
129
 Here, a reference 
was made for a preliminary ruling from the Irish High Court to review Directive 
2004/38/EC
130
 which had been adopted on the basis of the provisions of free movement 
within the Union, Articles 18, 21, 46, 50 and 59 TFEU. Essentially, the Court was asked 
whether this directive was in conflict with national regulations imposing upon a non-EU 
national spouse of a Union citizen the requirement to having been “lawfully resident in 
another Member State prior to coming to the host Member State in order to (...) benefit 
from the provisions of [the] Directive”.131 The Irish Minister of Justice had argued that 
it would fall within the competence of each Member State, according to Title IV of Part 
Three EC, to regulate the admission of non-EU nationals within the respective EU 
territory; only the movement of EU citizens within EU territory could also fall within 
the competence of the Union to decide.
132
 This was challenged by the applicants who 
relied upon the contested directive. 
In its judgement, the Court held that the applicants could indeed rely on the provisions 
provided for in the directive in question and that Member States could not impose 
contradictory legislation even if the latter would concern the initial entry of a non-EU 
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national into the territory of the Union.
133
 Rejecting such entry of a non-EU national 
spouse could act as a deterrent from the exercise of the free movement rights within the 
EU.
134
 Consequently, the Court found that the Union had the necessary competence 
to regulate, as it did by Directive 2004/38, the entry and residence of nationals of non-
member countries who are family members of a Union citizen in the Member State in 
which that citizen has exercised his right of freedom of movement, including where the 
family members were not already lawfully resident in another Member State.
135
 
Further, as regards the competence of Member States under Title IV of Part Three EC to 
regulate immigration, the Court found this to be conflicting with the general objective 
of a removal of obstacles to the free movement within the internal market.
136
 The Court 
observed that 
to allow the Member States exclusive competence to grant or refuse entry into and 
residence in their territory to nationals of non-member countries who are family 
members of Union citizens and have not already resided lawfully in another Member 
State would have the effect that the freedom of movement of Union citizens in a 
Member State whose nationality they do not possess would vary from one Member 
State to another (...) with some Member States permitting entry and residence of family 
members of a Union citizen and other Member States refusing them.
137
 
Therefore, the Court found that the contested directive had rightfully been adopted and 
precluded any conflicting national immigration laws. As has been argued by Currie, this 
judgement and the Court’s interpretation of the directive had a broadening effect on EU 
competences in the field of free movement.
138
 Similarly, Costello has criticised the 
Court’s ruling as conventional, economically motivated, and as having left several 
questions unanswered, in particular those relating to atypical family members.
139
 
Another interesting case, Parliament v Council,
140
 involved secondary legal bases in the 
area of asylum policies. Here, the Court was requested to review the legality of Council 
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Directive 2005/85/EC,
141
 which was adopted on the basis of ex Article 63(1)(d) EC. 
This provision was subject to ex Article 67(5) first indent EC, which required qualified 
majority voting as well as the co-decision procedure according to Article 294 TFEU. 
However, the Council did not follow this procedure. Instead, it established secondary 
legal bases within the contested directive,
142
 thus derogating from this procedure and 
applying unanimity voting as well as a mere consultation of the Parliament. The 
Council justified this approach with the help of ex Article 202 EC, which allowed in its 
third indent for such implementing powers to be attributed to the Council. The 
Parliament objected to this approach, arguing that all requirements of ex Article 67(5) 
EC had been fulfilled and that the Council therefore could not apply ex Article 202 EC. 
The Council, however, highlighted the politically sensitive nature of the issue which 
would thus justify such an approach, including a “less cumbersome” legislative 
procedure.
143
 
In its judgement, the Court recalled the principle of institutional balance which is 
clearly defined in the treaties and therefore cannot be undermined by the institutions 
themselves: 
To acknowledge that an institution can establish secondary legal bases, whether for the 
purpose of strengthening or easing the detailed rules for the adoption of an act, is 
tantamount to according that institution a legislative power which exceeds that provided 
for by the Treaty.
144
 
The Court further observed that the two legislative procedures provided for in ex Article 
67 EC and the secondary legal bases in the contested directive respectively differed and 
were thus incompatible with each other.
145
 On any account, ex Article 202 EC required 
the conformity with other provisions of the Treaty. The Court held that this was not the 
case here, since the Council’s practice clearly violated the requirements set out in ex 
Article 67 EC.
146
 In addition, the application of ex Article 202 EC and thus a less 
stringent legislative procedure could not be justified merely by the political sensitivity 
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of the issues in question.
147
 Consequently, the provisions of the contested directive had 
to be annulled. 
This case is evidence of the ‘supranationalisation’ of the integrated Title IV of Part 
Three EC and of the loss of intergovernmental features within this area. The Court 
clearly ruled in favour of a maximising of democracy in the form of qualified majority 
as well as a compliance with the institutional balance, i.e. the increased involvement of 
the Parliament in the legislative process. Admittedly, the Council was rather attempting 
to bend the law in its favour in this case. However, as could be argued, the Court has 
more often been willing to accept such conduct by the Commission rather than the 
Council. Nevertheless, as has been argued, the involvement of the Parliament could be 
considered “useful counterbalance” to the decrease of Member States’ rights in the 
legislative process.
148
 
 
IV. Freedom, Security and Justice (Lisbon) 
A. The Structure of Legal Bases under Title V of Part Three 
TFEU: The ‘fully’ integrated Third Pillar after Lisbon 
With the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty and after a transitional period of five 
years,
149
 the former third pillar provisions of the European Union will be fully 
integrated into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), i.e. the 
former first pillar. This entails certain implications on the actual relationship between 
the different sets of provisions which are now being dealt with under a single 
framework. Most significantly, this includes almost full scrutiny by the courts,
150
 which 
was not possible under the previous framework.
151
 The area of freedom, security and 
justice has therefore been described as part of a “linear process”,152 which appeared to 
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have as its ultimate goal a complete ‘Europeanisation’ of any intergovernmental 
features left in this area. At first glance, it seems as if the Treaty of Lisbon has now 
achieved this goal by abolishing the pillar structure and integrating the third pillar into 
the area of supranational EU law, and as a result thereof, having solved all problems 
surrounding the uncertainty of its intergovernmental nature. However, this would be a 
rather oversimplified picture of the reality. Instead, it is argued here that Title V of Part 
Three TFEU has to a certain extent retained a rather special role within the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
The purpose of this section is thus not to provide an analysis of all the changes which 
mark the transition from the former pillar system
153
 before Lisbon into the integrated 
system of a merged first and third pillar after Lisbon. Instead, specific issues shall be 
discussed which are evidence of the special status of former third pillar provisions and 
their preservation of intergovernmental characteristics in the Reform Treaty. To this 
end, this section will first look at the nature of the competence in Title V of Part Three 
as compared to other parts of the TFEU Treaty. Second, there will be an analysis of the 
legal instruments available. Third, the differences in the legislative procedures will be 
discussed. 
 
1. The nature and scope of the competence 
While under the previous treaty framework third pillar competences have mainly been 
reserved for the Member States, the integrated third pillar after Lisbon has lost its 
intergovernmental character. The Lisbon Treaty attributes shared competences between 
the Union and the Member States not only to former first pillar matters but also extends 
them to the new Title V of Part Three TFEU.
154
 This means that while the third pillar 
has previously been protected from supremacy, direct effect
155
 and pre-emption, this has 
changed under the Lisbon Treaty. Shared competences between the Union and the 
Member States imply that Union law under Title V of Part Three TFEU is capable to 
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interfere with national laws in this area and may even repress Member States’ 
competences under certain circumstances.
156
 
With the thus accumulated competences under the TFEU the Union is now able to 
exercise a broader range of powers specifically conferred on it. As a result, Article 352 
TFEU (ex Article 308 EC) can be applied to serve as a residual provision if the 
provisions under the area of freedom, security and justice do not provide the necessary 
powers.
157
 Such a practice has previously been held to go beyond the scope of Article 
308 EC since this provision was considered to be applicable to EC powers only which 
did not include third pillar competences.
158
 However, with the integration of the third 
pillar such a restriction as to the scope of Article 352 TFEU concerning the application 
to former third pillar matters has ceased to exist. It could thus be argued that this 
development represents a threat which could ultimately jeopardise provisions under 
Title V of Part Three TFEU. 
However, despite the explicit statement in Article 4(2)(j) TFEU that the competence to 
regulate in the area of freedom, security and justice shall be shared between the Union 
and the Member States, some provisions under Title V of Part Three TFEU indicate that 
there may be a derogation from this general rule. For example, this is the case in Article 
82(2) TFEU which provides for ‘minimum rules’ to be established, explicitly entitling 
Member States to adopting or maintaining more stringent measures. Similarly, Article 
83 TFEU also refers to ‘minimum rules’ and although there is no explicit statement as 
to whether Member States are allowed to adopt stricter rules, such a meaning could well 
be implied. Under the old legislative framework this was a clear indicator for the 
existence of complementary competences. However, under the Lisbon Treaty 
‘complementary’ competences are being confined to a ‘supporting’ nature159 and any 
minimum harmonisation rules thus have to be considered to characterise shared 
competences.
160
 This classification of competences under the new treaty framework has 
been criticised on the grounds that it leads to an increased number of so-called 
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“competence cocktails”, i.e. different types of competences within one policy area,161 
which may have rather dramatic consequences for legal basis litigation.
162
 
 
2. Legal Instruments 
This differentiation between first pillar and third pillar instruments has been abolished 
with the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon. The entire set of third pillar instruments 
has disappeared and has been replaced with the instruments already available under the 
first pillar before Lisbon. Any instrument adopted under the new Title V of Part Three 
TFEU now has to be in accordance with Article 288 TFEU which is similar to the 
former Article 249 EC. As regards the nature of the instruments available, the Lisbon 
Treaty distinguishes between legislative acts (Article 289 TFEU), delegated acts 
(Article 290 TFEU), and implementing acts (Article 291 TFEU).
163
 
 
3. Legislative Procedures 
With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon the so-called ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’ has been introduced according to which legislative regulations, directives, 
and decisions shall be implemented (Article 289(1) TFEU). The co-decision procedure 
now constitutes the rule, while consultation shall be sufficient only in specific 
circumstances (so-called ‘special legislative procedure’, Article 289(2) TFEU). Under 
the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ the Commission retains its monopoly for proposals 
(Article 294(2) TFEU) which is further supported by Article 293(1) TFEU providing 
that such proposals can only be amended by unanimous Council decisions save those 
exceptions listed in the provision. Qualified majority voting is being applied regularly 
(Article 294 TFEU). 
With the integration of the third pillar into the TFEU under Title V, it could generally 
be assumed that the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ applies equally to the provisions 
under this Title. However, it can be observed that certain exceptions are incorporated 
into the provisions under Title V of Part Three which allow for derogation from the 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’. According to Article 76 TFEU any measure concerning 
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judicial cooperation in criminal matters as laid down in Chapter 4, concerning police 
cooperation as specified in Chapter 5 as well as the administrative cooperation after 
Article 74 TFEU may not only be adopted on a proposal from the Commission (Article 
76(a) TFEU) but also on the initiative of a quarter of the Member States (Article 76(b) 
TFEU). Thus, the Member States have managed to retain a certain degree of their right 
of initiative as regards these former third pillar measures without leaving it entirely up 
to the Commission to make proposals. It can further be observed that the ‘ordinary 
legislative procedure’ is far away from constituting the regular procedure for provisions 
under Title V of Part Three TFEU. Instead, the ‘special legislative procedure’, as way of 
derogating from the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, can be applied accordingly.164 
Under this ‘special legislative procedure’ the Council shall act unanimously, while it is 
usually sufficient to merely consult the Parliament. It has been claimed by Hofmann 
that with the introduction of the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ far less legal basis 
problems will occur.
165
 This reasoning may only partly be supported here. While it 
could be true that the introduction of the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ can bring 
about a greater unity for the legislative procedure amongst former first pillar provisions, 
this does not apply to the integrated third pillar provisions. Instead, Title V of Part 
Three TFEU could still be considered as distinctive in comparison to the other 
provisions under the TFEU. Therefore, legal basis problems are still likely to occur. 
Despite the European Parliament’s increased influence in the legislative procedure after 
Lisbon as regards the integrated third pillar, national parliaments retain certain 
responsibilities. In particular, national parliaments are responsible to ensure that 
proposed measures under Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V of Part Three TFEU comply with 
the principle of subsidiarity (Article 69 TFEU). Another peculiarity of the provisions 
under Title V of Part Three is the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Although 
the former Article 35 (Amsterdam) TEU has been abolished, the new Article 276 TFEU 
still provides for an exceptional treatment of Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V of Part Three 
as regards operations carried out by the police or other law-enforcement services of a 
Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States 
which can escape from scrutiny by the Court of Justice.
166
 It has been pointed out by 
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Ladenburger, these provisions can be seen as a balance between the need to abolish the 
“institutional weaknesses of the [former] Third Pillar” and the desire to maintain “some 
particularities of an area traditionally perceived as close to the concept of sovereignty of 
the national state.”167 
A further specificity of the provisions under Title V of Part Three TFEU is the 
availability of emergency brakes
168
 and opt-outs which do not exist in most of the other 
TFEU provisions. Articles under Title V of Part Three which allow for an emergency 
brake include Articles 82(3) and 83(3) TFEU enabling the Member States to suspend 
the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ on the grounds that the proposed measure affects the 
criminal justice system fundamentally.
169
 Opt-outs are possible under Articles 86(1) and 
87(3) TFEU which permit a certain amount of Member States being in favour of a 
proposed measure to go ahead with its adoption, while others do not. This facilitates 
differential integration
170
 in the area of freedom, security and justice. Thus, it can be 
argued that it is in the interest of Member States to adopt measures on the basis of those 
Title-V provisions which leave it up to them to choose whether to participate or not. In 
particular, those Member States which would otherwise be outvoted in the Council, like 
for example Great Britain,
171
 can benefit from such provisions which provide for opt-
outs and could oppose the application of other provisions under the TFEU.
172
 These 
exceptions are further evidence of the special character of Title V of Part Three within 
the TFEU. The allegedly integrated third pillar has thus maintained a certain degree of 
distinction in legislative procedures in order to protect the integrity of the Member 
States in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
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B. Legal Basis Litigation between the TFEU and the area of 
freedom, security and justice 
1. Preliminary Observations 
a) Thesis One: Application of General Criteria of Legal Basis 
Litigation 
With the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the pillar structure has been 
abolished and the competences under the former third pillar have been brought within 
the ambit of supranational EU law. The same criteria which have been established under 
the former first pillar in legal basis litigation could now apply to the provisions in the 
area of freedom, security and justice. This would even allow for the adoption of a dual 
legal basis for a measure which pursues a twofold objective since the new Article 40 
TEU is not explicitly applicable to the area of the integrated third pillar. Thus, it could 
be argued that by abolishing the pillar structure, the Treaty of Lisbon has also abolished 
the former difficulties which have occurred in the course of the extension of former 
Community powers and with it: the legal uncertainty as regards legal basis litigation in 
cross-pillar matters. However, it could equally be argued that due to the specific status 
of Title V of Part Three TFEU, and its differences to other provisions under the TFEU 
as has been discussed above,
173
 this area also needs special protection mechanisms in 
order to ensure its integrity and proper application of the provisions therein. As has been 
pointed out by Peers, this is not to return to an entirely intergovernmental character of 
the area of freedom, security and justice as was the case before Lisbon.
174
 Instead, this is 
meant as a modest attempt to divert from the rather absolute picture showing the 
flawlessly integrated third pillar, which certainly is not the case. 
This shall be illustrated with a hypothetical example in legal basis litigation: Assuming 
that a third of the Member States proposes the adoption of a regulation establishing a 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office from Eurojust in order to combat crimes affecting 
the financial interests of the Union according to Article 86 TFEU. The Parliament, 
however, refuses to give its consent to the Council to adopt the measure under Article 
86 TFEU, arguing that such a measure should rather be adopted on Article 325 TFEU
175
 
in accordance with the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ after consulting the Court of 
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Auditors (Article 325(4) TFEU). In this hypothetical legal basis conflict the general 
criteria as discussed under the first pillar will have to be applied as a result of the 
integration of the third pillar provisions under Lisbon. Most likely, the Court will apply 
the ‘centre of gravity’ theory. By emphasising the importance of Article 325 TFEU as a 
legal basis for the proposed measure the centre of gravity can easily be found in favour 
of the more general TFEU provision to the detriment of the competence under Title V 
of Part Three, thus deterring Member States from their possibility of enhanced 
cooperation. Under these circumstances, it could be argued that the application of 
general criteria of legal basis litigation on the provisions of the integrated third pillar 
could potentially have the effect of undermining certain provisions under Title V of Part 
Three due to their specific character.  
The only protection may flow from the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle 
which, however, could be considered as inferior to the more successfully applied ‘centre 
of gravity’ theory.176 In addition, it could be argued that a provision can only be 
considered as lex specialis if it is compared to a more general legal basis, such as 
Article 114 TFEU or Article 352 TFEU. As a result, the lex specialis derogat legi 
generali principle cannot protect a provision under Title V of Part Three from other 
provisions under the TFEU than those just mentioned. Considering the eagerness of the 
European Commission to introduce new harmonising measures in the field of freedom, 
security and justice, it can be anticipated that the principle will soon be tested before the 
courts. Another possible derogation from the application of Article 114 TFEU may flow 
from the fact that provisions under the area of freedom, security and justice now already 
provide an option for harmonisation themselves.
177
 This may thus reduce the application 
of Article 114 TFEU to the area of freedom, security and justice,
178
 and therefore also 
the need to recall the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle. This, however, stands 
in contrast to the intergovernmental feature of mutual recognition between Member 
States in criminal matters which has been preserved in the integrated third pillar.
179
 The 
Lisbon Treaty is thus trying to strike a balance between cooperation mechanisms and 
harmonisation of the area of freedom, security and justice and to incorporate both in the 
TFEU. 
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As has already been pointed out by White, this may prove to be rather problematic.
180
 
Cooperation between Member States acknowledges their national identities to a greater 
extent, leaves them with a high discretion of choice, and does not prejudice their action. 
It can thus be argued that the area of freedom, security and justice “reflects a piece of 
the national legal culture and is therefore a symbol of state sovereignty.”181 
Harmonisation mechanisms on the other hand, are being imposed from the Union on the 
Member States by a superior act which is directly effective, thus national differences 
will become blurred. However, it may also be argued that mutual recognition could be 
seen as a concealed harmonisation in the long term: While one Member States takes a 
judicial decision, others will have to follow and adjust their laws, eventually leading to 
a harmonised approach in that field. The question which thus arises is whether it is an 
inevitable development that mutual recognition mechanisms will ultimately be 
substituted by harmonisation. On any account, it can be observed that mutual 
recognition in a specific area leads to a certain level of harmonisation therein: Although 
the actual terms are defined by the initiating Member State taking a leading decision, 
other Member States are obliged to recognize this decision and to comply with it. Peers 
even argued that a basic requirement for mutual recognition should be the existence of a 
minimum level of harmonisation or at least the comparability of substantive laws in 
criminal matters. According to him, the tension between the two approaches can only be 
solved by a European Public Prosecutor “who will work according to fully harmonized 
rules on procedure and substantive law.”182 
To sum up, if general criteria of legal basis litigation as they have been established 
under the former first pillar are now equally applicable to Title V of Part Three TFEU 
there is a certain risk that the application of the latter could be undermined. 
Harmonisation in the field of freedom, security and justice would then be possible. As 
has been demonstrated above, the ‘centre of gravity’ theory could be used in order to 
ensure the expansion of the ‘Community method’183 since other TFEU provisions 
would, in a majority of cases, prevail over those in Title V of Part Three TFEU. Further, 
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general provisions such as the residual competence under Article 352 TFEU could serve 
as a legal basis for a measure concerning criminal matters for which no such power is 
provided for in Title V of Part Three TFEU. A theoretically possible but rather unlikely 
application of the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle would shield provisions 
under Title V of Part Three in such cases from encroachment. However, this principle 
can be considered as weaker than other criteria such as the above mentioned ‘centre of 
gravity’ theory. Therefore, it is argued here that the application of general criteria of 
legal basis litigation for the delimitation of competences between Title V of Part Three 
TFEU and other TFEU provisions should be rejected. 
 
b) Thesis Two: Non-affection rule 
If the application of such general criteria does not bring about the required solution in 
legal basis disputes between Title-V and non-Title-V provisions of the TFEU, and if the 
area of freedom, security and justice therefore suffers from encroachment, the need will 
arise for special protection mechanisms for the integrated third pillar. This could be 
justified with the distinct character which has been identified for the provisions in Title 
V of Part Three TFEU,
184
 which, in turn, would uphold the continued validity of the 
Court’s statements in Casati185 and subsequent cases186 that certain responsibility for 
matters concerning freedom, security and justice should remain with the Member States. 
It could thus be possible that the Court establishes a new principle specifically aimed at 
Title-V provisions. This could be done in the shape of a non-affection rule similar to the 
one provided for in the new Article 40 TEU for provisions in the area of common 
foreign and security policy. The result of such a non-affection rule would be a clear 
delimitation between Title V of Part Three TFEU and other areas under the TFEU as 
well as a possible splitting of measures in borderline cases. Admittedly, the new Article 
40 TEU cannot be applied directly as it only concerns the relationship between CFSP 
and TFEU provisions. However, the Court may nevertheless establish a similar rule 
along these lines as regards the area of freedom, security and justice if it turns out that 
this would better guarantee the effectiveness and preservation of the distinctive 
character of the provisions under Title V of Part Three TFEU. 
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2. Case C-130/10 
After these theoretical considerations, the Court’s interpretation of the new provisions 
shall be analysed in the following, discussing Case C-130/10. 
 
a) The facts of the case 
The first case concerning a legal basis dispute between a Title-V and a non-Title-V 
provision of the TFEU has already been brought before the Court of Justice.
187
 Here, the 
Parliament sought to have Council Regulation (EU) No 1286/2009
188
 annulled on the 
grounds that it has been based on an incorrect legal basis. The amended measure, 
Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002,
189
 was originally based on the triple legal basis 
of Articles 60, 301 and 308 EC. The new Council Regulation has now been based on 
Article 215(2) TFEU (ex Article 301 EC) only. Article 215 TFEU reads as follows: 
1. Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on 
European Union, provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of 
economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the Council, 
acting by qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the 
necessary measures. It shall inform the European Parliament thereof. 
 
2. Where a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on 
European Union so provides, the Council may adopt restrictive measures under the 
procedure referred to in paragraph 1 against natural or legal persons and groups or 
non-State entities. 
 
3. The acts referred to in this Article shall include necessary provisions on legal 
safeguards. 
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The Parliament has intervened arguing that the correct legal basis should have rather 
been Article 75 TFEU (ex Article 60 EC) which falls under Title V of Part Three TFEU. 
This provision reads as follows: 
Where necessary to achieve the objectives set out in Article 67, as regards preventing 
and combating terrorism and related activities, the European Parliament and the 
Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, shall define a framework for administrative measures with regard to capital 
movements and payments, such as the freezing of funds, financial assets or economic 
gains belonging to, or owned or held by, natural or legal persons, groups or non-State 
entities. 
The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt measures to implement 
the framework referred to in the first paragraph. 
The acts referred to in this Article shall include necessary provisions on legal 
safeguards. 
Previously, these two provisions had the same procedural requirements involving the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority on the Commission’s proposal. This allowed for 
a joint legal basis. However, the new provisions under the TFEU have procedural 
differences which may not permit a combined legal basis and which may have led the 
Parliament to bring this action before the Court: While Article 75 TFEU involves the 
Parliament to the extent that it can define the framework for measures falling under this 
provision jointly with the Council, Article 215 TFEU only provides for an obligation to 
inform the Parliament of the decisions taken by the Council. Another peculiarity is that 
Article 215 TFEU requires a joint proposal by the Commission and the High 
Representative. Article 75 TFEU on the other hand does not envisage the latter’s 
involvement in the legislative process.
190
 
There are also significant differences between the two provisions with regard to their 
substance: Article 75 TFEU may be applied as a legal basis for “measures with regard 
to capital movements and payments, such as the freezing of funds, financial assets or 
economic gains” in order to fight terrorism and other organised crime as set out in 
Article 67 TFEU.
191
 In contrast, Article 215 TFEU concerns the adoption of restrictive 
measures “for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and 
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financial relations”.192 Action under both provisions may be directed against natural or 
legal persons, groups or non-State entities. However, the overarching aim of Article 215 
TFEU seems to target “relations with one or more third countries”,193 which is not the 
case with Article 75 TFEU.  It is explicitly stated in the proposed measure that the 
“purpose of Regulation (EC) No 881/2002” and thus also of Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1286/2009 itself “is to prevent terrorist crimes, including terrorist financing, in order 
to maintain international peace and security.”194 Further, the Council Regulation 
provides in the replaced Article 2 for the freezing of funds and not making available of 
such funds concerning all persons, groups or entities listed in the annex.
195
 
Finally, the proposed measure also has to be understood in the light of the CFSP 
objective flowing from the Council Common Position 2002/402/CFSP.
196
 Both 
Regulations have been based upon this Common Positions which allows for the Union 
to take the necessary action.
197
 Since this Common Position was based upon Article 15 
(Amsterdam) TEU, thus falling within the CFSP area, this ‘cross-pillar’ link would also 
have to be reflected in any subsequently adopted measure. 
 
b) Opinion of the Advocate General 
In his opinion delivered on 31 January 2012, the Advocate General first highlights the 
new Treaty’s contribution of supplementing “the legal arsenal enabling the European 
Union to adopt restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, groups or non-State 
entities” on the basis of Articles 75 and 215(2) TFEU respectively, which thus makes 
Article 352 TFEU superfluous.
198
 The delimitation of the two former competences was 
thus in the main focus of Advocate General’s opinion. 
In order to determine the correct legal basis, the Advocate General applied general 
criteria of legal basis litigation as they have been developed under the former first pillar. 
The Advocate General first recalled the principle of objective factors, such as the aim 
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and content of a measure.
199
 He observes that the contested regulation “establishes a 
listing procedure the purpose of which is to guarantee that the fundamental rights of the 
defence (...) are respected” and therewith has as its main aim “the fight against 
international terrorism and respect for fundamental rights”.200 The Advocate General 
further perceives that “the objective of preserving peace and strengthening international 
security, must be regarded as falling within the sphere of the CFSP”201 which would 
require Article 215(2) TFEU as a legal basis rather than Article 75 TFEU.
202
 
Analysing the exact relationship between the two legal bases in question, the Advocate 
General rejects the application of a lex specialis derogat legi generali principle. Instead, 
he considers the relationship to be of a complementary nature, however, at the same 
time points out that the contested measure cannot be adopted on a dual legal basis 
comprising both, Articles 75 and 215(2) TFEU, on the grounds that the legislative 
procedures required would contradict each other.
203
 On the basis that Article 215(2) 
TFEU was required in order to provide the necessary ‘cross-pillar’ link with the area of 
common foreign and security policy, the Advocate General concludes that 
the contested regulation was correctly adopted on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU on 
account of its ‘CFSP’ dimension. That dimension lies, first, in the fact that, by 
supplementing the legislative framework for the restrictive measures adopted in respect 
of persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the 
Taliban, that regulation has as its principal objective combating international terrorism 
in order to maintain international peace and security. Second, the contested regulation 
forms part of the system set up by the European Union to take forward international 
action decided upon within the Security Council and, more specifically, to implement 
measures to freeze funds and economic resources directed against persons and entities 
designated by the Sanctions Committee.
204
 
The Advocate General thus applied the ‘centre of gravity’ theory which he argues to rest 
with Article 215(2) TFEU due to its CFSP link. 
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c) The judgement 
In its judgement, the Court first recalled general criteria of legal basis litigation, such as 
the focus on objective factors, the ‘centre of gravity’ theory, and the exceptional use of 
a dual legal basis.
205
 It observed that the procedural differences between Articles 75 and 
215(2) TFEU are of such a nature that a dual legal basis has to be rejected: 
the differences in the procedures applicable under Articles 75 TFEU and 215(2) TFEU 
mean that it is not possible for the two provisions to be cumulated, one with the other, 
in order to serve as a twofold legal basis for a measure such as the contested 
regulation.
206
 
The Court then went on to analyse the exact scope of both provisions in question as well 
as their relationship with each other. Article 75 TFEU was interpreted rather narrowly in 
that it 
simply refers to the definition, for the purpose of preventing terrorism and related 
activities and combating the same, of a framework for administrative measures with 
regard to capital movements and payments, when this is necessary to achieve the 
objectives set out in Article 67 TFEU.
207
 
According to the Court, the scope of Article 75 TFEU could thus relate to internal 
actions only,
208
 while it attributed an extended scope of reaching the external sphere 
only to Article 215 TFEU due to the latter’s link with the area of common foreign and 
security policy.
209
 It held that “the combating of terrorism and its financing may well be 
among the objectives of the area of freedom, security and justice”, and thus of Article 
75 TFEU; however, “combating international terrorism and its financing in order to 
preserve international peace and security” would fall under the Union’s external action 
and thus within the realm of Article 215 TFEU.
210
 Therefore, the latter 
may constitute the legal basis of restrictive measures, including those designed to 
combat terrorism, taken against natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities by 
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the Union when the decision to adopt those measures is part of the Union’s action in the 
sphere of the CFSP.
211
 
Scrutinising the contested regulation in greater detail, the Court observed that it was in 
line with the objectives of its preceding Regulation No 881/2002, i.e. the preservation of 
international peace and security and the combating of international terrorism.
212
 This 
was further specified in the contested regulation as to also include the respect for 
fundamental human rights.
213
 Since this required for an external Union competence, the 
Court considered Article 215(2) TFEU as a sufficient legal basis:
214
 
Article 215(2) TFEU constitutes the appropriate legal basis for measures, such as those 
at issue in the present case, directed to addressees implicated in acts of terrorism who, 
having regard to their activities globally and to the international dimension of the threat 
they pose, affect fundamentally the Union’s external activity.215 
The Court then went on to examine the Parliament’s prerogatives of the choice of legal 
basis for the contested measure. The Court reiterated that such prerogatives cannot be 
the determinant factor for the choice of legal basis per se.
216
 While it confirmed the 
Parliament’s participation in the legislative process to constitute a “fundamental 
democratic principle”,217 the Court held that 
the difference between Article 75 TFEU and Article 215 TFEU (...) is the result of the 
choice made by the framers of the Treaty of Lisbon conferring a more limited role on 
the Parliament with regard to the Union’s action under the CFSP.218 
The Court was thus convinced of the correctness of Article 215(2) TFEU as a legal 
basis for the contested measure and consequently upheld the validity of Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1286/2009. 
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d) Evaluation 
The Court’s judgement came without big surprise, as it mainly followed the Advocate 
General’s reasoning. The Court applied general criteria of legal basis litigation as they 
have been developed under the former first pillar, in particular the ‘centre of gravity’ 
theory, thus prioritising Article 215(2) TFEU. While the Court’s detailed analysis, and 
its attempt to define the scope of the two provisions in question, have to be appreciated; 
it still leaves a few questions unanswered. 
The main point of criticism concerns the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
terrorism. Both Advocate General and Court have made this distinction and classified 
Article 75 TFEU as an ‘internal’ legal basis, while Article 215(2) TFEU was considered 
an ‘external’ competence. Although the Advocate General provides a detailed list of 
examples for measures to be adopted under either provision,
219
 this distinction would 
nevertheless deprive Article 75 TFEU of much of its application in an international 
context since the objective to prevent and combat terrorism will arguably almost always 
have a CFSP dimension. Thus rejecting the external application of Article 75 TFEU 
would thus seem to undermine the provision’s very substance. As the Advocate General 
rightly observed in his opinion, “[t]errorism does not recognise borders.”220 Further, as 
has been argued by Kau, Article 75 TFEU “conveys the impression of a highly political 
provision, in that it declares a strong commitment against international terrorism.”221 
Thus, the distinction between internal and external terrorism may at best achieve 
different results as regards the correct choice of legal basis, and at worst be an 
impossible line to draw. In its judgement, the Court has attempted to minimise the 
importance of such a distinction by arguing that 
the (...) argument that it is impossible to distinguish the combating of ‘internal’ 
terrorism, on the one hand, from the combating of ‘external’ terrorism, on the other, 
does not appear capable of calling in question the choice of Article 215(2) TFEU as a 
legal basis of the contested regulation.
222
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Nevertheless, the Court mainly relies on the ‘cross-pillar’ link incorporated in Article 
215(2) TFEU referring to the CFSP area, which is not the case with Article 75 TFEU. 
However, it still remains questionable whether this can be considered as the ‘centre of 
gravity’ rather than the objective to fight terrorism. In addition, Peers argues that Article 
215 TFEU does not even apply to measures concerning terrorism.
223
 It is therefore 
questionable whether the application of the ‘centre of gravity’ theory should not rather 
lead to the conclusion that Article 75 TFEU constitutes the correct legal basis here. It 
could thus be argued that the delimitation of competences between Articles 75 and 
215(2) TFEU does not depend on their scope but rather their subject matter. As has 
already been observed further above, the two provisions in question differ as regards 
their very subject matter. In particular, Article 75 TFEU explicitly refers to the freezing 
of funds which can be said to be one of the main tools mentioned in the contested 
regulation in order to achieve the set objectives. 
Applying Article 75 TFEU, instead of Article 215(2) TFEU, as a legal basis for the 
proposed measure would further pay tribute to the specific nature of the area of 
freedom, security and justice. While it does not appear possible to apply the lex 
specialis derogat legi generali principle in the current case, the statement of the Court 
that “it would not seem possible to regard Article 75 TFEU as a more specific legal 
basis than Article 215(2) TFEU” has to be criticised.224 As could be argued, the latter 
refers to any kind of restrictive measure, not necessarily linked to terrorism. Article 75 
TFEU, however, restricts its application to administrative measures specifically linked 
to terrorism. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether a provision such as Article 215 
TFEU could be considered as a more general provision in comparison to Article 75 
TFEU since the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle may help to derogate only 
from general legal bases such as Articles 114 and 352 TFEU. Thus, the only possibility 
would be to declare the entire area of freedom, security and justice to be specific enough 
in order to trigger the application of the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle as a 
general rule to protect provisions under Title V of Part Three or to introduce a non-
affection clause similar to the one provided for in Article 40 TEU. Otherwise, if the 
judgement in the current case becomes the rule for conflicts in legal basis litigation in 
this area, this could eventually undermine the provisions under and the special character 
attributed to the area of freedom, security and justice. 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
The area of freedom, security of justice as it was established under the former third 
pillar constituted an area remote from supranational EU laws and principles and as such 
it should have been interpreted intergovernmental throughout. As has been shown, the 
structure of the legal bases under the former third pillar can be compared to the former 
second pillar where the intergovernmental character was predominant. Nevertheless, the 
former third pillar was interpreted differently before the courts: Third pillar legal 
instruments were interpreted to entail indirect effect as well as a duty of loyal 
cooperation which significantly weakened the underlying intergovernmental concept 
since such principles have to be classified as rather supranational. Other examples were 
the passerelle clause as well as the extensive interpretation of the powers of the 
European Court of Justice to judicial review which contributed further to the 
diminishing intergovernmental character of the provisions under the former third pillar. 
Thus, over time, the third pillar has lost more and more of its intergovernmental 
character due to the expanding nature of the acquis communautaire. As a result, 
supranational principles were applied in this area of law and Member States lost their 
sole responsibilities for the provisions available under the third pillar. However, despite 
this encroachment from Union competences, the third pillar still had to be considered as 
a distinct area of law with its special rules and procedures. With the introduction of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the ‘suprantionalisation’ of the area of freedom, security and justice 
has received an immense push towards the ambit of supranational EU law. However, as 
can be argued, the new treaty does not constitute the first and final stride to harmonise 
this field of law, but rather has to be considered as another cornerstone in the already 
on-going process of diminishing intergovernmental competences in the third pillar 
which may or may not continue after Lisbon. 
As has been observed, the Treaty of Lisbon has not achieved to fully integrate the 
former third pillar into the realm of supranational EU law. The picture of a 
homogeneous legal system under the TFEU cannot be supported here. Instead, the area 
of freedom, security and justice has preserved some of its former intergovernmental 
features which are evidence of its partially special character. These include the 
application of a ‘special legislative procedure’, the involvement of national parliaments, 
Member States’ rights of initiative, emergency brakes, and opt-outs; under the TFEU 
these elements are mostly found within Title V of Part Three. Therefore, by preserving a 
178 
 
certain degree of distinctiveness for the area of freedom, security and justice and thus 
providing it with a special status, the Lisbon Treaty still grants Member States a 
preferential treatment in this area. 
This Chapter has further argued that the application of general criteria of legal basis 
litigation may not be sufficient in order to ensure the effectiveness and proper 
application of provisions under Title V TFEU of Part Three. While the ‘centre of 
gravity’ theory may be politically prejudiced or even random in border-line cases, the 
lex specialis derogat legi generali principle can only be applied under certain 
circumstances. Title-V provisions are therefore endangered to suffer from encroachment 
from other non-Title-V provisions under the TFEU unless specific protection 
mechanisms are being established which can safeguard Member States’ competences in 
the area of freedom, security and justice. It has been suggested in this Chapter that a 
possible protection mechanism may be established in the shape of a non-affection rule, 
similar to the one provided in the new Article 40 TEU, which could be specifically 
targeted at Title V of Part Three TFEU. This would lead to a better delimitation of 
competences between the area of freedom, security and justice and the other areas 
provided for in the TFEU. Further, this practice could result in a splitting of measures in 
cases where no single legal basis can be agreed upon. Overall, the Court’s judgement in 
Case C-130/10 has not brought about the necessary clarity for matters concerning the 
field of freedom, security and justice. It is hoped that future cases will divert from the 
rather narrow interpretation of Title-V provisions which could otherwise undermine 
their application. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis has contributed to the academic discussion surrounding the structure of legal 
bases and legal basis litigation in the European Union. It has provided a comprehensive 
analysis of previously established general criteria of legal basis litigation under the 
former first pillar and has extended this discussion to intergovernmental and inter-pillar 
matters. In addition, the new provisions under the Treaty of Lisbon have been 
scrutinised according to their impact on legal basis litigation, i.e. what the differences 
will be as regards previous areas of conflict, whether there will be new problems 
emerging, and which criteria can be used by the courts in order to provide guidance for 
legal basis cases in the future. The overall purpose of this research has been to better 
understand and possibly predict judicial outcomes of legal basis litigation as well as to 
identify existing flaws in previous and current legislative frameworks. 
 
I. Summary of Chapters 
The first Chapter has provided an intense discussion on the structure of legal bases and 
legal basis litigation under supranational EU law, i.e. the former first pillar. It has 
identified the differences between legal bases which lead to legal basis litigation before 
the European courts. First, the nature of the competence can be of various forms, i.e. 
exclusive, concurrent, shared, complementary, coordinating, parallel, or joint between 
the EU and the Member States. Second, different legal instruments entail different legal 
effects, i.e. directly effective, indirectly effective, or without direct effect. Third, 
legislative procedures can have an influence on the institutional balance and the voting 
requirements – qualified majority or unanimity – in the Council. These differences 
between the legal bases lead to divergent outcomes in the choice of legal basis by the 
EU as compared to the Member States or between the various EU institutions. Thus, 
legal basis litigation has occurred and the European courts had to solve situations of 
ambiguous or insufficient delimitation provided for within the treaties. 
The first Chapter has also analysed the general criteria which have been developed by 
the courts to provide guidance in legal basis conflicts, most prominently the ‘centre of 
180 
 
gravity’ theory and the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle. While these criteria 
of legal basis litigation were aimed at increasing legal certainty in such cases, the courts 
have failed to apply these principles in a consistent manner: Over time, the courts have 
created exceptions as well as conflicting criteria which would undermine previous ones. 
In particular, this was illustrated with the courts’ zig-zag course between the single-
legal-basis and the dual-legal-basis approach, but also the ‘centre of gravity’ theory has 
not consistently followed the ‘aim-and-content approach’ and occasionally diverted to a 
‘content-only’ test. Such inconsistencies in the judgements can be attributed to 
numerous competing competences available in the treaties and to the fact that choices of 
legal basis may therefore often have an arbitrary character. 
While the Treaty of Lisbon may have remedied some areas of legal basis conflicts, it 
has at the same time created new problems which the courts will have to address sooner 
or later. In particular, this includes the codification of the types of competences which 
may cause ‘competence cocktails’ in some areas, as well as the newly introduced 
hierarchy of legal instruments. The latter may lead to inter-institutional disputes 
concerning the distinction and correct application between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. 
Thus, legal basis litigation will continue to exist under the supranational provisions of 
the TFEU, requiring a consistent application of previously established criteria and 
maybe even the establishment of new principles and criteria in order to ensure legal 
certainty in new legal basis conflicts. 
The second Chapter has discussed external relations under the supranational EU law of 
the former first pillar, and intergovernmental law under the area of common foreign and 
security policy, as well as the cross-pillar dimension of external relations. These aspects 
have been analysed with regard to the general criteria established under the internal 
sphere of the former first pillar. As has been observed, external relations under 
supranational EU law has continuously been expanded with the help of the ‘doctrine of 
implied powers’, thus extending the exclusive powers of the EU to the detriment of 
Member States’ competences. In addition, the overlapping of different competences 
even within the same policy area has created intra legal basis litigation. Another 
peculiarity of supranational external relations law is the existence of mixed agreements. 
In contrast, external relations law under the intergovernmental sphere has always 
remained distinct from supranational law. Most prominently, the area of common 
foreign and security policy preserved its remoteness from judicial scrutiny and its 
specific decision-making procedures. 
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The second Chapter has also examined the delimitation between supranational and 
intergovernmental competences previously provided for in the old Article 47 
(Amsterdam) TEU. This provision has allowed for a constant encroachment upon 
Member States’ powers. After Lisbon, the intergovernmental policy areas have been 
strengthened with the changes introduced by the new Article 40 TEU. Nevertheless, the 
new provision does not bring an end to cross-pillar legal basis litigation in external 
relations. Instead, it raises new questions as regards the possibility of applying general 
criteria of legal basis litigation, such as the ‘centre of gravity’ theory, in inter-pillar 
matters. As has been suggested, however, the best solution would be a splitting of such 
measures which have supranational as well as intergovernmental objectives, linking 
them with the introduction of cross-references. This would avoid an encroachment of 
competences and enhance legal certainty in an already politically sensitive and complex 
area of law. 
The third Chapter has examined the area of freedom, security and justice under the 
various forms of legislative frameworks. The former third pillar has initially been 
intergovernmental in character which is evident from a similar structure of legal bases 
as under the former second pillar. However, a different, i.e. more supranationally 
influenced, judicial interpretation has led to a diminishing of intergovernmental 
competences in this area: Prominent examples are the attribution of indirect effect for 
former third pillar instruments, the introduction of loyal cooperation, the passerelle 
clause, as well as the diversion from the courts’ otherwise lack of judicial control in 
intergovernmental matters. This subtle supranationalisation under the former third pillar 
significantly weakened its intergovernmental character already prior to the introduction 
of the Reform Treaty. 
Over the years, the former intergovernmental third pillar has thus suffered from an 
increased diminishing of its powers until the final integration into the realm of 
supranational EU law under the Treaty of Lisbon. Nevertheless, this does not render 
legal basis litigation in this area obsolete. Rather, the previous inter-pillar litigation has 
now become intra-pillar conflicts. Indeed, most of the previous legal basis conflicts 
remain on the grounds that Title V of Part Three has preserved a special status within 
the TFEU, such as the application of the ‘special legislative procedure’, the involvement 
of national parliaments, Member States’ rights of initiative, emergency brakes, and opt-
outs. The formal integration, of course, now facilitates the application of general criteria 
of legal basis litigation, such as the ‘centre of gravity’ theory or the lex specialis 
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derogat legi generali principle. However, as has been argued, it would also be plausible 
to introduce a protection mechanism for Title-V provisions in the form of a non-
affection rule, similar to Article 40 TEU. This would ensure a better delimitation of 
competences for the area of freedom, security and justice as well as their proper 
functioning within supranational EU law. Unfortunately, such a solution was not found 
in Case 130/10 which has therefore not brought about the expected and also necessary 
clarification in this area. 
 
II. General Findings 
Overall, this research has shown that there is a significant amount of differences in the 
structure of the legal bases which can lead to legal basis litigation before the European 
courts. Such differences may concern the nature and scope of the competences, the legal 
instruments, and the legislative or decision-making procedures. In general supranational 
law is characterised by a rather great influence by the European Union with a tendency 
to more exclusive competences rather than shared or supporting powers, with direct 
effect of the legal instruments available rather than indirect or even no effect, and with 
qualified majority voting in the Council rather than unanimity. In contrast, the 
intergovernmental areas are characterised by a greater influence by the Member States 
which are interested in ensuring their autonomy and self-determination on the European 
stage. Nevertheless, Member States also retain certain influence under the supranational 
policy areas, but even more so the European Union which has always been able to 
expand its powers into the intergovernmental sphere. Therefore, as has been shown, 
more and more legal basis litigation has occurred also under the former 
intergovernmental pillars.  
However, as has been observed, differences in the structure of legal bases not only 
occur between the pillars, but also within the same pillar, and sometimes even within 
one and the same policy area or provision. This thesis has therefore distinguished three 
types of legal basis litigation as a result of the differences in the structure of legal bases: 
Inter-pillar legal basis litigation, intra-pillar legal basis litigation, and intra legal basis 
litigation. While inter-pillar legal basis litigation has mainly occurred between the 
supranational and the intergovernmental areas of EU law, i.e. between the former first 
and the former second or third pillars, intra-pillar legal basis litigation has been more 
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extensive under supranational EU law due to the limited possibility of judicial review 
under the intergovernmental areas. One of the main protagonists is undoubtedly the UK 
with its rather protectionist behaviour, but also other countries, such as Germany, 
Ireland, and Denmark, play their parts as main interveners before the European courts. 
In general, legal basis litigation in the EU has challenged the European courts on 
various occasions due to the rather great amount of competing competences within the 
treaties. The main problem in this development has been the extension of the acquis 
communautaire which has encroached on intergovernmental competences in numerous 
cases. However, inter-institutional battles have also contributed to the great amount of 
legal basis cases. The maintenance of the institutional balance has thus been one of the 
key principles of the treaty reform processes and their interpretation by the courts. 
Nevertheless, the Parliament’s role is still lacking in influence, particularly in areas such 
as external relations where it is often restricted to a mere consultation rather than co-
decision procedure. The optimum judicial standard remains to be the ‘centre of gravity’ 
theory, despite its occasionally arbitrary character due to the lack of better alternatives. 
With the introduction of Treaty of Lisbon legal basis litigation remains an issue before 
the courts and may even be extended in some areas. The introduction of a hierarchy of 
legal instruments and the codification of the different types of competences are 
examples of future areas of conflict under supranational law. However, as has been 
argued, the Reform Treaty has achieved to bring all areas of EU law within the same 
legal framework, thus fulfilling the often proclaimed unity theory. On the one hand, this 
might bring about some facilitation for the understanding of the EU system. On the 
other hand, the courts will be left with new challenges to solve legal basis conflicts 
which may even require the development of new principles or criteria of legal basis 
litigation. In particular, this concerns the integrated third pillar which has preserved 
some intergovernmental characteristics which should receive the necessary protection 
from the European courts or otherwise its provisions could eventually be rendered 
nugatory. 
The most significant change made by the Treaty of Lisbon concerning inter-pillar legal 
basis litigation has been the newly introduced Article 40 TEU. While the old provision 
was characterised as a ‘one-way street’, the new Article now works in both ways. This 
means that there may be less encroachment of supranational upon intergovernmental 
competences. However, the delimitation of competences between TFEU and TEU 
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provisions remains difficult. The only significant difference to the pre-Lisbon era is that 
there will not be an automatic preference for the ‘acquis communautaire’. Whether or 
not this will facilitate inter-pillar legal basis litigation remains to be seen, however, such 
conflicts involving both supranational and intergovernmental policy areas will certainly 
continue to exist before the European courts. 
 
III. Recommendations 
The final question which is yet to be answered is what could be done to confine the 
problem of legal basis litigation in the European Union. First, a rather radical solution 
could be to ‘supranationalise’ all areas of EU law with the Union acquiring exclusive 
competences. Certainly, this option would encounter enormous opposition from the 
Member States even though, as could be argued, their interests are still represented by 
the Council and a subtle ‘supranationalisation’ as is currently taking place will 
eventually lead to this result nonetheless. However, such an abrupt change seems far 
away from feasible and therefore does not contribute a solution to the legal basis 
problem. 
A second option could be to introduce an entirely simplified system with clear-cut 
policy areas. While this might be difficult to achieve, it could be argued that a first step 
has already been done with the newly codified types of competences under the TFEU. 
Nevertheless, this would have to be improved in several aspects concerning competence 
overlaps. This would also have to include the abolishment of general provisions of 
harmonisation, such as Articles 114 and 352 TFEU. Admittedly, this would induce the 
Commission’s opposition and might therefore also be rather difficult to enforce. On any 
account, as regards the different types of competences, there are other minor changes 
which have been discussed above which can easily be done without greater effort in 
order to increase legal certainty and avoid unnecessary legal basis litigation in the 
future. 
A third solution could rely on the status quo which, as could be argued, includes a 
subtle ‘surpanationalisation’. This could be remedied by the courts’ interpretation which 
may either take account of existing criteria of legal basis litigation, applying them in a 
more consistent manner, or develop new principles which would better guarantee legal 
certainty in overlapping areas of competence. The courts’ impact will be crucial in 
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particular as regards the changes made by the Treaty of Lisbon and therefore can be 
decisive for future legal basis litigation. Therefore it might be possible to minimise the 
problem of legal basis litigation rather than an entire abolishment. The legal system of 
the European Union is doomed to entail ambiguities between legal bases which cannot 
be modified easily. Thus, the only option is to ensure the proper application of the 
general criteria of legal basis litigation and the avoidance of the creation of unnecessary 
conflict areas and competence overlaps for the sake of legal certainty. 
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Regulation No 565/70 of the Commission of 25 March 1970 on the operation of the 
system of transport certificates for eating apples, amending Regulation No 459/70 
(Official Journal 1970, L 69, p. 33). 
 
Regulation No 686/70 of the Commission of 15 April 1970 (Official Journal 1970, L 
84, p. 21). 
 
The Fishing Nets (North-East Atlantic) (Variation) Order 1979, SI No 744. 
 
The Herring (Irish Sea) Licensing Order 1977, SI No 1388. 
 
The Herring (Isle of Man) Licensing Order 1977, SI No 1389. 
 
The Immature Nephrops Order 1979, SI No 742. 
 
The Immature Sea Fish Order 1979, SI No 741. 
 
The Nephrops Tails (Restrictions on Landing) Order 1979, SI No 743. 
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The Sea Fish (Minimum Size) (Amendment) Order (Northern Ireland) 1979, SI No 235. 
 
WTO Agreement establishing a common institutional framework for the conduct of 
trade relations among its members in matters related to the agreements and legal 
instruments annexed to it.
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